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INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration ot Neutrality and Jay's 
treaty with Great Britain were the two 
most noteworthy acts in the chain ot bold 
conduct, whose tradition has maintained 
itselt in subsequent times. 1 
The above quotation expresses very clearly the 
importance of neutrality and the Jay Treaty, not only tor the 
precedents that each established in the early national period, 
but also tor the foundations that they established in the 
tuture relationships between England and America. The main 
structure ot this thesis will be built around these two docu-
ments, and other events will be discussed in their relationship 
to them. 
In 1?89 the United States was just beginning to 
emerge and establish herself as an independent nation. Her 
place amongst the nations of the world was in the formative 
stage. Since independence from England had been gained, it was 
necessary tor Britain to recognize the new nation. England was 
the important country in the world, and had been ~erica's 
colonial mother. By the Treaty or Paris ot 1?83, which conclude 
the Revolutionary War, many matters (although seemingly settled) 
were left in doubt. As each year passed these grievances seemed 
to become even greater. 
1 F.s. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton, An Eesay on American union, 
G.P. Putnamts sons, New York, Bk. IV, 55. 
-1-
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John Adams was despatched to England in 1785 to 
discuss the problems of commerce and the frontier, but his 
mission failed. It seemed verT clear that England did not de-
sire a commercial treaty with the United States. Adams knew 
England's policy, and thus he wrote: 
'Though I have been received here,' the 
minister observes in a letter June 26, 
'and treated with the distinction due 
to the rank and title you have given me, 
that we shall have no treaty of commerce 
until this nation is made to feel the 
necessity of it. Cui bono? they cry; to 
what end a treaty ot' commerce, when we are 
sure ot as much American trade as we have 
occasion for without it.' 2 
England did not respond by sending a representatiT 
of her govermaent to the United States. Apparently England 
did not see any importance in carrying on negotiations with 
America. Finally in 1791 George H~ond was officially ap-
pointed as a minister to America. This appointment was proba-
bly a last resort on England's part. Mr. Payne viewed the 
appointment in this manner: "Even then Hammond was not ap-
pointed until there was a threat that unless the young Republic 
was recognized., congress would pass an aet discriminating 
against English commerce.• 3 
2 T. Lyman, The Dip1oma~r of the United States, Wells and Lilly, 
Boston, 1828, I, 161. 
3 G.H. Payne, England-Her Treatment of America, Sears Publishin 
co., New York, 1§31, 24. 
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On the other hand the appointment showed very 
clearly that now the United states was ready to be recognized 
as an independent nation by a European country. Jl.though 
Hammond was not authorized to negotiate a commercial treaty, 
he could discuss it without obligating England in any way. 
H~ond was to try to settle the existing grievances. 
America's relationship with France had been es-
tablished by a Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1778. By this 
treaty France pledged her aid to .Am.erica to defeat Britain. 
In return tor this aid, America incurred several obligations 
to France. She was to guarantee protection to the French West 
Indies; was to come to France's aid it France were attacked or 
was carrying on a de:Censi ve war. France could arm and equip 
privateers, and sell prizes in American ports; and finally the 
principle ":Cree ahips-:Cree goods" was recognized. There were 
also to be reciprocal trade arrangements. It was these pro-
visions that caused much consternation on England's part during 
the troubled year or 1793. 
With the declaration ot war by France upon Englan~ 
it was necessary tor America to state officially her position. 
Would it be as an ally or one of the belligerents, or would 
it be a middle course? The president, with the advice of his 
-4-
cabinet,decided to take the middle course. This middle course, 
or neutrality, by a nation was entirely new to the law of 
nations. This principle served as a basis for future foreign 
relations. 
The events prior to and in consequence of this 
proclamation will be the major aspect of this work. Neutrality 
at the time seemed to affect America's relationship with France 
more so than with England. The relationship between England 
and America is the center of this thesis, so consequently 
France has been given a very minor role. The most general 
principles of neutrality will be discussed, since an under-
standing of these principles will be necessary in order to 
analyze the associations between the two countries. The more 
specific details and events have been discussed by many authors 
who have made neutrality in general the subject of their works. 
A commercial arrangement or another treaty which 
would settle America's grievances with England, became a ne-
' 
cessity in 1793-1794. Since England was reluctant to make any 
kind of a treaty, the United States took the initiative. 
~ohn Jay was appointed by Washington, with the consent or the 
Senate, as envoy extraordinary, to negotiate with Lord 
Grenville, a satisfactory pact for both countries. 
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After muan negotiation a treaty was finally signe 
on November 19, 1794. Although it was pleasing to England, 
Aaeriea looked upon it with scorn. It was important for its 
effect on Congress, the Executive, and the various sections ot 
the country. Many precedents were established both consti-
tutionally and diplomatically. Arbitration as a method tor 
settling disputes amicably was initiated by Jay's work. This 
principle has been handed down through the years, and its use 
has been successful in eliminating the immediate resort to 
war. According to many authors, however, this was about the 
only valuabl~ part of the treaty. 
Jay's Treaty was the first important treaty rati-
fied by the newly launched government of the United states, 
and its significance lies in the fact that it was consummated 
with England. The future relations of the two countries were 
cemented together even though there were to be innumerable 
disagreements in the future. America's r.elations emerged on 
an entirely different basis, for America negotiated with 
Britain not as mother country to colony, but on supposed terms 
of equality. 
Neutrality will be given as thorough a discussion 
as is possible. The discussion of Jay's Treaty will be rather 
--
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lengthy, but in order to present the material adequately this 
must be done. Both will be discussed in relation to the 
viewpoints of the two famous statesmen concerned with the 
policy of the country. These men are Thomas Jetterson and 
Alexander Hamilton. On each and every issue these two men were 
at swords points- one presenting the Federalist viewpoint- the 
other the Republican. On only one point were they in agre~ent, 
and that was in an overall view of the Jay Treaty; they both 
thought it an aexecrable thing on the part of an old woman.• 4 
Washington needed both men to help hUn make an unprejudiced 
decision, as Charles Thomas pointed out: 
Once again we must realize that neither 
Jefferson nor H~lton could have formulated 
a policy of true neutrality tor this troubled 
year. Yet the presence of each was necessary 
in order that the unprejudiced Washington 
could select rrom the proposals or each the 
elements ot a truly neutral policy. 5 
4 C. Bowers, Jeti"erson and Hamilton- The Struggle tor Dem.ocrac;rl 
Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 192:.>. 
5 c. Thomas, American Neutrality in 17~3, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1031, 66. 
CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE TREATY 
-7-
The FrenCh declaration ot war on England 
found the United States Gove+nment wholly 
without precedent or its own as a guide or 
conduct and with little information as to 
specific practice by European nations in 
previous wars. There were no scholarly 
digests or international law to which a 
perplexed official might turn with assurance, 
no long-standing files ot the Department ot 
state to consult, no ne~trality laws to 
declare in toree. International m,ari time 
law itselt was in a state ot tlux. 1 
NOOTKA. SOUND 
The year 1789 saw the first important question 
racing America's new-government regarding a course to be pur-
sued in the event of war between Spain and England -over the 
Nootka Sound Affair. Sinee it was not too important and was 
settled amicably not too many details will be presented in this 
study. 
Spain seized a British vessel trading in Nootka 
Sound, which is an inlet on the West coast or Vancouver Island 
over which Spain claimed jurisdiction. The vessel was interned 
and sent to Mexico. England made an issue or this arrair in 
that Spain had no right to interfere with British trade. Britai 
prepared tor war because it was not merely a question ot owner-
1 s. Bemis, Jay's Treat:y, Macmillan Co., New York, 1923, 135. 
-a-
ship of a few trading ships, but the outposts of two great 
colonial empires clashed in the northwestern part of America. 
It there would be war England would strike at 
Spanish New Orleans or Louisiana trom her position in canada. 
In the meantime England was impressing American seamen in the 
event of actual warfare .• The United states was strategically 
located between the possessions of the two countries, and had 
grievances against each. If America's position did become im-
portant, she would give her help to the country offering the 
most advantages. Jefferson felt that it Spain would give inde-
pendence to Louisiana and Florida, the United States would 
join on her side. If she did not wish to do this, he advised 
strict neutrality. Note he did not urge America to join the 
British side. 
Later on in the controversy it became evident that 
Lord Dorchester, Britain's representative in Canada, might ask 
permission to march troops from Detroit to the Mississippi 
River. Washington was undetermiaed as to what position should 
be taken, thus he asked advioe :from Jefferson, Hamilton, and 
Adams. Adams advised neutrality; Hamilton advised giving con-
sent; Jefferson advised avoiding a direct answer. 
-9-
If, as seemed probable, they asked permission 
to send troops across Ameriean soil to attain 
their objectives, the United States would be 
placed in an unenviable position. Acquiesenee 
might mean war with Spain; refusal might mean 
war with Britain. As might be expected, o-
pinions varied widely; but it was generally 
agreed that the United States should, if 
possible, keep out of the conflict. 2 
Spain asked France to help her, but France was in 
no position to help any one, thus Spain was forced to turn to 
humiliation and accept the British demands. spain left Nootka, 
which was the highest point of her empire on the west coast. 
1lliat, then, were the beneficial results of this 
episode tor the United States? According to Mr. Bailey the 
first was the neutral position taken by the Uni~ed states; the 
second was that Britain realized the importance of America; 
the third, Congress could pass retaliatory oammeroial legis-
lation against England. An American tariff would deal their 
commerce a blow, tor the United States was Britain's best 
overseas customer. 3 
Mr. Channing gave a very brief but accurate summa-
ry of the affair: 
The net result of the Nootka Sound contro-
versy was to lay down the doctrine that 
neutrality was the best policy for the 
United states and to add impressment to 
2 T. Bailey, A Diplomatic Histor~ of the American People, F.s. 
Crofts & co., New York, 1940, 4. 
3 Ibid •• 
-
-lo-
to the grievances already existing against 
Great Britain. 4 
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCE 
An analysis of the British-American commerce is 
important in order to understand the relationship between neu-
trality and commerce. 
A navigation act was passed in Congress in 1789, 
the stipulations of which were the following: a duty of fifty 
cents per ton was placed upon foreign built and owned vessels; 
and thirty cents per ton on American built but foreign ownei 
ships; ships that were built and owned by Americans paid six 
cents per ton. The purpose of this discrimination was to st~u­
late interest in American commerce. 
Even after the Revolutionary war the Americans 
tound that they were still dependent upon Britain for many 
manufactured products, although Britain's greatest trade was 
not with America. Professor Bemis brought out this point re-
garding commerce: ~Three-fourths ot American trade was carried 
on with Great Britain~ whereas only one-seventh of all British 
trade plied back and forth between that country and the United 
States.~ 5 
Britain did not wish to relax any of the discrimi-
nations that were in effect against American trade after the 
4 E. Channing, A History of the United States, Macmillan co., 
New York, 1926, V, l24. 
5 Bemis, 190. 
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war. American ships had to pay large tonnage duties in British 
ports. 
The trade to Great Britain, restricted as 
it was, thus constituted over seventy-fi-ve 
per cent ot all the toreign commerce ot the 
United States. British writers were not wrong 
when they concluded that the United States 
could not prosper without it. Moreover, 
British ships carried over half the commerce 
between the two countries. 6 
The Anglo-American commerce in 1'789 was 
indispensable to the prosperity ot England. 7 
Ninety per cent of American imports came 
trom Great Britain and the American revenue 
came mostly trom tarift on imports. 8 
England was old and hardened in a system of ex-
clusion and commercial proscription. The situation was quite 
different in America: 
On the other hand, the United States having 
no manufactures at home to protect, or 
foreign possessions, whose trade it was 
necessary to monopolize, found themselves 
at variance on every point with the systems 
ot the European governments. 9 
It cannot be doubted that American commerce was 
necessary to Britain, but American commerce was not as great 
as Mr. Brebner maintained it to be: 
6 
.!.£!!. ' 34. 
7 Ibid., 35. 
8 ~., 36. 
She had a huge accumulated capital of 
9 T. Lyman, The Diplomacy of the United States, I, 155. 
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skilled labor and management, of commercial 
knowledge, and ot the ships and crews which 
could find their ways (and make th~ pay) 
anywhere in the world. 10 
This certainly was an exaggeratio~ ot American resources. 
WEST INDIA COMMERCE 
So tar the discussion has been centered about the 
Anglo-American commerce, but another important aspect of trade 
during this time was the West Indian trade. Since the islands, 
beyond the Spanish holdings in the caribbean,were for the most 
part in British possession, England wanted exclusive right to 
this trade. (France, Spain, Netherlands and Denmark also had 
possessions here). Mr. Bell stated that "Great Britain had 
sixty million pounds invested in the islands; three-quarters 
of a million of its revenue was derived from West Indian pro-
duce." 11 If she did permit America to enter into her monopoly 
ot trade, it was on condition that· British ships had to carry 
the products. America then could sell the West Indian products 
to the world. 
The following chart indicated the increase in the 
reexportation ot West Indian staples from the United states to 
Europe over a period of years: 
10 J. Brebner, North Atlantic Triang1e,Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1945, 70. 
11 H~C. Bell, "British Commercial Policy in the West Indies, 
1783-93", English Historical Review, Longmans Green & Co., 
London, 1916, XXI, 450. 
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-- -Products 1791 1793 1797 1799 
Cotfee(1b.} 962,977 17,580,049 44,521,887 31,987,088 
·- ---
~ -"""·~..-• .wa •,. ...,_,., - ... ~-~,--
cocoa " 8,322 234,8'15 875,334 5,970,590 
l'WW "'d.l! • ~ur~I.M~v:~~ 11101\M .. 
e .. .., 
Molasses(gal ) 12,721 28,733. 48,559 61,911 
··~~ 
. l\1<\'iH"~~~~ ~t~~ ~
sugar (lb.) 189,315 487,600 3,788,429 9,532,265 
··~· •> ••• ~.· 0 ,<It;~ lf'l1:'t_,_...:•~. ~M' ·-~~ 
12 
Coffee headed the list throughout all the years, and far ex-
ceded sugar. Thus coffee was the most important product from 
the West Indies that was reexported from America. 
If Britain had condescended to open this trade to 
the United States, it would have proven to be very profitable 
tor "The West Indies, in particular, required food and lumber 
from the United States; and their merchants had pressed for a 
commercial treat.y in 1783.tt 13 
By a British Order in Council of 1'183, the follow-
ing trade was permitted: 
The West Indies{jhat is the British West IndieSJ 
were allowed to import American lumber, flour, 
bread, grain, vegetables, and live stock, and 
to export to the United states rum, sugar, 
molasses, coffee, nuts, ginger, pimento. But 
the importation of American meat, dairy produce, 
and fish was forbidden, and the trade was 
confined entirely to British ships. 14 
l2 R. Walsh, An Ap~eal from the Juigments of Great Britain 
Respecting the nited states ot America, Ames & White, 
Philadelphia, l819. This chart was taken from Pitkin's 
Statistical View, 1817. 
13 A. Ward and G. Gooch, The Cambridge History ot British 
Foreign Policy 1785-1919, Macmillan Co., New York, 1922, 
I, 153. 
14Bell, 436. 
Because ot British persistence in discrimination, 
Madison proposed his resolutions in 1791. These resolutions 
provided tor laws discriminating against British commerce. The 
proposals were not adopted, however, they were significant in 
that Britain hasten9Q to appoint a minister to the United 
states. The man chosen was George Hammond. 
When Hammond was appointed in 1791, he was given 
no authority to conclude a commercial agreement with America. 
Lord Grenville explieitly intormed Hammond that the West 
Indian trade was not to be opened to America. 
'It the Government of the United States 
should propose that the Ships ot the 
said States should be allowed to enter 
the Ports ot His Majesty's Colonies in 
America, and ot His Islands in the West 
Indies, as they did betore the war, when 
the countries belonging to these states 
were British Colonies. You must give 
them to understand that this Proposition 
cannot be admitted even as a Subje~t of 
Negociation.' 15 
'rHE PR OCLAMA.TI ON o:r NEU'l'RALITY 
The true nature and design of such an 
act ~eutralit~ is to make it known to 
the powers at war and to the citizens 
of the country issuing the proclamation, 
that that country is at peace, with the 
belligerent powers and not obligated by 
any treaties to beeome a party to the 
war as an ally of either side, and that 
15 B • .Mayo, ttinstructions to the British Ministers to the 
United States l79l-l8l2tt, American Historical Association, 
Annual Report, United states Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1941, III, 12. 
conduct must be observed conformable to 
the above situation and strict neutrality 
maintained towards both sides. 16 
-16-
The government of the United states was very 
indecisive when France declared war on England. By the treaty 
with France, the United States had obligated herself to come to 
France's aid if France were attacked or carrying on a defensiv 
war. Since France had declared war on Britain, she very 
definitely put herself on the offensive side in the war. 
Because or this, the defensive clause of the treaty was not 
binding. That was the only reason that would justify America's 
not joint.ng France. 
There was no doubt but that France had been 
the first to declare war against everyone 
of the powers with which she was then known 
to be at war. Therefore, a merely defensive 
alliance could not bind the United States. 17 
There were several other articles or the treaty of 
1788 which caused trouble with England. These particular arti-
cles have been cited elsewhere in this work. It can be under-
stood that Britain would look with askance upon these articles 
for it seemed as though they were aimed directly at her. She 
knew, too, of the pro-Freneh feeling that reigned throughout 
the United States. 
16 M. Woodbury, "Public Opinion in Philadelphia, 1789-1801", 
Smith College, Northhampton Mass., V, 73. 
17 c. Thomas, 58. 
-16-
Hamilton felt that the treaty with France had been 
made with the King of France, and since the King's government 
had ceased to exist, the treaty was no longer binding. Jeffer-
son held that the treaties were made between nations and not 
between governments, thus the treaty was just as binding in 
1793 as it was in 1778. Both men did agree, however, that neu-
trality was the best possible course for America. 
President Washington did not wish to com.mi t the 
United states to ·either side in the controversy, if it was 
possibly within his power to prevent it. 
At the very first news of war in Europe, 
Washington had thought of strict neutrality. 
Then he had approved secretary Jefferson's 
plan to modify it somewhat in favor of France, 
because of the commercial interests of his 
own people; and he had not been averse, at 
least, to excepting Spain from the proclamation, 
because'of the grave situation in the southwest 
•••• But Washington returned to his first de-
termination that the United States must be 
strictly neutral toward every French endeavor, 
even those against Spanish .America, as he 
listened to the arguments of secretary Hamilton, 
felt the constant pressure of the British 
minister,H~ond, and observe the irritating 
behavior of the new minister from France. 18 
Washington's decision to issue the proclamation 
may be defend.ed by the following: 
18 A. Darling, our Rising Em.~ire 1763-1803, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1940, ~6. 
It rested with the President to judge 
whether there was anything in the laws 
of nations or our treaties incompatible 
with neutrality. 'Having judged that 
there was not, he had a right and, if 
in his opinion the interests or the 
nation required it, it was his duty as 
executor or the laws to proclaim the 
neutrality of the nation, to exhort 
all persons to observe it and warn them 
or·the penalties which would attend its 
non-observance.'l9 
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Washington issued the proclamation on April 22, 
1'793, and decided to live up to the treaties as well as he 
could without involving the United States in a war. 
The proclamation read as follows: 
Whereas it appears that a state of war 
exists between Austria, Prussia., Sardinia, 
Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, 
of the one part and France on the other; and 
the duty and interest of the United States 
require, that they should with sincerity 
and good faith adopt a conduct friendly 
and impartial toward the belligerent Powers: 
I have therefore thought fit by these 
presents to declare the disposition or the 
United States to observe the conduct aforesaid 
towards those Powers respectively; and to 
exhort and warn the citizens of the United 
States carefully to avoid all acts and 
proceedings whatsoever, which may in any 
manner tend to contravene such disposition. 
And I do hereby also make known, that 
whosoever of the citizens of the United states 
shall render himself liable to punishment or 
forfeiture under the laws of nations, by 
committing, aiding or abetting hostilities 
against any of the said Powers, or by carrying 
19 Woodbury, '76. 
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to any of them those artieles which are 
deemed contraband by the modern usage of 
nations, will not re~eive the protection of the 
United States, against such punishment and 
forfeiture; and turther, that I have given 
instructions to those officers, to whom it 
belongs, to cause prosecutions to be insti-
tuted against all persons who shall, within 
the cognizance ot the courts of the United 
states, violate the law of nations, with 
respect to the Powers at war, or any of 
them •••• 20 
The proclamation was not directed to any foreign 
government, but to the citizens of the United States as a 
warning against aiding any of the belligerents. It also served 
as a signal tor America's withdrawal trom Old World politics 
based on the balance of power. The document was assailed 
throughout the United States, tavored by some, resented by 
others. ~~Y asked why it was not issued in 1792 before Englan 
entered the war, rather than issued in 1793 when England be-
came a contestant. Hamilton answered this question by saying 
that Austria and Prussia were the main powers in the war, and 
they were not maritime powers so neutrality was not needed 
until England and Spain, who were maritime powers, entered the 
scene. The pro-French group tel t that the proclamation a-
bandoned France when she needed help. 
Jefferson telt that Britain should have been made 
to pay a price for American neutrality. He expressed this 
20 w. MacDonald, (ed.}, Docum.entar~ source Book of American 
History, Macmillan co., New Yor , 1926, 244. 
> 
reeling in a letter to Gouverneur Morris sent on April 20, 
1795 from Philadelphia; "Indeed we shall be more useful as 
neutrals than as parties by the protection which our !lag will 
21 give to supplies or provision." Jefferson probably intended 
that America could supply the French under the cover of neu-
trality, but England had something else to say about this. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROCLAMATION 
The wording of the proclamation was very clear, 
and definitely stated America's position. Nowhere throughout 
the document was the word "neutrality" mentioned as suoh. In 
a letter to James Madison, Jefferson accounted for this; 
The proc,lam (natio) n as first proposed was 
to have been a declaration of neutrality. 
It was opposed on these grounds. 1. That a 
declaration of neutrality was a declaration 
there should be no war, to which the Executive 
was not competent. 2. That it would be batt~ 
to hold back the dec [laration] of n (eutrali tyj, 
as a thing worth something to the powers at 
war, that they would bid tor it, & we might 
ask a price, the broadest privileges of 
neutral nations. The !st. objection was so 
tor respect and as to avoid inserting the 
term neutrality & the drawing of the instru-
ment was left to E.R. 22 
These, in a summary, were Jefferson's objections to the procla-
mation. 
Hamilton classified the objections to the doou-
21 W. Ford, (ed.), The Writin~s of Thomas Jefferson, G.P. 
Putnam's sons, New York, 1 99, VI, 217.(This will be re-
ferred to hereafter as Jefferson-Writings.) 
22 Ibid., 315. This letter was sent from Jaokson,Mississippi, 
ana-was dated January 23, 1793. 
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ment under the following headings: (1) that the proclamation 
was without authority; (2) that it was contrary to the treaty 
with France; (3) that it was contrary to the gratitude which 
was due from America to France; (4} that it was out of time 
and unnecessary. 
Jefferson's reason for the first objection was: 
"··· that the president not having the power to declare war, 
had not the power to declare that there should not be war, ~· 
to declare a state of neutrality." 23 
Hamilton maintained: 
If on the one hand the legislature have 
a right to declare war, it is, on the other, 
the duty of the executive to preserve peace 
till the declaration is made; and in fulfilling 
this duty, it must necessarily possess a right 
ot judging what is the nature of the obligations 
which the treaties of the country impose on 
the government. 24 
The president certainly had the authority to 
issue such a document. Neutrality was a necessity at that time 
and was founded in the ~itings of vattel, who was an authority 
on international law. 
Jefferson's views regarding the violation of the 
treaty with France naturally were favorable to that country. 
In a letter to the president, he said: "The doctrine then of 
23 C. Hynaman, "The First American Nuetralityn, Ill. Studies 
in the Social Sciences, University of Illinois, Urbana, 
!954, XX, 12. 
24 The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Williams and Whiting, New 
York, 18l0, III, 322. 
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Grotius~ Puttendort, and vatte~ is that treaties remain ob~i­
gatory notwithstanding any change in the form ot government.n25 
Hamilton said: ~This must be evident when it is considered, 
that even to turnish determinate succours to ships or troops, 
to a power at war, in consequence of antecedent treaties havin6 
no partie~~ reference to the existing gsarre~, is not incon-
sistent with neutra~i ty •••• tt 26 It troops and sh.ips can be 
turnished by a neutra~ nation, the nation ceases to be neutra~, 
and becomes an al~y of one O·f the bel~igerents. 
The newspapers bitter~y attacked the president 
and the proclamation. Most of 'the attacks were by the pro-Frena~ 
groups. The French minister., Genet, was very active in the 
south at that time, and many groups ral~ied to him in the be-
lief that the United States would come to France's aid. Britain 
very definitely gained by .America's neutrall ty. 
Miss Woodbury sought the reason for the attacks, 
and expressed Hamilton's opinion: 
It was his [Hamil to~ that the real purpose 
of the attacks upon the Neutrality Procla-
mation in newspapers and pamphlets was not 
to bring about a tree discussion ot an tm-
portant public measure, but to weaken the 
confidence of the people in their executive 
and thus prepare the way for a successful 
opposition. to the government. 27 
25~efferson-Writings, 217. 
26 Hamilton, 317, the last five words are the author's italics. 
27 Woodbury, 73. 
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Neutrality bore a golden harvest in the carrying 
trade of a warring world, and this was especially so until the 
British and French decrees closed the seas to American shipping 
Thus neutrality paid financially as well as morally. 28 
Mr. Thomas presented an interesting view regarding 
the opinion of France and England on America's position: 
In the estimation of the belligerents 
the strength of .America was slight in 
comparison to the importance of the 
European struggle. Consequently, neither 
would have tolerated her neutrality if 
it became evident that a neutral policy 
would react to the benefit of the opponent. 
It was the good fortune of the Washington 
administration that, collectively, the 
members were able to reoogni~e the strength 
of a frankly neutral policy. 29 
It was agreed by all nations concerned that the 
United states carried out her neutrality very efficiently, 
probably too efficiently according to France's opinion. There 
were a few instances of failure ·in enforcement of the neutral 
principles, but the soundness of the principles prevailed. 
During the Administration of President 
Washington at least, the ~erioan govern-
ment furnished its own initiative in 
blocking the efforts of American citizens 
to enter the war under belligerent colors. 
Only on very infrequent occasions did the 
British government press the executive to 
28 L.Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations", American 
Political science Review, waverly Press, Baltimore, XIII,382 
29 Thomas, 50. 
investigate or interfere with Genet's 
schemes to enlist American unrest and 
anti-British feeling directly under 
French military and naval command. 
The absence of prompting by the British 
by no means signifies, however, that 
the British government was in doubt, 
whether the machinations of Genet and the 
response of American citizens were proper 
subjects tor diplomatic protest. 30 
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:Mr. Thomas had this to say: "It was the straight and narrow 
course which was ~teared during the succeeding months that 
laid so firmly the foundations of American neutrality and 
turnished such an admirable example of neutral conduct to the 
world." 31 
Even Lord Grenville admitted that the United 
states did a splendid job in carrying through her neutrality. 
Although from the following quotation one would be inclined to 
believe that the United States was not too neutral where 
England was concerned: 
'With respect to the conduct of the present 
Goverlllllent of America His Majesty's I\tlinis-
ters think that there appears to have pre-
vailed in its general tenor a desire for 
the maintainenoe of a fair Neutrality and 
even a disposition friendly towards this 
country. ' 32 
According to this America was not "too" neutral if she showed 
a friendly disposition towards England. 
30 Hynem.an, 142. 
31 Thomas, 51. 
32 Mayo, 44. 
b 
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This chapter will come to a conclusion with this 
statement by 1~. Thomas: ~And again, the proclamation itselr 
was not so important as was its execution.~ 33 
33 Thomas, 51.. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PRINCIPLES OF NEUTRALITY 
The first call made upon her was a 
crucial. test; for it was made by 
England her recent oppressor and 
enemy tor protection against the 
violation of neutral relations 
within her territories by or 1n 
behalf of the subjects of France, 
her ally and friend, by whom she had 
been aided in the war with England, 
and towards whom the United States 
felt and acknowledged the strongest 
obligations. 1 
CONTRABAND OF WAR 
This chapter will be devoted to the very general 
principles of neutrality and how they affected the Anglo-
American relationship. 
It became known in England that France was plannin 
to receive in payment for America's debt to her, a shipment of 
corn in lieu of money. England ~ediately became worried. Her 
position and her future intentions can be noted in Lord 
Grenville's instructions to Hammond: 
'No. 6 Whitehall, March 12th, 1793 
I have great reason to believe, that on principal 
Object of Mons. Genet's Mission is to procure a 
1 c. Loring, Neutral Relations ot England and the United states, 
W.V. Spencer, Boston, 1865, 15. 
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Supply or Corn and Provisions from the states 
of America and that for this Purpose he has 
been instructed to open a Negotiation with the 
American Government for liquidating the Payment 
of their loan to France by transmitting to 
the Ports ot that eountrr a supply ot corn 
and Provisions equal to the amount of the 
Outstanding Debt. It will therefore be proper 
tor ~ou to use every means in Your power to 
ascertain whether any such Negotiation is 
going forward •••• It in the result of any 
such Negotiation, Provisions and Grain should 
be actually shipped on board American Vessels, 
on the account ot the Freneft Government they 
would evidently be Brench Property, and, as 
such, liable to Capture.' 2 
Although the United States declined to pay the 
debt in this manner, it can be seen how carefully England 
watched the American-French relationship. She was certainly 
overstepping the bounds of the law of nations by acquiescing 
in the opinion that food was contraband of war. 
The first British Order in Council was issued as 
a result of the above mentioned negotiation. The order was 
issued on June 8, 1793, and provided for the detention of all 
vessels loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour, or meal 
bound to any port in France. Such cargoes could be purchased 
on behalf of the English government, or the masters of suCh 
ships might be permitted, on giving due security to dispose ot 
their cargoes in the ports of any country in amity with England 
2 Mayo, 37. 
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rn this way England maintained that the owner of such pro-
visions would be paid for his goods. 
Grenville justified this legislation by the 
following letter to Hammond, a part of which is quoted here: 
'No. 8 Whitehall, 5th J~ly, 1'193 
In Your Communication on this subject 
provisions being contraband You will not 
fail to remark that by the L @.w)of Nations, 
particularly by the most modern writers par-
ticularly by vattel,,it is expressly stated 
that all provisions are to be considered as 
.Article.s of Contraband, and as such liable to 
confiscation ih the case where depriving an 
Enemy of these supplies is one of the means 
intended to be employed for reducing him to 
reasonable terms.' 3 
If England was so willing to accept the opinion 
of the modern writers on the law of nations for this principle, 
why did she not agree to the principle-"free ships-free goods"? 
This certainly was a modern principle, but England refused to 
recognize it. She only accepted the modern rules that aided 
her. Other European countries accepted this principle, and it 
was included in America's treaties with these countries. 
Mr. Lyman phrased England's so-called authority 
for issuing such an edict in this way: ~The authority of 
England is, therefore, in itself sufficient to prove that pro-
4 
visions are not rigidly contraband by conventional law." 
3 ~., 41. 
4 Lyman, 179. 
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The Unit.ed States continued to trade in contraband, 
although the risk of seizure followed every ship. washington 
did not forbid the export of contraband goods and this must be 
recognized as a very significant feature of the first American 
neutrality. Jefferson also stated "••• that the United States 
would take no steps to interrupt the contraband trade of its 
citizens, and that it would interpose no objection to the confis 
cation of contraband by the belligerent powers." 5 
contraband: 
The writings of vattel authorized the trading in 
In both sections cited (llO and ll3 vattel) 
the rights of neutrals to trade in articles 
contraband of war is clearly established; in 
the first, by selling to the warring powers 
who come to the neutral country to buy them; 
in the second, by the neutral subjects or 
citizens carrying them to the countries of 
the powers at war and there selling them. 6 
In a letter to Mr. Pinckney, Jefferson condemned 
the British ord.er : 
This article is so manifestly contrary 
to the law of nations that nothing more 
would seam necessary than to observe that 
it is so. Reason and usage have established 
that when two nations go to war, those who 
chuse to live in peace, retain their natural 
right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures, 
and other ordinary vocations; to carry the 
produce of their industry, for exchange, to 
5 c. Hyneman, 146. 
6 H. Lodge, War Addresses 1915-1917, Houghton Mifflin co., 
Boston, 1917, 124. 
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all nations belligerent or neutral as usual; 
to go and come freely, without injury or 
molestation; and, in short, that the war 
among others shall be, for than, as if it 
di~ not exist •. SDoes not cite an authoity for 
this statement~ 
· It suffices, tor the present occasion to 
say, that corn, flour, and meal, are not of 
the class of contraband and consequently remain 
articles of free commerce. 
The state of war then existing between 
Great Britain and France, furnishes no legitimate 
right to either interrupt the agriculture of 
the United States, or the peaceable exchange 
of its produce with all nations; and consequently 
the assumption of it will be as lawful hereafter 
as now:, in peace as in war •••• 
This act too, tends directly to draw us 
from that state of peace, in which we are 
wishing to remain. If we permit corn to be sent 
to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally 
bound to permit it to France. To restrain it 
would be a partiality which might lead to war 
with France; and, between restraining it 
ourselves, and permitting her enemies to 
restrain it unrightfully, is no difference. 7 
.Jefferson was right in his opinions. In the estimation of this 
writer, food as contraband of war cannot ethically be defended. 
For a more thorough study of this question see Chapter v. 
One of the articles of the order provided that 
armed vessels ot Great Britain seize tor condemnation, vessels 
entering a blockaded port for the first time. The ships of 
Denmark and sweden were excepted. The reason for this exception 
being that " existing treaties with these powers; cannot, 
7 Documents .Accompanain~ A Messafe of the President of the 
'Ctnited states, A.&. iay, Wash ngton, 18o6, 4-6. 
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therefore, give any just grounds of umbrage or jealousy to 
other powers; between whom and Great Britain no such treaties 
subsist.tt 8 Jefferson felt that this was practically stating 
that vessels of the United states were lawful prize, and those 
of Denmark and Sweden were not. 
Jefferson stood for the agricultural interests of 
the country, and this order naturally harmed the agrarian 
interests. In a letter to Hammond, he set forth his arguments: 
Certainly none was ever more so than the 
instruction in question, as it strikes at 
the root of our agriculture, and at the 
means of obtaining for our citizens in 
general, the humerous articles ot necessity 
and comfort which they do not make for 
themselves, but have hitherto procured 
from other nations by exchange." 9 
After this bit of legislation by Britain, the 
Uni t_ed States naturally wanted to pass retaliatory measures. 
The last report of Jefferson on the Commercial Privileges and 
Restrictions was made the basis for Madison's reintroduction 
of his famous resolutions on January 3, 1794, placing re-
strictions upon British goods and vessels. Once again the 
measures were not passed. 
FREE SHIPS-FREE GOODS 
Because Britain had blockaded France (paper block-
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ade), she could not get her goods from the French West Indies, 
thus she opened the French West India trade to the United 
states ( some authors believe before the war). The United 
states could carry the produce directly from the islands to 
France. France was "&itting around" the British blockade. 
Britain issued another Order in Order in Council 
in November 6, 1793. This ord~ provided tor the seizure of 
all ships laden with goods that were the produce of any colony 
belonging to France. It also prohibited the carrying of pro-
visions or other supplies f'or the use of any such col.ony. 
Britain held that by the Rule of 1756, trade closed to neutrals 
in time of peace could not be opened in time of' war. It denied 
to America the direct trade between their ports, the FrenCh 
islands, and France. Even the Federalists denounced it. 
This also was a repudiation of the principle that 
"free ships make tree goods". Jefferson viewed this principle 
as follows: 
It cannot be denied that according to 
the general law of nations, the goods 
of an enemy are lawful prize in the 
bottom of a friend, and the goods ot 
a friend privileged in the bottom of 
an enemy; or in other words, that the 
goods follow the owner. The inconvenience 
of this principle in subj eating neutral 
vessels to vexatious searches at sea, 
has for more than a century rendered 
it usual for nations to substitute a 
conventional principle that the goods 
shall follow the bottom, instead of 
the natural one before mentioned. 10 
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By adhering to this principle the United States 
was not gaining anything for herself and was really losing; 
for French goods were being protected by America's flag. In a 
letter to the French minister, Jefferaon expounded this view: 
Indeed we are the losers in every direclion 
of that principle [free ships-free goods for 
when it works in our favor, it is to sa e 
the goods of our friends, when it works 
against us, it is to lose our own, and we 
shall continue to lose while the rule is 
only partially established. When we shall 
have established it with all nations we 
shall be in a condition neither to gain nor 
lose, but shall be less exposed to vexatious 
searches at sea. To this condition we are 
endeavoring to advance, but as it depends 
on the will of other nations as well as 
our own, we can only obtain it when they 
shall be ready to concur. 11 
Grenville refused to commit England to a recog-
nition of this new principle. In a letter to Hammond he gave 
England's stand: 
'It is indeed necessary to state on 
this occasion that the Principle of 
free Ships making free Goods, is one which 
never has been recognized by this 
Country and that it undoubtedly 
10 s. Padover, The Com!lete Jefferson, Duell, Sloan &. Pearce 
Inc., New York, 194 , 221. 
11 Jefferson- Writings, 35?. 
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wi~~ not be al~owed in the present case. 12 
The order was delayed being put into execution 
until December, so that British armed vesse~s would have time 
to get to the islands and seize the American ships there 
without warning. Britain did seize about 250 vesse~s, and the 
vice admiralty ot the West Indies condemned about 150 of them. 
To say that this was the worst possib~e order 
that England could have issued at that time, would be a mild 
understatement {litotes). England was practically asking for 
war by attempting to regulate American trade. 
After ·a whi~e Britain rea~ized the harshness of 
her unyielding po~icy. On January 8, 1794, another order was 
forthcoming. This order modified the order of November by 
permitting direct trade between the French West Indies and the 
United states, in goods that were non-contraband of war. Ships 
could bring products from the West Indies to America, pay the 
duties, and then export them to Europe. This was trading indi-
rectly with France. 
ARMING OF PRIVATEERS 
Another principle of neutrality which England op-
posed was the fitting out of privateers trom neutral ports.· 
12 Mayo, 37-38. 
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France was granted this privilege in America (by treaty), while 
this same privilege was to be denied to France's enemies (which 
at the time happened to be England). With the issuance ot the 
proclamation ot neutrality, France was not permitted to arm her 
privateers in American ports. A neutral nation has no right to 
make its ports a base of hostile operations for one belligerent 
against another. Mr. Thomas stated that •The neutral duty of 
the United States extended to the use of her porta as surely 
as it extended to the use of her iron and wood." 13 
The United States restored or indemnified any 
prizes that were seized by privateers which were outfitted in 
the United States without the knowledge of the federal govern-
ment. By so doing, America displayed her honest efforts to 
maintain her neutrality. 
Prizes which had been taken by such 
privateers fitted out, and sailing 
trom ports, in the United states, were 
restored to the British owners; and the 
Government of the United states proclaimed, 
that it held itself responsible to indemnify 
for such captures. 14 
SEARCHES AND IMPRESSMENT 
Both sides agreed that a belligerent ship might 
visit and search a neutral merchantman. As to the extent ot 
the search there was disagreement. If the ship's papers did 
13 Thomas, 145. 
14 Loring, 16. 
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not convince the officer in charge of the search as to the 
nature of the cargo, a search was necessary, so said Britain. 
The United States contended that an examination of the ship's 
papers was sufficient. In case of a suspected ship with fraudu-
lent papers, a search might be ordered. 
The United States, while freely admitting 
the belligerent right of search, denied 
that it might be employed tor any but the 
acknowledged purposes of enforcing blockades, 
seizing priae goods, and perhaps·oapturing 
officers and soldiers in the actual service 
of the enemy. 15 
'rhere were two categories relative to neutrality, 
the first was that relating to the enforcement of neutrality 
within America's own territory and waters; the second pertained 
to neutral rights of the United States on the high seas. 
Many times the searching party used the pretense 
of search as a means of impressing seamen into the Royal Navy. 
Although this was a. practice at that time, it was not practiced 
to any great extent until the period prior to the War of 1812. 
Britain was not always too careful to ascertain 
without a doubt the nationality of the seamen involved, conse-
quently many American seamen were impressed. An .American had 
a chance of being returned, but an Englishman, who had become 
a naturalized Jmerican, had no chance of being sent back to 
America, for Britain believed that ~once an Englishman- always 
15 J.B.Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy, Harper & 
Brothers, New York, 1918, 113. 
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an Englishman". 
All of the British attacks on American commerce 
paved the way for reta~ia'OO.ry measures. These various acts 
passed by England aroused the public in America, thus somethin 
had to be done. This something was the American Embargo passed 
March 26, 1794. by Congress .• This provided that all vessels in 
American ports that were bound for a foreign port were for-
bidden to leave. On April 18, it was extended for another 
month. 
The terms of the embargo were made very genera~, 
and were seeming~y aimed at foreign commerce, but they were 
aimed specifically at Britain • .America was still afraid to 
antagonize Britain, for America was not prepared tor war, and 
war at that time would have meant a victory for Britain. 
The Federalists thought that by sending an envoy 
to England, to settle amicably the differences between the 
two countries, would be the best course of action. So John Jay 
was chosen to carry forth this difficult task. 
This chapter can be summed up by using a splendid 
quotation taken from Mr. Foster: 
It is now plain that the neutrality 
proclamation of the President was a 
most wise and necessary act- one ot 
the most important in the history of 
the country, as it was the inauguration 
of a principle of international law and 
governmental practice which ha·s won for 
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us the respect of the world and contributed 
very materially to our national prosperity. 16 
16 J. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, Houghton Miffli 
Co.~ Boston, 1900, 157. 
CHAPTER III 
J"AY'S MISSION 
In order to avert the impending crisis 
Washington finally decided to send an 
envoy extraordinary to England and to 
endeavor to hold congress in cheak 
until another effort at negotiation 
should be fulfilled. 1 
J"AY'S APPOINTMENT 
Messers Cabot, King, Ellsworth, and strong, all 
staunch Federalists, decided that a special envoy should be 
sent to the Court ot st. :James. These men brought their de-
ois1~ to the president, who agreed that an envoy should be 
sent. washington immediately thought of Hamilton. one can im-
agine the protests. that were raised when Hamilton's name was 
mentioned for such a mission. Because of his pro-British 
feelings it was felt that he would grant concessions to England 
The whole idea of the mission was scorned by the Republican 
group. 
The whole project of a mission was 
bitterly assailed by all ~epublioans 
and many Federalists. Furthermore, 
Washington had unerringly divined 
the weakness of Hamilton in the role 
of envoy to England. The proposal to 
1 J".H.Latane and D. Wainhouse, A History of American Foreign 
Policy. Odyssey Press, New York, 1940, 9o. 
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to nominate him raised such a storm 
of protest that finally it became 
evident that from a political 
standpoint, his appointment was im-
possible. 2 
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John Jay's name was then recommended. Jay did not 
receive the whole-hearted support of the people. Since Jay was 
oneof the negotiators of the Treaty of 1783, he was thought to 
be well qualified tor such a mission. But his attitudes and 
pro-BritiSh opinions, then, were still in the minds ot the 
people. 
On the surface, Jay's indifference to the 
navigation of the Mississippi, his mythical 
monarch~al principles, his attachment to 
England and aversion to France, appeared 
explanatory of the hostility. 3 
REASONS FOR OPPOSITION 
It was thought unnecessary and inexpedient to 
send a special envoy to England when Thomas Pinckney was there 
as a representative of the American government. 
Jay was disfavored because he was Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court. A chief justice, it was said, should not 
be sent to make a treaty which might later come up tor his 
judicial review. This argument does not seem very plausible, 
for if Jay were qualified for the mission, he could have re-
signed trom the bench. The country should not be denied the 
2 R. Hayden, The senate and Treaties 1789-1817, Macmillan co., 
New York, 1920, 65. 
3 c. Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton, 249. 
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opportunity of sending a capab~e representative. This was just 
a ruse to cover up the real reason for the opposition. 
The real opposition was centered about Jay's 
beliefs and opinions. Mr. Bowers felt that "••• third, that 
John Jay held opinions against the interest and just claims of 
his country which rendered it unwise to entrust to him the 
task of securing justice from Great Britain." 4 
Jay himself was reluctant to accept the mission. 
In a ~etter to his wife he expressed himself very clearly. 
since this letter was intended to be his private correspondence 
with no thought of its being published, it can be regarded as 
authoritative. To his wife, too, he would express his true 
feelings. 
This is not my seeking; on the contrary 
I regard it as a measure not to be desired 
but to be submitted to: 
If it should p~ease God to make me 
instruments~ to the continuance of peace, 
and in preventing the eftusion of blood, 
and other evils and miseries incident to 
war, we sh~l both have reason to rejoice. 5 
And in another letter to his wife on April ~9, he said: 
4 Ibid., 70. 
so far as I am personally concerned, 
my feelings are very, very far from 
exciting wishes for its taking place. 
No appointment ever operated more 
unpleasant~y upon me; but the public 
5 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Ja!, ed. by H. 
Johnston, G.P. PUtnam's Sons, New York, 189 , IY, 4. This 
letter was written from Philadelphia, April 15, 1794. 
considerations which were urged, and the 
manner in which it was pressed, strongly 
impressed me with a conviction that to 
refuse it would be to desert my duty for 
the sake of my ease and domestic concerns 
and comforts. 6 
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Jay took his mission seriously, and honestly 
thought he would be helping his country. It cannot be said 
that he was idealistic in his suppositions. He considered it 
his duty to accept the commission without thought to his 
personal gains. 
1794. 
The Senate oonfi~ed his nomination on April 19, 
It therefore was not Alexander Hamilton, 
Secretary of Treasury, but John Jay, Chief 
Justice of the United States, who set sail 
on May 12, 1794, assured that washington's 
administration would nQt permit his negoti-
ations in London to be hampered by the 
measures before Congress for sequestering 
debts due to British creditors and for 
commercial nonintercourse until Britain 
should compensate American shippers, pay 
for the Negroes, and evacuate the Northwest 
posts. But it took the deciding vote of 
Vice President J'ohn Adams in the senate to 
defeat the non importation bill ot the 
Jeffersonians. 7 
A very important principle ot neutrality was that 
a neutral was not permitted to negotiate a treaty with a 
belligerent. When a new treaty with France was urged, it was 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 A.B. Darling, our Rising Empire 1763-1803, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1940;1'18. 
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agreed that a neutral could not consummate a treaty with one 
of the belligerents in a war. Yet Jay was appointed tor the 
express purpose of concluding a treaty with England, who waa 
a belligerent. In a strict interpretation of this principle, 
Jay's mission, then, was very definitely a violation of the 
neutrality tha.t .America proclaimed. Mr. Hyneman stated: 
"Consequently it may be argued that all treaty relations 
between neutrals and belligerents should remain frozen during 
8 period of war." 
JAY'S INSTRUCTIONS 
Although Jay's instructions were drafted by 
Randolph, Secretary of state, they were a reflection ot 
Hamilton's views. Hamilton, at the time, accepted the BritiSh 
Orders in Council, and by so doing departed from America's 
previous treaties. He also acquiesced in the principles that 
food was contraband of war, the seizure of enemy property in 
the bottom of a neutral, and the Rule ot 175~. 
In short, Hamilton and the Federalists, 
with scant consideration tor the previous 
attitude of the nation in treati~s with 
European powers [F:ranctil would accede to all 
British contentions - detention and pre-
emption of foodstuffs, Rule of 1755, capture 
ot enemy property on neutral Ships - pro-
vided some compensations were made tor the 
8 Hyneman, 42. 
for ~he extreme interaretation and harsh 
application of the Or er of November 6. 
To get admission to the British West Indies 
-43-
they would consent to bind the united states 
not to raise the tariff on BritiSh goods 
during a term of years beyond a fixed ratio. 9 
Jay was given discretionary powers, and received 
only two restrictions. The extent of his powers has never 
been equalled by any envoy since that time. 
The envoy discussed the whole subject of the 
treaty freely with Hamilton, King and other Federalists. He 
knew just how far he would be supported if he judged any devi-
10 
ation from his instructions necessary. This was especially 
so if he had to relinquish a part ot his instructions in order 
to gain other points. 
Jay's official instructions did not of 
~ourse direct him to surrend~ these 
\!D-Odernj principle [Of neutrali tyJ, but he 
was given a wide discretion, and Hamilton's 
views as reported by H~ond to his 
superiors governed the negotiations. 11 
Jay was instructed t.o obtain the following: 
••• To keep alive in the mind of the 
British Minister that opinion which the 
solemnity ot a special mission must 
naturally inapiJ:_e. of the strong agitations 
excited in the people of the United states, 
by the disturbed condition of things 
between them and Great Britain; to repel 
!!£1 for which we are not disposed, and 
212. 
1785-1929), 
11Latane and Wainhouse, 90. 
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into which the necessity of vindicating our 
honor and our property may, but can alone, 
drive us; to prevent the British ministry, 
should they be resolved on war, from carrying 
with thwn the British nation; and, at the 
same time, to assert, with dignity and 
firmness, our rights, and our title to 
reparation tor past injuries. 
Compensation for all the injuries sustained, 
and captures, will be strenuously pressed by you. 
If the British ministry should hint at any 
supposed predilection in the United States for 
the French nation, as warranting the whole or 
any part of these instructions, you will stop 
the progress of this subject, as being ir-
relative to the question in hand. 
II. A second cause ot your mission, but not 
inferior in dignity to the preceding, though 
subsequent in order, is to draw to a con-
elusion all points of difference between the 
United states and Great Britain, concerning 
the treaty of peace. 
III. It is referred to your discretion 
whether, in ease the two preceding points should 
'Qe so a-9~omodated as to promise the continuance 
of tranquility between the United States and 
Great Britain, the subject of a commercial 
t~eaty may be listened to by you, or even 
broken to the British ministry. 
No stipula.tion, whatsoever is to interfere 
with out obligations to France. 
A treaty is not to continue beyond fifteen 
years. 
IV. This enumeration presents generally 
the objects which it is desirable to comprise 
in a commercial treaty; not that it is 
expected that one can be effected with so 
great a latitude of advantages. 
--
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If to the actual footing of our commerce 
and navigation in the British European 
dominions cou+d be added the privileges 
of carrying directly from the United States 
to the British West Indies in our own 
bottoms generally, or of certain defined 
burthens ••• this would afford an acceptable 
basis of a treaty for the term not exceeding 
fifteen years; and it would be advisable 
to conclude a treaty upon that basis. 
You will have no difficulty in gaining 
access to the ministers of Russia, Denmark, 
and Sweden, at the Court of London. The 
principles of the armed neutrality would 
abundantly cover our neutral rights. If, 
therefore, the situation of things with 
respect to Great Britain should dictate 
the necessity of taking the precaution of 
foreign co-operation upon his head ••• and 
if an entire view of all our political 
relations shall, in your judgment, permit 
the step, you will sound those ministers 
upon the probability of an alliance with 
their nations to ·support those principles. 
VI. such are the outlines of the conduct 
which the President wishes you to pursue. 
He is aware that, at this distance, and 
during the present instability of public 
events, he cannot undertake to prescribe 
rules which shall be irrevocable. You will 
therefore consider the ideas herein expressed 
as ~ounting to recommendations only, which 
in your discretion you may modity as seems 
most beneficial to the United SU&tes, except 
in the two following cases which are immutable 
•••• you will inform them that the Government 
of the United States will not derogate from 
our treaties and engagmnents with France, and 
that experience has shown that we can be 
honewt in our duties to the British nation 
without laying ourselves under any particular 
restraints as to other nations; and second 
that no treaty of commerce be included 
or signed contrary to the foregoing 
prohibition. 12 
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Jay was limited in only two points regarding the 
treaty with France and the commercial restriction. It will be 
noted that Jay was authoriaed to ask for the opening of the 
British West Indies on condition that the tonnage be limited. 
Yet when this article in the treaty was known, it was violently 
protested. Jay, however, was acting under orders. 
SUMMARY 
~~. Payne stated: "England was more willing to 
negotiate with Jay than with Adams, because Jay was more easily 
bent to her designs and because France, with whom she was at 
war, was beginning to gather strength. The ardor for another 
war cooled, only tor these selfish reasons.~ 13 
The administration hoped ~hat some of the diffi-
culties with England would be reconciled by this mission. It 
was also desired that this reconciliation could be brought 
about without compromising America's neutrality with France. 
America could not draw nearer to France without pulling 
herself into hostile relations with England - a position which 
the interests of the country forbade it to take. 14 
12 Johnston, 11-20. 
13 Payne, 31. 
14 w.H. Trescott, The Diplomatic History of the Administrations 
of washington and Adams, Little Brown & co., Boston, 1857", 
1o1. 
CHAPTER IV 
GRIEVANCES t NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS 
Vital national questions entered into the 
negotiations of Jay's treaty. The surrender 
by the Britiah of the frontier posts affected 
our· relatiolis with the Indian population 
on our Northern border; the boundary question 
involved the extent of the Republic, the 
navigation regulations bore directly upon 
occupations in which American capital was 
invested and in which thousands of Americans 
earned their living; to define contraband 
affected large groups of producers. European 
internatio~al relations, British internal 
polities, American politics, the strength 
and adaptability of the American Governm~t 
were a~l involved in the events leading up 
to the negotiation or tne treaty, in the 
negotiation itsel~, in the ratification 
and the enforcement of the treaty. 1 
POSTS 
The various grievances, British retention or the 
posts; non-payment of debts due British subjects; taking of 
the negroes with the evacu~tion of New York by the British; 
that Jay was instructed to settle dated back to the Treaty of 
Paris in 1783. Both countries violated the treaty, but it was 
a perplexing question to decide whieh country violated it 
first. 
Jefferson believed that since Britain violated 
the treaty first, the United states could legally violate it 
1 Bemis, Introduction. 
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a~so. Britain believed that the United States was the first 
vio~ator. In international ~aw there was no court to whieh a 
country would have access in order to settle such a matter 
as this. Naturally the discussions over this question were 
carried over a period of years. If one party to a contract 
abrogated it, the other party would be justified in violating 
it too. 
Jay's belief was contrary to this, however: 
'It we establish the principle', he wrote, 
'that we have a right to depart from the 
treaty in one article, because they have 
departed from it ~n another, they will 
certainly avail themselves of the same 
principle; and probably extend it furthe~.' 2 
Oliver Wolcott, writing under the pseudonym 
WMareustt, stated this view: 
Neither Great Britain nor the United States 
have ever aamitted that they were guilty ot 
the first infraction. It is, however, certain, 
that at length the Treaty was infraoted by 
both parties; and that the first infraction 
on the part of the United States was committed 
by the state of Virginia. 3 
Professor McLau~in held that •Both countries violated the 
treaty anQ.practically simultaneously- America by the acts 
against the loyalists and against the recovery of debts, 
England by the retention of the posts ~nd the transportation 
2 Channing, 136. 
3 o. Wolcott, British Influence on the Affairs of the Unit~~ 
States Proved and ~lained, Young and Minis, Boston, 1804, 
5.(This author blam~ wverything on the state of Virginia.) 
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of negroes." 4 This seened to be the most logical solution to 
thei question. 
DATES FOR CLARITY 
Some dates that will aid in making the situation 
a trifle clearer were given by Professor Channing. The docu-
ment to cease hostilities was signed by America on February 
14, 1783, and by Britain, February 27, 1783. Hostilities 
actually ceased in April of 1785. The Treaty of Paris was 
signed September 3, 1783, and ratified by congress, January 
14, 1784, and by Britain, April 9, 1784. Ratifications were 
exchanged at Paris on Iviay 12, 1784.. From this date then the 
treaty became a binding compact. on this very same day, 
Ha1dimand, speaking for Britain, stated that the posts would 
not be given up until there was some agreement about the loyal-
ists in ~erica. The necea~ary legislation tor carrying this 
treaty into effect was passed By Congress on May 30, 1783. 
Britain evacuated New York, carrying with her about 5000 .. negro 
slaves, on November 25, 1783. At that time the t-reaty was not 
5 
a binding agreement. 
JEFFERSON .AND HAMILTON'S VIEWS ON DEBTS 
Jefferson wa~ of the opinion that the treaty was 
4 A. McLaughiin, .,"The Western Posts and the British Debts", 
American Historical Association, Annual Retort, United 
states Printing Office, Washington, 1895, 21. 
5 Channing, et. passim. 
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violated in England before it was known in America, and in 
America as soon as it was known. England violated it by the 
acts of her commanders at the evacuation of New York. 
Since the individual states did not comply with 
the Congressional legislation ( tor carrying the treaty into 
e:f':f'ect.) immediately, England used this as a basis tor her 
arguments in the retention of the posts. 
Whatever may have been the original reason 
for their retention, a convenient excuse 
for holding the,posts soon arose when it 
became evident that the weak American 
Confederation was powerless to restrain 
individual states from putting obstacles 
in the way of the collection of British 
debts guaran~eed by the treaty. This was 
an ex post facto excuse, as we know, but 
a strong one. 6 
A change of' government in the interim affected the acts of the 
states. 
As soon as Hammond arrived in the United states 
he sent a letter to Jefferson enmnerating Britain's grie~anoes, 
and in this he was following Grenville's instructions. 7 
6 Bemis, 10 .. 
'If President asks about Posts and Forts -
You are to say that His Majesty would have 
restored these Posts and Forts immediately 
after the Ratification ot the beforamentioned 
Treaty, it the said States had complied 
with the Fourth and Fifth Articles of' the 
said Treaty in favour ·or British Creditors; 
7 This letter was published in A.S.P.F.R., but was too long 
to quote. 
And that His Majesty can never think of 
restoring the said Posts and Forts, until 
those Articles are fully complied with.' 8 
-51-
Hammond was on very friendly terms with Hamilton. 
This was important in considering the relationship between the 
three men, Jefferson, Hamilton and Hammond. Jefferson submitted 
an abstract of his reply to Hammond to Hamilton for examination. 
Hamilton in turn reiterated Jefferson's argmnents to Hammond. 
Something which a man of the Virginian's 
temperment certainly never would have done 
had he known that practically every argument 
so strongly made therein had already been 
neutralized by his colleague 1n confidential 
oral negotiations with the British Minister. 9 
Hamilton cannot be excused tor such conduct. 
Mr. Latane spoke of his actions in this manner: "He was willing 
to sacrifice everyone and everything to maintain peace with 
England. This explains his attitude towards Jefferson and his 
interference with the negotiations of his colleague through 
10 
secret conferences with Hammond." 
Jefferson's arguments were far superior to Hammond 
He cited cases where every state law that was contrary to the 
treaty of peace (and specificallymeant the laws regarding 
the collection of debts) had been revoked except in South 
Carolina. The law in this state affected the natives as well as 
8 Mayo, Vol. III, 9. 
9 Bemis, 106. 
lOJ.H. Latane and D. Wainhouse, 77. 
the British • 
••• that the recovery of debts was 
obstructed validly in none ot the 
states, and invalid!! only in a 
few; and that not ti 1 long after 
the infractions on the other side. 11 
JAY'S VIEWPOINTS 
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In a letter to Randolph sent during the negoti-
ations, Jay stated the British cause: 
••• that, therefore, it was not until 
the end of May, 17~, that Great Britain 
was bound to give any orders to evacuate 
the posts; that suCh orders could not 
arrive at Q.uebec, until in July, 1784; and, 
consequently, that the allegation of a breach 
or the treaty by the non-execution of the 
article respecting the posts, grounded on 
circumstances prior to the 13th July, 1764, 
are evidently unfounded; that, in the 
interval between the arrival and publication 
in America, of the provisional articles, and 
at the month of July 1784, by which time, at 
soonest, orders {issued after the exchange of 
ratifications of the treaty of peace, the 
last of !~y) could reach Quebec, incontestible 
violations of the treaty h.ad taken place in 
theUni ted Sta te·s •••• That in opposition to 
this, new legislative ac'&.s had, in the interval 
before mentioned, been passed, which were 
evidently calculated to be beforehand with 
the treaty, and to prevent its having its 
full ana fair operation on certain points and 
objects, when it should be ratified and take 
effect; that these acts were the first 
violation of the treaty, and justified Great 
Britain in detaining the posts until the 
injuries caused by their operation should be 
compensated. 
11 Wolcott, 18. 
.. ' 
That Great Britain was not bound 
to evacuate the posts, nor to give any 
orders for the purpose, until after the 
exchange of ratifications, does appear 
to me a proposition that cannot be 
reasonably disputed. 12 
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.Jay's points here were very logical. The British 
did not have to give orders for the evacuation until after the 
tatification of the treaty by both sides, which took place in 
May of 1784. Naturally the British had a good argument in this, 
and it was a very good method for retaining the posts. 
\ 
HISTORIANS ' VIEWS 
Dr. McLaughlin viewed the posts in this way: 
From the formation of the new Govermaent 
England was without valid excuse tor 
retention on the old ground. At least her 
merchants were called upon to make use of 
the courts offered her, or all pretense 
at retaliation was assumption and unjustified 
intrusion on our rights. 13 
Professor Bemis maintained that the British main-
tained the posts for economic reasons: uThe real reason tor thi 
'settl~ policy to refuse delivery of the posts, notwithstandi 
the terms of the treaty,t lies in the fur trade, at that time 
the greatest and most profitable single industry in North 
I 
14 America." 
There can be no 4oubt that Britain held on to the 
12 Public Papers of .John .Jay, 63. 
13 McLaughlin, 122. 
14 Bemis, 5. 
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posts for the lucrative fur trade, and also in the hopes ot 
building a neutral buffer state between America and canada. 
Mr. Burt disproved this theory by stating that such suspicions 
were the operation of prejudice. Although it was lo~g accepted 
by the United states, it was never proved. 
According to their own estimates, London 
imported annually from canada furs worth 
two hundred thousand pounds, ot which 
nearly two-thirds came from the American 
·side of the line, and the commercial debt 
of the whole interior was three hundred 
thousand pounds. We may therefore conclude 
that two-thirds of th.i s am.oUl'lt, or two 
hundred thousand pounds, was owing from 
American t~ritory. 15 
To conclude, the private gain was as dust 
in the balance compared with the public 
loss. From a purely business standpoint 
it was Britain's interest to deliver the 
posts to the Americans as soon as possible, 
if only the fur trade were taken into account. 
Therefore we must seek other reaaons for 
Britain's violation of the treaty. The 
indefinite retention ot the posts was due 
primarily to a British blunder and secondarily 
to an American weakness.· 15 
All of the negotiations between Jay and Grenville 
were oral, and thus were not recorded anywhere. The drafts of 
the treaty, one by Jay and the other by Grenville, were found 
in the archives of London. 
15 A.L. Burt, The United States . Great Britain and British 
North America, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1940, 84. 
lo Ibid., 85. 
-55-
SETTLEMENT 
The draft of the treaty by Jay called for the 
evacuation of the posts by June of 1795. Grenville wanted June 
of 1796. As the article stood in the final treaty, the posts 
were to be evacuated in 1796. Here Jay gave in to Grenville. 
Article II. His Majesty will withdraw 
all his troops and garrisons from all 
posts and places within the bGundary 
lines assigned by the treaty of peace 
to the United States. This evacuation 
shall take place on or before the first 
day of June, one thousand seven hundred 
and ninety six •••• 17 
Mr. Mowat by stating: ttJay, by getting these most 
valuable fur-trading posts, reaped where the very able American 
negotiators of 1782 had sown, tor the best posts were on the 
American side of the line." 18 thus admit~ed England's reason 
tor holding onto the posts. 
D~TS 
Since most of the debts due to the British were 
in the South, it was from this section that most ot the oppo-
sition to their payment was made. Most of the debts were due 
to commercial hou~es. The United States did not want to pay 
the interest on the debts during the war, because this was not 
expressly stipulated by the treaty of peace. 
17 J. Elliot, The American Diplomatic Code, Jonathan Eliot Jr.t 
Washington, l8~,·242. 
18 R.Mowat, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and 
Great Britain, E. Arnold&. co., London, 1925, 214. 
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Claims against the United states exceeded eighteen 
million dollars. 
~:~=-~=-~;;~~~·~"""0 ..0~--t 
" " Pennsylvania & Delaware..... 15,000 
" " States North of Maryland.... 218,000 
" " Five Southern States........ 3,869,000 
" " Virginia •••••••••••.•••••••• 18,500,000 
' 
~-·-·-----~. -~dft7b-~-·-I.Wt ....... 'l lob ............ __ "',.. .... ~ ....... 
19 
Virginia's debts far exceeded all of the other states. This was 
the reason for the strong opposition to the payment of the 
debts. 
The debts were to be settled in this manner: 
Article Vt. ••• It is agreed, th~t in all 
' such cases, where tull compensation tor 
such losses, cannot, for whatever reason, 
be actually obtained, had and received by 
the said creditors in the ordinary course 
of justice, the United States will make 
full and complete compensation for the same 
to the said creditors •••• For the purpose 
of ascertaining the amount of any sueh 
losses and damages, five Commissioners 
shall be appointed and authorized to 
meet and act in manner following •••• 20 
After the provisions of the treaty became known, 
two writers Deeius (who opposed it) and Camillus (in reality 
Hamilton and King- favored it} discussed this particular 
article in the followin&,Decius said: 
19 Wolcott, 12. 
20 Bemis, 326-329. 
The mode of adjusting t.he sum due to 
British creditors, agreeab~y to the 
sixth article, wil~ be unjust towards 
these states which have interposed no 
lawfu~ impediments in the way of 
recovering such debts, as they must 
also bear part of the burden, and 
thus suffer the delinquency of others. 21 
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Deoius was correct in this argument, for the taxpaying people, 
whether they owed debts to the British or not, would be further 
taxed to pay these ob~igations. Who wou~d have to help discharg 
the debt? The merchant, who had already ~o.st his property; the 
farmer, who had nothing to do in contracting the debt, yet he 
would be called upon to pay by means of a land tax. Deeius 
a~so felt that the matter should be left to the Americ~ courts 
rather than put a stigma on the United states. 
Regarding the use of the commissioners to sett~e 
the controversy, Camillus viewed it thus~y: 
Let it be remembered, the government of 
Great Britain has to consult the interests 
and opinions of its citizens, as wel~ as 
the government of the United States those 
of its citizens. The only satisfactory 
course which the former could pursue, 
in reference to its merchants, was to 
turn over the whole question of interest 
as we~l as the principa~ to the commissioners. 
And as this was truly equitable, the govern-
ment of the United States could make no 
well-founded opposition to it. 22 
2~ American Remem.brano.er, printed by Henry Tuckniss for Mathew 
Carey, Philadelphia, October ~o, ~795, II, ~22. 
22 The Works of Alexander H&md~ton, 295. 
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The United States also had claims upon the British 
tor illegal seizure and condemnation of American vessels in 
the West Indies as a result of the British orders in Counc11. 
Jay was also instructed to seek indemnification for than. 
This matter was to be settled by arbitration, as 
provided tor in article seven: 
Article VII - That for the purpose of 
ascertaining the amount of any such 
losses and damages, five Commissioners 
shall be appointed and authorized to act 
in London. 23 
This article was to be reciprocal, however, for it provided in 
addition to the above, the following: 
And whereas certain merchants and others 
of his Majesty's subjects, complain, that 
in the course of the war they have sustained 
loss and damage, by reason of the eapture 
of their vessels and merchandise, taken 
within the limits and jurisdiction of the 
states, and brought into the ports of the 
same, or taken by vessels originally armed 
in ports of said states. 
It is agreed tliat in al.l such cases 
where restitution shall not have been made 
agreeably to the tenor of the letter from 
Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, ••• 'he 
complaints of the parties shall be and 
hereby are referred to the commissioners 
to be authorized and required to proeeed 
in the like manner relative to these as to 
the other cases committed to them •••• 24 
23 Bemis, 326-329. 
24 MacDonald, 250. 
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Thus England was to ahara in compensation along 
with t.he United States, -·and the very tact that the commission-
ers were to meet in London {the fifth commissioner could easily 
be an Englishman) revealed the onesidedness of this article. 
Camillus showed that the 1atter part of the article could be 
used to America's advantage: "TWo characters are made essential 
to the cases in which the compensation is to be made; one, that 
the prizes were brought within our ports - the other, that we 
torebore to use all the means in our power to restore them." 25 
~ust how this could be used to America's advantage was a 
questionable matter. Camillus further stated that damages by 
capture~, which were not followed by condemnations, were pro-
vided for as well as those where condemnations followed. He sai 
that America could not aSk Britain to pay tor seizures ~til it 
was fairly ascertained what was to be paid, especially when she 
suspected that a good proportion ot the property might turn out 
to be French - not when she was in a position to dictate. 
In these two articles, arbitration was adopted tor 
the first time in history. 
'His Britannic Majesty shall, with all 
consistent speed and without causing 
25 Hamilton, 309. 
any destruction or carrying away any 
negroes or other property ot the American 
inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, 
garrisons, and fleets trom the said United 
States, and from every port, place and 
harbor within the same.' 26 
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The wording of this article was very ambiguous, 
tor it did not state exactly which negroes were meant - whethe 
the negroes that were wi~hin the British lines prior to the 
time of the treaty were meant, or those who came into British 
hands after the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged, 
was not definitely stated. With such ambiguity, it was diffi-
cult for Jay to have legal grounds to uphold the claims for 
indemnification of the slaves carried off at the evacuation of 
New York in November of 1783. 
Professor Ogg concluded that the British were 
forbidden to carry away the slaves after the signing of the 
treaty {September 3, 1783). It seemed to the writer that the 
treaty would be binding when it was ratified by both countries. 
This date was May 12, 1784, consequently Britain had not vio-
lated the treaty • 
• • • that the British were forbidden to 
carry away only such negroes as had come 
into their possession after the signing 
of the treaty at Paris, and that in the 
disposal of those within their lines at 
26 F. Ogg, "Jay's Treaty and the Slavery Interests of the 
United States-, American Historical Association, Annual 
Report for t~e year 1901, United Sta~es Government Printing 
Office, Wash1ngtan, 1902, I, 275. Thls article was a part 
of the Treaty of Paris. 
that tim..e they were left -entirely 
without restriction. 27 
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Jay's views regarding slavery would be Dnportant at this time: 
As to my sentiments and conduct rela-
tive to the abolition of slavery, the 
fact is this: - In my opinion every 
man of every colour and description, 
has a natural right to freedom, and 
I shall ever acknowledge myself to be 
an advocate for the manumission of 
slaves, in such way as may be consistent 
with the justice due to them, with the justice due to their masters, and with 
the regard due to the actual state of 
society. These considerations unite in 
convincing me that the abolition of 
slavery must be necessarily gradual. 28 
Jay was convinced that slavery was morally wrong, thus he was 
not too inclined to press the issue tor indemnification, 
especially if the whole negotiation would be negligible because 
ot it. 
Since the planters represented the agricultural 
interests of the United States, the government was just as 
obliged to secure justice for this class as well as the merchan 
class. The southerners said that they could not pay their 
debts, because their slaves, who worked the land tor them, 
were in British hands. 
Jay insisted to Grenville that the carrying away 
27 ~., 280. 
28 w. Jay, The Life of John Jay, J.J. Harper, New York, 18~3, 
I, 285. 
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of the negroes, contrary to the seventh article of the treaty 
of peace, was the first aggression. Grenville failed to see 
in this any violation of all. 
Britain maintained tha~ the slaves, once in the 
lines or Britain, were freed and no longer considered property, 
so no indemnification was necessary. Britain had abolished 
slavery, and had promised freedom to the American slaves who 
came within the BritiSh lines. This of course was a trick used 
to her own advantage. Some negroes left their masters to seek 
this freedom, while others were captured and became British 
property until given their freedom. It must be pointed out 
here that England did not always feel so obliged to carry out 
her promises especially regarding the evacuation of American 
posts. Mr. Ogg said: "In other wordB, the carrying away of the 
negroes was justifiable in view of the pledges previously made 
to them." 29 
Randolph wrote to Grenville "••• that while property 
is acquired in movables as soon as they come within the power 
of the enemy, yet property rights thus acquired in war may, 
by the treaty of peace be renounced." 30 By this statement 
Randolph admitted what day was careful not to, that the slaves 
became British property. 
Britain would not concede to pay for the slaves, 
29 Ogg, 282. 
30 Ibid., 285. 
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and :ray began to feel that the whole treaty was being en-
dangered by his refusal to yield on these comparatively minor 
issues. Mr. Lyman stated: "From any point of view the matter 
was too insignificant to wreck the treaty upon it, and :ray 
31. 
waived the claim." 
There was no mention made ot reparation tor the 
slaves in the final draft of the treaty. :ray abandoned this 
point, and the Southerners later felt - abandoned their inter-
ests tor the sake of the commercial privileges given to New 
England. 
The slave holders ot the south, knowing 
well the abolitionist propensities of 
:ray, were not slow to conclude that he 
had willingly betrayed their interests 
by trading off their claims in return 
for commercial privileges tor New England. 
And, moreover, since the people in 
the North could not find in the treaty 
any very substantial commercial advantages, 
the acquisition of which could be attributed 
to the abandonment of the slave owners' 
demands, there remained. little ground for 
hope that the question might not again 
disturb our diplomatic relations. 32 
Camillus stated that the laws of war gave England 
the right to possess real property which would fall into her 
hands. Negroes were personal property and liable to become 
booty, thus they belonged to the enemy as soon as they crossed 
the British lines. Britain was free to use them or set th~ 
31 Lyman, 305. 
32 Ogg, 295. 
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tree, but restitution was impossible. Camillus said: "Nothing 
in the laws of nations or in those of Great Britain therefore, 
will authorize the resumption of liberty once granted to a 
human being." 33 In answer to this, it could be said that the 
negroes were freed by BritiSh laws, but in the United States 
slavery was still a thriving institution, and there were no 
laws abolishing it. The slaves would not be considered free. 
Throughout this letter, Hamilton's detestation of slavery and 
his admi»ation for Britain can be clearly discerned. 
BOUNDARY 
The next question that came up for discussion was 
the boundary dispute. This was quite lengthy and detailed, but 
it will only be necessary to give a brief summary of this point 
of contnetion. By the treaty of peace, the northern boundary 
was set at 45°north latitude on the st. Lawrence River. This 
line was impossible because the Mississippi River rises south 
of the latitude of the Lak-ot-the-woods. A boundary gap of 
about 175 miles was left between the source of the Mississippi 
and the northernmost corner of the Lake-of-the-woods. In other 
words the Mississippi River was the western boundary, and the 
northern boundary ran from the, Lake-of-the-Woods to Lake 
Superior and followed the Great Lakes to the st. Lawrence 
River, then the St. Croix in the northeast. This dispute over 
33 Hamilton, 191. 
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the boundary grew out of a dubious identity of the River st. 
croix. Besides this question, Grenville insisted on settling 
the northwestern boundary. 
He felt that a line drawn due west from the Lake-
of-the-Woods would not strike the Mississippi River. He pro-
posed two lines therefore: one of which was a line from the 
West Bay of Lake Superior, due west to the Red Lake River (the 
east branch of the Mississippi), the boundary was tllen to run 
down that tributary to the main river; the second proposal was 
a line due north from the confluence of the St. Croix River 
to the Mississippi until it would meet the waterway between 
Lake Superior and the Lake-of-the-Woods. 
These lines would have meant a cessioa of between 
30,000 and 35,000 square miles of American territory. The 
United states would have lost valuable iron and copper deposits 
Jay held his ground on this point and refused to yield. 34 
The boundary dispute was provided for in the 
treaty. Article four provided that there was to be a joint 
survey beginning at 1° latitude below the falls of st. Anthony 
to the source of the Mississippi River. The boundary rectifi-
cation would be dependent upon the result of this survey. 
34 For map of Grenville's proposals see Appendix I. 
!IF 
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There was to be a join~ commission of three men to determine 
what river was intended under the name st. Croix. The com-
mission determined {at a later date) that the schoodiac was 
the river intended by the negotiators of 1783. This settled 
the northeastern boundary. 
CHAPTER V 
T.HE TREATY AND NEUTRALITY 
As a treaty of AMITY, it is partia~ 
and defective; 
As a treaty of COMMERCE, it is not 
reciprocal; 
As a treaty of NAVIGATION, it is 
humiliating 
And it is, in other respects, destructive 
to the prosperity, security and independence 
of the United States; and subversive to the 
CONSTITUTION. 1 
Throughout the following chapters, an attempt 
will be made to show whether this quotation was a truth or an 
untruth. 
PRINCIPLm OF NEUTRALITY 
Jay failed to obtain recognition, in the treaty, 
of the modern principles of the laws of nations. England held 
to her old principles, and would not waver. It was in this re-
gard that many authors telt the United States abandoned her 
treaty with France. In this part or the treaty Jay definitely 
departed from his instructions and the principles of America. 
FBEE SHIPS-FREE GOODS ABANDONED 
Jay abandoned the principle ttfree ships - free 
1 Am. Rem., III, 306. 
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goods~ in favor of the older principle "enemy ships - enemy 
goods", England's favorite. Article twenty•seven of the treaty 
was aimed directly at America's trade with Franca, and was 
contrary to a previous treaty with that country. :ray also 
abandoned one of the restrictions ( to make no treaty contrary 
to the one with France) placed in his instructions. 
Mr. Lyman stated: 
There was, also, an express declaration 
that the Flag did not cover the merchandise. 
This is the only treaty, signed by America, 
in whieh this acknowledgment can be found. 
We have never been able to obtain from 
England a denial of this right of the 
belligerent, but silence wears a different 
aspect from the direct confirmation of 
the legality and practice. 2 
Camillus naturally justified the article in many 
wa~ He believed that a belligerent had the right to search a 
neutral or an enemy ship, but he doubted if the enemy goods on 
board a neutral ship were seizable. The right of search was 
necessary to seizure. The captain of the enemy vessel could 
determine the just cause of search. 
2 Lyman, 305. 
The reasoning employed to prove that all 
neutral ships, on the main ocean, are 
liable to capture, is supported by the 
the ablest writers on public law, and 
their decision is believed to be unanimously 
in its favor. 3 
3 Hamilton, 448. 
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ThenCamillus discussed "why" the article was looked upon with 
s eorn: 
The principle complaint, is not, that 
the article exposed our own property to 
loss by capture, for this is not the 
ease, but that it does not prote~t 
enemy's property on board our vessels. 4 
Since England was at war with France at the time 
of the signing of the treaty, it would have been to America's 
advantage to recognize the principle that free ships make free 
goods, for she could profit by trading with France who badly 
needed neutral carriers. France's navy was no match for that 
of England's, because England was superior on the seas. An 
article recognizing this new principle by England would have 
been advantageous to Franee, thus England could never submit 
to such a recognition. In the treaty she was successful in 
maintaining the ancient rule "that enemy goods on a neutral 
vessel were liable to seizurert. She wanted this article in the 
compact, and so was willing to grant a few other concessions 
in order to gain it, for it meant much more to her than the 
few privileges. 
Camillus stated (again justifying England) -
"an impediment by any third nation to the exercise of the 
4 Ibid. 1 441. 
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right of capture on the ocean by either of the belligerent 
parties, would be an injury." 5 He sanctioned England's right 
of search and seizure. 
cato, another writer using this pseudonym, stated 
that article seventeen empowered Britain (contrary to the 
armed neutrality principle) to take enemies' property from 
aboard .American vessels. Even though the principle "free ships 
free goods" was new to the law of nations, the previous law 
of nations had been the law of the British Admiralty courts: 
following: 
5 Ibid., 4.4.3. 
I ask whether the neglect to make any 
precise stipulation in this case is not 
a new proof, of what I have before ob-
served, that where the law of nation was 
favorable to us, no stipulation was made 
to eritorce it; and that where it is 
unfavorable, there it is strengthened by 
an express provision? an instance of 
doubt occurring in this very article.-
Doubts might be entertained, whether 
neutral ships should not protect enemies' 
property - these doubts are determined 
against us, by the express words ot the 
article; while our right to freight, &c. 
is left to Judge Green's construction of 
the laws of nations. 6 
Decius stated his opinion of this article in the 
As a ne~tral and trading people, and as 
a nation, likely, with common prudence, 
ever to continue at peace with all the 
6 Am. R~, I, 228. 
world, we should have insisted, even at 
the risque or war, especially when making 
a treaty, that free vesBels should make 
free goods.With what people are we afraid 
or going to war, that we are so anxious to 
restrain the vessels of Great Britain from 
carrying their effects? There is but one 
country with which our government appears 
soliticious to embroil us, and that is 
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]'ranee. Should such a war really take place ••• 
is it probable Great Britain would become 
carriers for the Frsnch? and if she did, 
would our government dare to authorize her 
citizens to make prize of any property on 
board her vessels? 
Between the two Britain and France, 
what is to become of American vessels? 7 
The writers,who opposed the article, were of the 
opinion that even though the old principle (enemy goods could 
be seized in neutral vessels) was a part ot the law of nations, 
the modern interpretation, through recent treaties, changed 
or annulled this old law, and established another in its 
stead; equally binding on the world. Camillus, taking the oppo-
site viewpoint, reminded them "••• the treaties, which stipu-
late that free ships make free goods, also stipulate that 
enemy ships make enemy goods.n 8 In other words the goods or a 
neutral round in the ships of an enemy were liable to capture. 
Congress said that neutral bottoms should protect enemy goods, 
but here it stopped. The capture and condemnation of neutral 
7 Ibid., II, 158. 
8 Hamilton, 451. 
-'13-
goods found an enemy ship was never authorized by Congress, 
tor such an authorization would have been a violation of the 
9 
rights of neutral powers. 
Cato felt that the United States would probably 
be at peace while Britain would be at war many tiRes in the 
tuture, and would have the right to dispose of prizes in 
American harbors as provided for in the treaty. Britain was 
America's natural enemy (interests clashed because of the 
contiguity of their territories), thus if America were opposed 
to Britain in a naval war, the treaty would cease to operate; 
if America were her ally she would have privileges without 
the treaty. America, thereby, made the concession by giving 
10 in on this article. 
~ay definitely contravened his instructions by 
agreeing to article seventeen, for he was restricted in that 
he was not to make a treaty whiCh would be contrary to Americd 
treaty with Frane e.. Other treaties had been made with Holland 
and Denmark recognizing this new international law, and so it 
beeame·an American priUDiple, and in the ~ay Treaty the oppo-
site doctrine was accepted. 
Professor Bemis also criticized ~ay in the 
9 Ibid., 456. 
10 .Am..Rem~ ,cato No. XII, I. 
following: 
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Jay's Treaty failed to secure recognition 
of the principles of international maritime 
law which theUnited States under the Govern-
ment of the Confederation had written into all 
of its treaties with friendly foreign powers 
or allies - France, the Netherlands, Prussia, 
Sweden - principles which accorded with the 
definitions of the First Armed Neutrality. 11 
CONTRABAND 
In regard to contraband Jay practically admitted 
that provisions were cont,raband of war, although provisiOiils, 
as su~, were not mentioned in the treaty. By one word, however 
the United States committed herself to this doctrine, and the 
word was "existingn. When used with"the law ot nations•, it 
meant acquiesence in contraband, for Britain maintained that 
provisions were contraband of war by the •existing law of 
nations•. 
• •• whereas .the treaty of 1'144 does not 
in terms authorize the seizure of provisions 
and other articles not generally contraband, 
excepting in oases, when by the existing 
law of nations they become so. 12 
The writer disagreed with the opinion expressed 
by Mr. Gray regarding contraband: 
That by the modern law of nations, 
provisions are not, in ~neral deemed 
contraband; but they may become so, 
11 Bemis, 250. 
12 F.C. Gray, "Jay's Treaty Free Ships - Free Goods", North 
American Review, 0. Everett, Boston, 1823, XVII, 156. 
although the property of a neutral, on 
account of the particular situation of the 
war or on account of their destination. 
If destined for the ordinary use of life 
in the enemy's country they are not in 
general contraband; but it is otherwise 
if destined for the army and navy of the 
enemy, or for his ports of naval and 
military equipment, they are deemed 
contraband. 13 
-'15-
The question can be asked - who would determine the use of the 
provisions? One of the belligerents would maintain that the 
provisions were intended for military use, and would confiscate 
thaa; the other belligerent, for whom the provisions were in-
tended, would state that they were for the general use of the 
people. Up to this time in History, provisiams had not been 
considered contraband. Cato felt that Jay should have specified 
those oases (where provisicns would be seized and not be con-
sidered as contraband) as accurately as possible. The occasions 
for seizing articles of contraband were undefined. The judge, 
therefore, would have to determine (when a ship was brought in) 
whether her cargo , consisting of provisions and other article 
was or was not a case in which the provisions became contra-
band. England could now condemn every American vessel going to 
France, thereby leaving American commerce in the hands of a 
judge of the British Admiralty. 14 
13 Ibid., 153. 
14 Am. Rem., Cato No. IX, I. 
••• I have not yet, after the most diligent 
search, round a single treaty in whi~ the 
same latitude is given the word contraband, 
as Mr. Jay has given it in his treaty with 
Lord Grenville: nor have I met with one, 
though such possibility may exist, in whiCh 
no provision is made to guard the neutral 
ship from search and spoliation. 15 
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In the treaties with France, Spain, and Holland contraband was 
defined and confined to arms, munitions, and military stores. 
It did not, however, include naval stores as did the Jay Treaty 
Cato could not understand Jay's attitude in 
agreeing to let provisions and naval stores be contraband. 
Previously in a treaty with France, Britain ex~pted naval 
stores from the list of contraband. Even if certain articles 
were contraband, by common politeness, Britain should have 
exempted America as others had done, and as she herself had 
done with France. Cato said: 
l5 ~·· 221. 
"unpleasant": 
Britain already at war with a nation who 
furnishes us a good market for them.? Are 
they not staples, of our country, which 
we have a very considerable interest in 
shipping? What equivalent does the treaty 
hold out to us for ielinquishing this 
important branch of commerce? ••• will 
-77:,. 
Mr. Jay assert, that these were contraband by 
the modern law of nations? 16 
-
Even Camillus admitted that this article was 
I even admit that it has one unpleasant 
ingredien~ in it, and I ~ convinced 
that our envoy must have consented to 
it with reluctance. 
The most labored, and at the same 
time, the most false of the charges against 
the eighteenth article is, that it allows 
provisions to be contraband in cases not 
heretofore warranted by the laws(of nations, 
and refers to the belligerent party, the 
decision of what those cases are. 17 
His reasons for opposition were: 
It is this, that though the true meant~g 
of the clause, be such as I contend for, 
still the existence of it affords to 
Great Britain a pretext for abuse which 
she may improve to our disadvantage. 
I answer, it is difficult to guard 
against all the perversions of a contract 
which ill faith may suggest. 18 
Yet he found an excuse even for this: 
But while I confess, that the including 
of naval stores, among contraband articles 
is an ineligible feature of the treaty, I 
16 Ibid., 221. 
17 Hamilton, 468-469. 
18 Ibid., 476. 
ought to declare, that its consequences 
to the interests of the United States, 
as it regards the trade in those articles 
in time of war, do not appear to me im-
portant. 19 · 
SHIPS OF WAR AND PRIZES 
-78-
According to article twenty-four: ~It shall not 
be lawful for any foreign privateers ••• who have commissions 
from any other prince or state in enmity with either nation to 
arm their ships .in the ports of either of the said parties, 
nor to sell what they have taken, nor in any other manner to 
exehange the same •••• " 20 By this article, then, no power at 
war with Britain could sell its prizes in American harbors. 
This was contrary to the law of nations (independent of 
treaties) which provided that any nation may carry her prizes 
to a neutral port, and se£1 them. France, without an express 
stipulation to that effect in her treaty with America, had 
been permitted to sell her prizes in American ports. To with-
draw that license when France was involved in war against 
England would not only have been contrary to the law of nations 
but also would present an unfriendly appearance. 
Article twenty-five provided that America and 
Britain could bring prizes to each other's ports without having 
19 Ibid., 484. 
20 MacDonald, 255. 
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the prizes detained or seized. It also provided that no shelter 
be given in their ports, to ships of countries who made a 
prize upon the subjects or citizens of each ot the parties to 
the treaty. This article was an inconsistenc-y on Jay's part •. 
By the treaty with France, America had granted France the 
privilege of bringing her prizes to American ports, and it 
would seem that by this treatise France was definitely denied 
this privilege. Later on in the article, however, the following: 
was expressed: nNothing in this treaty cont'-ined shall, howeve 
be construed or operate contrary to former and existing public 
treaties with other sovereigns and states.n 21 This apparently 
exempted France, but it remained to be seen whether Britain 
would hold to her promise. 
CONCLUSION 
What advantages did America rec5tve regarding 
neutrality in this treaty? The answer is - none. America did 
not adhere to her doctrine that free ships meant free goods, 
a principle she had established in previous treaties. Jay also 
adhered to a new principle which operated to ~erica's disad-
vantage, namely, accepting provisions and naval stores as 
~ontraband. How provisions ethically and morally could be 
21 ~., 257. 
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listed as contraband was hard to discern. Although at a later 
date provisions were declared contraband. If the provisions 
were intended for military purposes, it would be more readily 
accepted, but when intended for general use, it cannot be de-
fended. Britain would agree to such an article because it 
worked to her advantage •. She was superior on the seas, and 
thereby was assured of obtaining her supplies. By this naval 
superiority she could also subdue her enemy faster by seizing 
provisions intended for her enemy's use. 
Th~ articles pertaining to ships of war and 
prizes worked to England's advantage once again. America, by 
agreeing to the document, maintained an unfriendly attitude 
to her former ally, France. Several of the articles were aimed 
directly at France by their indirect operation on America. 
England's advantages can easily be seen. 
Jay was to seek protection !or .American seamen 
against impressment into Britain's navy. This was specifically 
listed in his instructions. Yet not one provisiaa pertained 
to this subject. Jay cannot be criticized too severely for 
this because he could not wring concessions from Britain when 
he had nothing to use as a "persuader~. England was able to 
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dictate the terms of the treaty because of her superior po-
sition. She had no intention of abandoning impressment, for 
that was her only way of maintaining her navy. To have abandoned 
the whole treaty because of several small matters would have 
been foolhardy. By not obtaining a clause regarding the seamen, 
it seemed to the people that the government was not protecting 
the rights of its individual citizens. Even if Britain consente 
to abandon the practice in theory, it was doubtful whether she 
would have carried it out in practicality. Camillus said, " A 
general stipulation against impreswnent of our seamen would 
have been nugatory, if not derogatory." 22 This matter was 
a major issue previous to the war of 1812. 
Nothing was said pertaining to paper blockades. 
At the time they were quite numerous. 
22 Hamilton, 212, 
CHAPTER VI 
THE Cill~CIAL ASPECTS OF THE TREATY 
Blessed be the treaty makers! By their 
fruits, ye shall know them! 1 
Although Britain was supposed to have granted a 
number of concessions to America in regard to commerce, the so 
called concessions were negative. In reality America would have 
had to pay heavily for such favors. 
WEST INDIA TRADE 
The twelfth article of the treaty opened the 
British West Indies to American trade, and here Jay seemed 
(for the first time) to be fulfilling his instructions, but 
American vessels could not be heavier than seventy tons. In a 
way Jay was carrying out his orders, for the limiting of 
tonnage was distinctly stated. In return for this great favor 
from England, America was not to export to any port in the 
world any at the tropical products of the Indies (this was a 
British monopoly). These tropical products were specifically 
named: cotton, coffee, sugar, molasses, and cocoa. The stipu-
lation would have deprived America of the benefits she derived 
1 Am. Ram., II, 288. 
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from a state of neutrality during the war. The effect on the 
American cotton, which was just beginning to be an important 
export from America, can be readily se:en. Foreign nations 
would then become carriers tor American trade. 
Atticua criticized the article in this manner: 
This article robs us, at a blow, of the 
carrying trade, and deprives us of the 
privilege of exporting West India produce, 
although imported from other islands -
Nay, there is not one exception in favor 
of cotton, the growth of our own country; 
and it is well known, that we export cotton 
from some of the southern states to a 
considerable amount. 2 
Cato said: 
••• in considering the treaty in a more 
commercial view, that it contained an 
express relinquishment of the Indian 
trade; that it placed the West Indian 
commerce upon'as disadvantageous a 
footing, as to render foreign nations 
our carriers, not only in that trade, 
but in the exportation of many articles 
(as sugar, cotton, coffee cocoa) that we 
might import from the West Indies, or 
raise among ourselves; I proceed now to 
show that our vessels wtll become 
equally useless in the European trade, 
if the treaty goes into effect. 3 
Britain would sustain the whole of the carrying 
trade between the United States and her dominions or pos-
sessions. In 1789-1790 the American exports to Britain were 
2 Ibid. t 211. 
3 ~., I, 162. 
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9,363,000 tons; and the imports were 15,200,000 tons. 4 
England's advantage can be distinguished. 
Camillus, usually the champion of every article 
of the treaty, failed to look with fondness upon this commercia 
article. Yet he exonerated Jay by saying that the envoy was 
probably unfamiliar with the importance of cotton to the 
United States. 
4 Ibid., 162. 
The exclusion of all vessels above the 
burden of seventy tons would diminish 
the benefits and value of this trade; 
and though we cannot calculate upon 
obtaining by future negotiations a total 
removal of a limitation on this subject, 
it is not altogether improbable that a 
tonnage something larger may be procured. 
This limitation, though disadvantageous, 
is not the strongest objection to the 12th · 
article; the restraining or regulating of 
a portion of our trade, which does not 
proceed from, and is independent of,the 
treaty, forms a more decisive reason against 
the article than any thing else that it 
contains. 
The cause of this restraint is found 
in the commercial jealousy and spirit of 
monopoly, whicn have so long reigned over 
the trade of the colonies. 
To have lett it entirely open and free 
would have to have enabled us not only to 
supplT ourselves by means of our own 
navigation, but to have made it an instrument 
of the supply of other nations with her 
West Indies produetions. 5 
5 Hamilton, 402-403. 
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The wrath of the South was aroused because of 
this article. Jay not only failed to secure indemnification 
for the negroes, but he also bound the United states to ob-
serve a treaty whose stipulation curbed its commercial inter-
ests. Mr. Mowat maintained that the article only hurt the 
New Englanders who wished to get West Indian molasses tor 
6 
making rum. 
Frotessor Bemis stated the following: 
The restraints which the twelfth article 
have placed on American exportations of 
West Indian products, would have cut ott 
the reexportation not only of ~gli~ but 
ot French and all other foreign West Indian 
products, and incidentally it would have 
prevented for the period of the war then 
in existence between England and France 
the development of American domestic 
cotton export, the prospective importance 
of whiCh nobody then appreciated. 7 
Cato felt that America could do without the 
trade with the British islands, for only one-eighth of 
American trade was with them. As an example to further 
prove his point, he used the amount of sugar imported into 
the Unit.ed S'ta tes in 1790. He gave no authority to authenti-
cate his figures: 
5 Mowat, 25. 
7 Bemis, 258. 
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SUGAR IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED STATES IN 1790 
Fren~ Islands 9,521,829 lbs. 
Dutch Islands 2,707,131 
Danish Islands 2,833,016 
British Islands 
14,861,975 
2,230,647 
17,092,523 
On the other hand those islands were very dependent upon the 
United States tor their supplies. America could trade on her 
own terms. Britain was not reciprocal by opening the trade in 
the islands. 
Previous to the treaty Britain severely criticize 
France tor opening her West Indian trade to Amerioa who was a 
neutral nation, because France was involved in war. The openin 
of this trade was a supposed violation of a principle ot 
international law which was - trade not open to a neutral in 
time of peace, cannot be opened in time of war. By the J"ay 
Treaty, however, Britain opened her West Indian trade to a 
neutral~eric~in time of war. Yet she looked upon her action 
as being in accordance with the law of nations. England's 
8 Am. Ram., I, 230. 
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inconsistency can be seen; any violation of internationa1 1aw 
that worked to her advantage was to be upheld - if it worked 
to her disadvantage the action was a breach of maritLme law. 
England also violated international law in making a treaty with 
America at that particular time, b~cause a belligerent was not 
to make a treaty with a neut.ral during wartime. But this was 
not to be considered because of the supremacy of the country 
performing these indiscretions. 
The Senate refused to ratity the treat.y with this 
article as a part of it. In the final ratification it was sus-
pended with England's consent. For a further discussion see 
Chapter Eight. 
EAST INDIA TRADE 
A,rticle thirteen permitted the United Sill tes to 
trade in the East Indies also. This again was supposedly anothe 
great concession on England's part, tor her own subjects were 
not authorized to trade there. The Bast India Company had a 
monopoly on this trade. In a general overall view of the article 
it would seem a favor to ~erica, as usual, however, there 
again were restriction: 
But it is expressly agreed, that the 
vessels of the United states shall not 
carry any of the articles exported by 
thsm from the said British territories, 
to any port or place, except to some port 
or place in America, where the same shall 
be unladen •••• 
-sa-
It is also understood that the 
permission granted by this article, is not 
to extend to allow the vessels ot the United 
States to carry on any part of the coasting-
trade of the said British territories. 9 
These two restrictions nullified any advantages received by 
America in the first part of the article. 
Cato, Decius, and Camillus presented opposite 
viewpoints on the article, Decius and Cato being 1n agreement: 
Decius said: 
The merchants, who are certainly the most 
competent judges in these matters, contend, 
that the trade of the United States to the 
East Indies, is placed on a much worse footing 
than before. They assign, among others the 
following reasons: lst, That American vessels 
carry a small proportion of salted provisions 
to Bombay, · where they take in eot ton and 
sharkskins on freight to Uhina, which. was so 
considerable, as to enable them to lay in a 
return cargo to great advantage •••• 
2d. That American ships going to Bengal, 
frequently found very advantageous freights 
to some free ports in Europe •••• It is 
supposed that nine-tenths of our trade to 
the British East Indies was carried on in this 
way. 
3d. The direct trade to Bengal and Bombay 
was trifling until the sugar plantations in 
the West Indies were destroyed. We then imported 
9 MacDonald, 251. 
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sugar from the East Indies to advantage; 
but on the restoration of peace, this trade 
cannot be pursued but to disadvantage - the 
voyage being too long, the sugar not so 
strong ••• , and the supplies from the islands 
being sufficient tor any use we can make of 
th~, the former not answering to refine. 10 
Cato stated: 
The fact, with respect to that trade, is, 
that as the merchandizes carried to India 
consist of commodities which the European 
nations cannot conveniently supply together 
with money and necessaries for refitting their 
ships; As the proceeds of these cargoes are 
employed in purchasing India toods from the 
factors of the European nation at whose ports 
we trade, there is a clear profit in admitting 
us freely to their ports, and thereby rendering 
such ports the entrepots between the United 
States and India. 
The rBstrictions in the trade have thus 
narrowed, instead of enlarging, our advantages 
in trading to the British factories; but as all 
the others are open to us, she will be compelled 
to receive us or lose our commerce; and as her 
ports afford no peculiar advantage, neither 
the one nor the other merits our attention: 
the article as far as iit goes, is not good; 
but one can hardly call it bad, when connected 
with the rest of the treaty; the deficiency of 
grace in a single feature does not attract 
our noti~e, when the whole face is strikingly 
deformed. 11 
Camillus felt: 
It is said that we are already in the 
enjoyment of a less restrained commerce 
with the British territories in India, 
and that the treaty will alter it for the 
lO Am.. Rem!.t II, 136. 
11 Ibid., I, 219. 
worse: ina~uch as we thereby incapacitate 
ourselves to carry on any part or the 
coasting trade of the British territories 
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in India, and as we relinquish the profitable 
freights to be made between Bombay and 
Canton, and likewise those sometimes 
obtained from the English territories 
in Bengal and Ostend. 12 
Previously, the trade was only temporary and liable to vari-
ation at any time, but by the treaty it was placed on a more 
stable footing since Britain could not change the trade for 
twelve years (the period of time covered by the article}. 
The trade with the East and West Indies was not 
as opportunistic as at first believed. The merchants th~selves 
were not satisfied with the terms of the articles pertaining 
to this commerce. 
DOMINIONS AND TRADE 
The terms of the fourteenth article regarding 
trade with the dominions of Great Bri ts.in se~ed to be reeipro-
ealt but again the advantages were on the British side of the 
scale. American territories were opened to British merchants 
for trade, but American trade was confined to the spot pre-
cisely on which American traders found no interest in settling 
in canada. Therefore, American trade was practically limited 
-91-
to trade in .American territories. Ameri'can merchants received 
no advantages over British merchants. The British merchants 
camld trade with equal advantage in American territory, and 
superior advantage in British territory. 
Cato said: 
If the present arrangement will as I 
have shown, oppress our commerce and 
destroy our navigation - if it banishes 
our seamen, and starves our ship carpenters -
if it puts our whole trade into the hands 
of' foreigners even for a time "'! how many 
years will it take, under the wises~ and 
best ·arrangements, to recover the ground 
we lost? - Every thing must be re-created; 
and the discouragement we must then give 
to foreign navigation, after having lost 
our own, which will be felt by every order 
of people. This distress will again be the 
argument for new humiliations, and our 
subjugation to Britain be rendered perpetual •••• 
Why relinquish every thing, to gain nothing. 13 
EUROPEAN TRADE 
The article pertaining to the European trade 
read as follows: 
13 
It is agreed that no other or hi~er 
duties shall be paid by the ships or 
merchandize of one party in the ports 
of the other, than such as are paid by 
the like vess~s or merchandize of all 
other nations ~oat favored nation claus~ 
But the ritisb. government reserves 
to i tseU the right of imposing on 
.American vessels entering into the BritiSh 
;Am. Rem., Cato No. VII, I, 174. 
ports in Europe, a tonnage duty equal 
to that which shall be payable by 
British vessels in the ports of America: 
And also such duty as may be adequate to 
countervai~ the difference of duty now 
payable on the importation of European 
and Asiatic goods, when i~ported into 
the United States in British or in 
American vessels. 
In the interval it is agreed, that 
the United states will not impose any 
new or additional tonnage duties on 
British vessels, nor increase the now-
subsisting difference between the duties 
payable on the importation ot any articles 
in British or in Am.eri can vessels. 14 
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These last two provisions were assailed in the 
Uni~ed States, for the power of Congress {to regulate commerce) 
was challenged. This article regulated the commerce between 
America and Britain, which was a power of Congress. 
British vessels had to pay only 50 cents per ton 
on goods sent to .Am.erica, because the British merchant paid 
the same tonnage duty in .America as American citizens, and 
his return cargo paid no duties in England. On the other hand 
the American merchant could ship the same articles on the 
same terms, but by the fifteenth article, Britain had the 
right to lay on the return cargo a duty of ten per-cent - thus 
the American would have to pay 55 cents per ton. The British 
14 MacDonald, 253. 
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did not have to pay a tonnage duty in the West Indies, while 
the vessels of the United States did. America was prohibited 
by the terms of the article from imposing any new duties. 15 
CONCLUSION 
Naturally all of the det~ils of these aspects of 
commerce could not be brought forth in this work, for they 
were too numerous and detailed. 
In recapitulation then, {1) the treaty prevented 
the United States from imposing new duties on tonnage, while 
Britain was permitted to impose additional duties on American 
~ 
vessels; (2) the British could prevent America from carrying 
produce to France and Rolland, if she declared them in a state 
of seige •. ~erica eould not carry their produce to Europe. 
By the most favored nation clause Britain bene-
fitted, for there were many commercial opportunities that 
would be given to America which would not be given to Britain. 
For exam!'le, if Spain opened the IvUssissippi River to America. 
for trade, Britain would also share in it by this stipulation. 
Britain would not receive such an opportunity in her own 
behalf. 
Will Spain consent to open the 
Mississippi to us, when we have divided 
15 By article twenty-eight it was agreed that the frist ten 
articles of the treaty were to be permanent, and that the 
other articles (ex~ept the twelfth) were to be in effect 
for twelve years. The twelfth article was temporary, in that 
it was to last for the duration of the war between England 
and France or for two ears after the treat was ratified 
~--------------------------------~ 
the benefits with Great Britain? 
can it be supposed that she will 
have less jealousy ot.both, than 
she had of one? Events wiLl de-
termine these questions •••• 16 
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The commercial advantages certainly were on the 
side of Britain - America was probably receiving more com-
mercial advantages without the treaty. cato also felt this 
way, as the following will bring out: 
16 
Now let me ask, whether our commerce 
is not upon a much worse tooting, than 
it was before Mr. Jay went to England? 
Whether every injury, tor which he was 
sent to seek redress, has not been 
renewed with double rigour? 17 
Am. Ram., Atticus No. IV, II, 225. 
17 Ibid., I, 232. 
CHAPTER VII 
ANALYSIS OF OTHER ARTICLES 
The teleseope of Herschel is necessary 
to discover the advantages said to be 
contained in the treaty with Great 
Britain; for they are so distant and . 
so obscure, that, like the mountains 
in the moon, they can only be seen 
through an extraordinary magnifying 
medium. 1 
NATURALIZATION 
The second article o! the treaty not only per-
tained to the evacuation of the posts, but also provided a 
definite status tor the settlers who remained within that 
territory. These settlers could enjoy all o! their property-, 
and were .to be protected. They were at liberty to remain in 
the territory or to remove their effects. Those that r~ained 
were not required to become .Am.erican citizens or to take an 
oath o:t allegiance to the government. Those who did not declare 
their allegiance to the British king, "shall be considered as 
having elected to become citizens of the United states."' 2 
This was criticized because it declared who shall 
become citizens of the United states. The: right of naturali-
1 Am. Rem., II, 222. 
2 MacDonald, 245. 
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zation was given to Cpngress by the constitu~ion. In Article I, 
section 8 - nThe Congress shall have Power To establiah an 
3 
unito~ Rule of Naturalization •••• " The treaty supposedly 
gave this power to the president and senate, thus infringing 
upon a Congressional right. Atticus said: "••• but by the 2d 
article of the treaty, the president and senate have establishe 
a rule of naturalization within the precincts and jurisdiction 
of the posts. The pretended federalist. will supply a name for 
so daring an attack upon a constitution which they have extoll 
as the perfection of human wisdom." 4 
In considering the treaty, however, the British 
government was guaranteeing protection for its subjects, a 
course America would most definitely have taken. They were pro-
tected from being coerced into American citizenship. If after 
one year the settlers did not declare their alleagiance to the 
British king, they wera considered to have elected American 
citizenship. The text of the article did not say "are citizens", 
therefore, Congress could still determine whether they complied 
with the laws of naturalization. It was not taking a power 
away from Congress. 
INLAND NAVIGATION 
It is agreed that it shal'l at all times 
3 Ibid., 221. 
4 Am R~., II, 225. 
be tree to his Majesty's subjects, 
and to the citizens ot the Unit:ed 
States, and also to the Indians 
dwelling on either side ot the 
said boundary iine, treely to pass 
and repass by land or inland navi-
gation, into the respective territories 
and countries ot the two parties, on 
the continent ot America (the country 
within the limits ot the Hudson's Bay 
company only excepted) and to navi-
gate all the lakes, rivers and waters 
thereat, and freely to carry on trade 
and commerce With each other •••• this 
article does not extend to the admission 
ot vessels ot the United states into 
the seaports, Harbours ••• ot his Majesty's 
said territories as are between the mouth 
thereot, and the high~t port of entry 
from the sea. The river M1ssissippi shall, 
however, ••• be entirely open to both 
parties •••• 5 (article two} 
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Once again the treaty appeared ·to be reciprocal, 
but restrictions were apparent. This passage by land or 
inland was a greater acquisition tor Britain according to 
Decius. America did not have free navigation of the st. Lawren 
River and other Britiah waters. A British trader could set 
out from Canada and was free to bring his merchandise down to 
New York or Philadelphia. American merchants, however, were 
stopped at the highest point of entry to hire British cargoes. 
Deoius stated: 
Upon a cursory reading, it appears to 
~· 
• 
.---------------------------------------~ 
~ay Great Britain under a similar 
restraint but the least attention 
will discover this not to be the. 
case. It is this, 'British vessels 
:rrom the sea are not to be adliiitted 
into our rivera beyond the highest 
port of entry for vessels from the 
sea.' What~ Great Britain wish 
tor mor&? would her sea vessels 
ever att~pt, if permitted, to go 
further than the highest port or 
entry. 5 
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Camillus favored this freedom or inland navigation 
as being a part or the spirit of America: 
The maxims or the United States have 
hitherto favored a tree intercourse 
with all the world. ~ey have conceived, 
that they had nothing to tear trom the 
unrestrained.competition of commercial 
enterprise, ~d have only desired to be 
admit ted to it on equal t erma. 
Our envoy, therefore, in agreeing 
to a liberal plan of intercourse with 
the British territories in our neighbor-
hood has conformed to the general spirit 
ot our country, and to the general policy 
of our laws. 7 
Policy does not attaia anything it' it is not reciprocal. Since 
this provision was not reciprocal, it did not have any ad-
vantages for America. 
SEQ.UESTRA'r!ON AND CONFISCATION 
Debts, shares, or monies held by individuals of 
either country, whether they be in public funds or in private. 
5 Am. Ran., II, 122. 
7 Hamilton, 245. 
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or public banks, will not be confiscated or sequestered in 
time of war, so ran article ten. The following were the object 
protected by this article: (1} debts of individuals to indi-
viduals; (2} property of individuals in public funds; (3} 
property of individuals in public banks; (4) property of indi-
viduals in private banka. 8 
Some writers felt that sequestration and confis-
cation were retaliatory measures which could be used by a 
nation at war to its advantage. According to Cato: "··• £!; 
taliation is one of the laws of nations; but that law, so 
frequently essential to the support of our rights, is, by 
this article, entirely taken away, so far, at least, as re-
lates to this object." 9 Camillua was ot the opinion that it 
was heresy to view confiscation as the best means of ratali-
ation and coercion, and the only means of defense: 
That is the consequence of the favorite 
doctrine that the confiscation or 
sequestration of private debts is our 
most powerful, if not our only, weapon 
of defence. Great Britain is the sole 
power against whom we could wield it, 
since it is to her citizens alone, 
that we are largely indebted. 
What do we do to the other nations 
who might meance ua? - Or has Providence 
guaranteed us specially against the 
malice or ambition of every power on 
earth, except Great Britain? 10 
8 Ibid., Camillus No. XIX. 
9 ~. R~., I, 243. 
lOHamilton, 350. 
,.. 
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At that time .America owed millions o:t' dqllars to 
Britain not only in private debts but also in public debts. 
~erican citizens, on the other hand, held practically nothing 
in British funds or banks - here again Britain was protecting 
her subjects,having learned from her experiences in the Revo-
lutionary War. She had mueh to lose if her debts, both public 
and private, were confiscated. 
Decius said: 
It is true, Great Britain promises 
the same forbearance on her part; 
but upon a m.oment•s-reflection, it 
will occur, that this promise, even 
if observed, ia in reality no con-
sideration. Millions are due to the 
subjects of Great Britain from the 
government and from individuals of 
the United States; while, comparatively 
speaking, our citizens hold nothing in 
the British funds or banka, and have 
few, if any demands upon the subjects 
of that navion. 11 
Decius also declared that Bynkershoek, a reliable writer on 
international law, recognized the right to seize enemy proper-
ty (property her also included money). Camilius' view was 
just the opposite: 
The result is, that by the present 
customary law of nations, within 
the sphere of its action, there is 
no right to confiscate or sequester 
11 Am. R~., II, 128. 
private debts in time of war. 
The reason or moti Y>e of which 
law is the advantage and safety 
of commerce. 12 
Camillus was also of the opinion that property was liable to 
seizure as long as it was not trusted to public faith, but in 
America property was trusted to the public faith: 
This DEPOSIT is found in our hands, 
only in consequence of that confidence, 
which the proprietor has put rn our 
good faith, and it ought to be respected, 
even in case of open war. 13 
As to private property Camillus stated: 
As to private property in public funds, 
the right to meddle with than is still 
more emphatically aegatived. 'The state 
does not so much as touch the sums it 
owes to the enemy. Ever{ where, in case 
of war, funds credited o the public are 
exempt from confiscation and seizure.' 
These terms manifestly exclude sequestration 
as well as confiscation. 14 
Regarding this article, it se~s Camillus was very prolific, 
for he said in conclusiaa: 
Thus we perceive, that opinion and 
usage, tar from supporting the right 
to confisaate or sequester private 
property, on accoun~ of national 
wars, when referred to the modern 
standard, turn against the right, and 
coincide with the principle of the 
article of the treaty under examination. 15 
12 Hamilton, 347. 
l3 Ibid •• 
14 Ibid •• 
15 a±!· J 353. 
~ 
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CONCLUSION 
The other terms of the treaty were not too im-
portant. The author has chosen and diseussed the most sig-
nificant aspects of the document as they affected immediately 
the relationship between the United States and Britain. The 
treaty was viewed as it affected neutrality and the laws of 
nations; as it changed ~he commercial relationship with re-
gard to the East and West Indies, and the dominion and Europea 
trade; and the remaining articles affecting navigation, se-
questration and confiscation of debts. 
From all conclusions, the statement at the 
beginning of Chapter Five {page 45) concerning an evaluation 
of the treaty, could be considered as the truth. The treaty 
was certainly anything but reciprocal on Britain's part with 
regard to commerce, neutral rights and navigation. 
Whether another envoy could have obtained a bette 
treaty was problematical. Jay undoubtedly did his best under 
the circumstances. The treaty was valuable in that it was the 
first treaty to be made by the embryo nation, and the fact 
that it was with England aided in its importance. It did post-
pone the dismal prospect of war for a number of years. For 
this alone it should receive the highest commendation, even 
though it did laQk certain benefits. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE TREATY, THE SENATE AND THE EXECUTIVE 
Circular-
The President of the Uni~ed States to ; 
Senator for the State of • ----
Certain-matters, touching the public good, 
requiring that 1th e senate shall be convened 
on Monday, the Sth'of JUne next, yo~ are 
desired to attend at the senate Chamber, 
in Phi~adelphia, on that day, then and 
there to receive and deliberate on such 
communtcations as shall be made to you 
on my part. 1 
TREATY AND THE SENATE 
Although the president received the treaty, which 
was signed on November 19, 1794, in March 1795, he called the 
Senate into a special session on June 8, 1795 to discuss the 
ratification ot the treaty and ·other documents connected with 
it to the Senate (this is important to remanber when the House 
sought to obtain these same documents later on). 
After the preliminaries and the verification of 
credentials were accomplished, the following resolution was 
proposed: 
Ordered, That the Sinators be under an 
·injunction of secrecy on the communications 
this day received from the President of the 
1 Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the senate of the 
United states ot America, Dutl Green, Washington, 1828, I, 
177. Hereafter referred to as Ex. Jour •• 
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United States, until the further 
order of the Senate. 2 
This resolution was passed, thus secreay was to veil the 
discussions of the treaty in the senate. 3 
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The treaty was read and considered on June ll. 
On June 12 the following motion was brought forward: 
Ordered, That so much pf the resolution 
of the 8th instant as enjoins secrecy 
upon the Senators with tespeot to the 
nommunieations on that day received from 
the President, be rescinded. 4 
The S@nators agreell to postpone the discussion of this motion 
until saturday, June 13. On saturday the ~otion was passed 
in the negative; yeas 9, nays 20. 
The treaty itself was further discussed on the 
15th and loth, and on the latter date ... "It was agreed to 
refer the 12th article to the tuture discussions ot the senate 
and, after progress in the consideration of the 13th article 
5 
n 
• • • • 
The following motion was presented on Wednesday, 
June 17, after a discussion of only five days: 
2 Ibid., 178. 
-
3 since secrecy was imposed on the Senate, it is difficult 
and practically impossible to obtain any information about 
the discussions of the treaty within the chamber. Just 
the various motions that were proposed were given in all 
of the avaliable sources, and will be presented here. 
4 Ex. Jour., 182. 
5 ..!.ill.. ' 182. 
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senate 
concurring therein,) 'That they do 
consent to, and advise the ~esident 
of the United States, to r~tify the 
treaty ot Amity, Commerce, and Navi-
gation, between his Britannic Majesty 
and the United states ot America, 
concluded at London, the 19th day of 
November, 1794, on condition that 
there be added to the said treaty an 
article whereby it ~hall be agreed to 
suspend the operation ot so·~ueh ot 
the 12th article: as respects the 
trade which his said Majesty hereby 
consents may be carried on between 
the United States and his islands 
in the West Indies, in the manner, 
and on the terms and conditiams 
therein specified. 
'And the senate recommended 
to the President, to proceed without 
delay, to further friendly negotiations 
with his Majesty, on the subject ot 
the said trade, and of the terms and 
conditions in question. 6 
The Senate was ready to ratity the treaty with the suspension 
of the twelfth article. There was not too much opposition to · 
it in this branch of the government. 
The twelfth article was discussed further, and 
on Friday, June 19, this request was made of the president: 
6 Ibid •• 
Reaolve.d, That the President, of the 
Unitil !tates be requested to cause 
to be laid befor_e the senate the 
reports of John Jay while in the 
office of Foreign Affairs, the 
correspondence between the commander 
in Chier of the American army with 
Sir Guy Carleton, on the subject of 
the 7th article of the treaty ot 
Peace with Great Britain, and also 
Mitchel's map of North America. 7 
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The information desired was necessary in order to find Jay's 
views about the negro question, and the deli'V·ery of the posts 
by the British. 
The reconsideration of the motion, made on the 
17th, respecting the twelfth article was resumed on saturday, 
June 20. The three Tolumes of the reports of Jay, while 
Secretary of state, and the correspondence with Sir Guy 
carleton, were presented for an examination by the senate. 
Burr proposed, on June 22, that the motion of the 
17th be postponed in order to effect alterations on the follow-
ing artioles of the treaty: two, three, six, and twelve; while 
the ninth, tenth, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth be expunged. 
He wanted to change the second article so that the settlers 
and traders mentioned would have no privileges or rights other 
than t.hose which we;re given to them by the treaty of 1783. 
The third article he would obliterate or so modify it that the 
citizens of the United States could use all rivers etc. within 
British territories, in other words, have rights equal to the 
7 ~·· 183. 
,.-
~------------------~--------------------------~ 
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British rights in America. The British in consequence of not 
paying for the negroes carried awa~, would pay tor the loss 
and damage sustained by her retention of the posts. The 
twelfth article would be excluded unless the United states was 
not restrained in the exportation of any articles of the 
produae of the said islands. The discussion of this matter was 
postponed until JUne 23. It then passed in the negatiYel yeas 
10, nays 20. 
The motion ot the 17th respecting the ratific;atio 
of the treaty and suspension of the twelfth article was recon-
sidered. Senator Read made a motion, which was seconded by 
senator Butler, to amend the motion so that after the word 
"specified"~ast word in the first paragrap~these words be 
inserted: 
'And also tor obtaining adequate 
compensation tor the negroes, or 
other property of the .American 
inhabitants, carried oft tram the 
United States, in violation of the 
definitive treaty of peace and 
friendship, between his said Majesty 
and the United States, signed at Paris, 
the 3d day of Sept. 17B3.L 8 
After deliberation it was agreed that Read with-
draw his motion in order to introduce a motion drawn up with 
8 Ib,id., 185. 
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more consideration on the same subject. 
A motion was then made to postpone th~ motion 
~otion of the l7t~before the Senate to take into consideratio 
a list of reasons tor not ratifying the treaty. (1} The United 
States did not receive satisfaction tor the negroes carried 
away; (2) the rights of the individual states were unconsti-
tutionally invaded by the ninth article; (3) it rested on 
legislative discretion to exercise power prohibited by the 
tenth article; (4} the eommercial aspects lacked reciprocity; 
(5} the treaty prevents the United states tram controlling 
:1ns commerce and navigation with other nations; '6th.Becauae 
the treaty asserts a power in the President and Senate, to 
control, and even annihilat~ the constitutional right of the 
Congress of the Uni1ted States over their commercial. intercours 
with foreign nations.' 9 This was important,, in that, the 
Senate recognized the infringement of a Congressional righ~ to 
regulate commerce; the construction of this treaty might 
produce infractions ot treaties subsisting between the Uni~ed 
states and her allies: 'Notwithstanding the senate will not 
consent to the ratification of this treaty, they advise the 
President of the United states to continue his endeavors, by 
9 Ibid., 185-186. 
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triendly discussion with his Britannic Majesty, to adjust all 
the real Muses o:r complaint between the two nations .. ' 10 
This was passed in the negative; yeas lO, nays 
19. Another motion was proposed to divide the original motion 
o:r the 17th so as to adopt the first paragraph ending with the 
word "specified". This was passed in the affirmative; yeas 20, 
nays 10. The second paragraph recommending further negotiation 
was not adopted. The following men voted tor ratifying the 
treaty with the twel:fth article suspended: J. Livermore, New 
Hampshire; Cal.ebStrong and George Cabot, Massachusetts; 
Oliver Ellsworth and John Trumbull, Connecticut; Theodore 
Foster and William Bradford, Rhode Island; Rufus King, New 
York; .Tohn Rutherford, New .rersey; .Tames Ross and William 
Bingham, Pennsylvania; Henry Latimer, Delaware; R. Potts, 
Maryland; Humphrey Marshall, Kentucky; .racob Read, south 
Carolina. All of these men, with the exception of two, repre-
sented the New England and Middle Atlantic states. some ot the 
senators were absent on leave when the vote was taken. Ac-
cording to this tabulation, politically the North and Middle 
East were favorable to the treaty without the twelfth article. 
The people of these sections, however, were not so kindly 
10 Ibid., 185o 
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disposed to the treaty as was their senators. 
The nays were represented by a group ot "ir:reeon-,. 
cilables" from the South who wanted no part of the treaty 
whatsoever. They were the following men: Landon of New 
Hampshire; Robinson, Vermont; Burr, New York; Brown, Kentucky; 
Masons and Tazewell, Virginia; Bloodworth and Morton, North 
Carolina; Butler, South Carolina; JaCkson, Georgia. The 
senators from Vermont and New Hampshire were opposed to the 
article pertaining to navigation and trade with the Indians. 
The southern states stood together in voting against ratifi-
cation, for several reasons: the way the debts were to be paid, 
no further sequestration or confiscation ot debts, individual 
rights were curbe4. by the ninth article, and no clause pro-
viding for the payment of the negroes carried away. 
The secretary was ordered to lay the ratification 
paper before the president. 
on Friday, June 26, Livermore proposed,and Butler 
seconded, 'That the resolution of the 8th instant, enjoining 
secrecy upon the senate, with regard to the communications on 
that day I!Ulde by the President, be rescinded; but that it be 
nevertheless enjoined upon the senators not to authorize or 
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allow any publication in print, of the said communication, or 
any article thereat.' 11 This was passed in the affirmative; 
yeas l4, nays 12. It was moved by. Read to amend the original 
motion by adding to it - 'But that it be nevertheless enjoined 
upon the Senators not to authorize, or allow any eopy of the 
said communication, or of any article thereof.' 12 This was 
passed in the affirmative; yeas 14, nays 12; the question to 
agree to the motion as amended was passed in the affirmative; 
yeas 18, nays 9. 
Before the injunction ot secrecy was lifted from 
the Senate, senator Mason of Virginia obtained an inaccurate 
copy of the treaty, and had it printed in the Auro~a Inte1li-
gencer(Pennsylvania). The people in the South praised Mason 
for this action. 
THE TREATY .AND THE EXECUTIVE 
Arter washing'OO.n received notification that the 
Senate ratified the treaty with the suspension of the twelfth 
article, he became concerned about several questions which 
arose by this action of the Senate. In order to obtain advice, 
he sent the following letter to members or his cabinet, pro-
posing these questions: 
ll Ibid., 190. 
l2 Ibid •• 
Sir, 
-~12-
Phi~adelphia, 29 JUne, 1795 
I enc~ose to you a copy of the reso~ution 
of the senate, ad vi sing that the late treaty 
with Great Britain be ratified. Upon this 
resolution ~wo questions arise. 
First, is or is net that reolution 
intended to be the final act of the Senate; 
or do they expect, that the new article which 
is proposed shall be submitted to them before 
the treaty takes effect? 
Secon~y, does or does not the constitution 
permit the President to ratify the treaty without 
submitting the new article, after it shal~ be 
agreed to by the British King, to the Senate 
for their further advice and consent? 
I wishryou]to consider this subject as 
soon as posslble, and transmit to me your opinion 
in writing, that I may without delay take some 
det'ini tive step upon the treaty. 15 
It was decided, by all save Hamilton, that the president did 
not have to submit the treaty to the senate again with the 
new artic~e after England had consented to it. 
The only way that Washington's view of the treaty 
can be discerned was through his private and public corres-
pondence. It will be necessary at this point to quote exten-
sively from his letter to his cabinet and his :friends. He was 
especially cont'idential with Hami~ton, and it was through these 
letters that one can obtain a real insight as to the president' 
real feelings about the treaty. He did not intend that these 
~3 The Writings o:r George Washington, ed. by Worthington Ford, 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1889-1893, XIII, 60. Hereafter 
referred to as Washington- Writings. 
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letters be published, thus he would express himself freely. 
The president was not entirely pleased with the 
treaty - he had several objections to it, but they were over-
balanced by its advantages. Before sending it to the senate, 
he had resolved to r~tify it it it were approved by that body. 
He felt that he was acting in entire. accordance with the 
constitution- for he let it be his guide. He was criticized 
tor undertaking the negotiation [_a treaty of commerce] without 
the consent of the senate. ~he Senate did, however, confirm 
Jay 1 s appointment as envoy extraordinary~ Washington acted 
constitutionally throughout the entire negotiation and ratifi-
cation of the treaty. He was especially concerned over the 
unfavorable reaction of the public. 
In a letter to Hamilton, which was private and 
eonfidentia~, Washington stated: 
Philadelphia, 3 JU~y, 1795. 
MY DEAR SIR, 
It ia not the opinion of those who were 
determined (before it was Rrowulgated) to 
support or oppose it, that I mn solioitious 
to obtain; for these I well know rarely do 
more than examine the side to which they lean; 
without giving the reverse the consideration it 
deserves •••• My desire is to learn from 
dispassionate men, who have a knowledge of the 
subject, and abilities to judge of it, the 
, 
genuine opinion they entertain of each 
article of the instrument and the result 
of it in the aggregate. In a word, placed 
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on the footing the matter now stands, it is, 
more than ever, an incumbent duty on me to 
do what propriety, and the true interest of 
this country shall appear to require at my 
hands, on so important a subject, under such 
delicate circumstances. 
The treaty has, I am sensible, many 
relations, which, in deciding thereon ought 
to be attended to; - some of them too are of 
an important nature. - I know also, that to judge with precision, of its commercial 
arrangements, there ought likewise to be an 
intimate acquaintance with the various 
branches of commerce between this country and 
Great Britain as it now stands; - as it will 
be placed by the treaty, - and as it may 
effect our present, or restrain our future 
treaties with other nations. 14 
Here Washington was very interested in the commercials aspects 
of the treaty, for he wanted to know whether the t~eaty placed 
America on a more advantageous footing. He showed his interest 
in the commercial interests of the country. He was criticized 
for this by the people who felt that he should have been just 
as concerned about other class interests. In this letter he 
did not mention the other articles of the treaty or how they 
affected the country in general. 
In another private letter to Hamilton, Washington 
criticized the co~~ercial parts of the treaty especially 
14 Ibid., 61. 
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article three as it acted upon the trading interests of the 
American merchants: 
PHILADELPHIA, 13th July, 179 • 
MY DEAR SIR, 
The most obnoxious article {12th} being 
suspended by the Senate, there is no occasion 
to express any sentiment thereon. - I wish, 
however, it had appeared in a different form. -
And altho' it is but said to presume that, no 
further advantage c:COul.d have been obtained in 
the 3d article, yet the exclusion ot the vessel& 
belonging to the Uni~ed States from all the 
'Seaports. Harbours, Bays, or Creeks ot His 
Majesty,' when theirs are admitted into all 
ours, to the highest Port ot entry, is not 
marked w1 th reciprocity. - It may be urged and 
truly, that under the existing regulations ot 
the B. governmEilt, we are not, at this time 
allowed those privileges; except when they 
are made to subserve their own purposes: whilst 
from Q.uebec (but how we are to get there I know 
not,) and upwards, -the lakes, and waters 
on their side of the line, are open to our 
commerce, and that we have equal advantages in 
the Indian t~de on both sides; except within 
the limits of the Hudons's bay company. 
All this looks very well on paper; but 
I much question whether in it:s operation it 
will not be found te work very much against 
us. 
My opinion ot this article therefore is, 
that it would have been more tor our peace, if 
not tor our interest, to have restrained the 
traders ot both nations to their own side of 
the line, leaving the Indians on each, to go to 
whichsoever their interest, convenience, or 
inclination, might pro~pt them. This woul6 have 
thwarted the views of the British on the 
Mississippi, whilst all the doors into 
upper Canada• and the West ern Country 
would have been as wide open to them, 
as they are now made by the trea~­
and no difficulty I am persuaded would 
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have been tound by our people, of introducing 
goods across the line, at~er they had got 
them to it, and the Posts possessed by us, 
if this avenue should be found the most 
convenient and cheapest. 15 
Still another letter showed Washington's concern 
over the commerce of the nation: 
15 Ibid., 65. 
MOUNT VERNON, 29,July, 17.95. 
MY DEAR SIR; 
That it has received the most tortured 
interpretation, and that the-writings against 
it (which are very industriously circulated) 
are pregnant of the most abominable w.ts-
representa~ions, admits of no doubt; yet, 
there are to be found, so far as my inform-
ation extends, many well disposed men who 
conceive, that in the settlement ot old 
disputes, a proper regard to reciprocal justice does not appear in the Treaty; •••• 
In a word, that as our exports consist 
chiefly of provisions and raw materials, 
which to the manufeaturers in G. Britain, 
and to their Islands in the West Indies, 
affords employment and food; they must have 
had them on our terms, if they were not to be 
obtained on tneir own; whilst the im~orts 
of' this country, offers the best mar et tor 
their fabrics; and of course, is the principal 
support of their manufacturers; but the 
string which is most played on, because it 
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strikes with most force the popular ear, 
is the violation, as they term it, of our 
engagements with-France; or in other words 
the predilection shown by that ins,trument 
to G. Britain at the expence of the French 
nation •••• it is the interest of the French 
(whilst that animositf, or jealousies between 
the two nations exist) to awil themselves 
of such a spirit to keep us and G. Britain 
at variance; and they wil~in my opini~ 
accordingly do it. 16 
To Randolph, the secretary ot State, washington 
expressed his deep anxiety over the reception of the :;,;reaty. 
He was not worried as to how this reflected on himself, but 
because the French could use this confusing situation to their 
advantage: 
MOUNT VERNON, 29, .July, 179 
MY DEAR SIR; 
I rtew the opposition, which the treaty 
is receiving from the meetings in different 
parts of the Union, in a very serious light; 
not because there ~s ~ weight in ~ of 
the objections, wh1ch are made to it~an was 
foreseen at first, for there are none in some 
of them, and geosa misre~resentations in Oinirs; 
nor as it respects mysel personally, tor this 
shall have no influence on my conduct, plainly 
percei v1ng, and I am accordingly preparing 
my mind for it, the obloquy whiCh disappointment 
and malice are collecting to heap upon me. 
But I am alarmed on account of the effect it 
may have on, and the advantages the French 
government may be disposed to make of, the 
spirit which is at work to cherish a belief in 
them, that the treaty is calculated to favor 
16 Ibid., 78. This was a private letter to Alexander Hamilton. 
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G.B. at their expense •••• but, when they 
see the people of this country divided, 
and such violent opposition given to the 
measures ot their own government pretendedly 
in their favor, it may be extremely em-
barrassing to say no more of it. 
To sum the whole up in a few words, 
I have never, since I have been in the 
administration of the government, seen a 
crisis, which in my judgment has been so 
pregnant of" interesting events, nor one 
f"rom which more is to be apprehended, 
whether viewed on one side or the other. 
From New York there is, and I am tol.d 
will fUrther be, a counter current; but 
how f"ormidable it may appear, I know not. 
If the same does not take place at Boston 
and other towns, it will afford but too 
strong evidence, that the opposition is 
in a manner universal, and woul.d make the 
ratification a very serious business 
indeed.But, as it respects the FrenCh, 
counter resolutions, even would, for the 
reasons I have already mentioned, do 
ltttle more than weaken, in a small degree, 
the effect the other side would have. 17 
In still another letter to Randolph he expressed his fears: 
MOUNT VERNON, 31, JUly, 1795. 
MY DEAR SIR, 
• • • that the prejudices against 1 t ~reatYI 
are more extensive than is generally imaginer 
···• How should it be otherwise, when no 
stone has been lett.unturned, that could im-
press on the minds of the people the most 
arrant misrepresentation of facts; that their 
rights have not only been neglected, but 
absolutely sold; that there are no reciprocal 
advantages Iii'"'"l'h e treaty; that the beneti ts 
are all on the side of G.B.; and, that seems 
to have had more weight with them than all 
the rest, and was the most pressed, that the 
1? Ibid., 80-81. 
,... 
' 
treaty is made with the design to 
oppress the FrenCh, in open violation 
ot our treaty with that nation, and 
contrary, too, to every principle of 
gratitude and sound policy? ••• If the 
treaty is ratified, the partisans of 
the FrenCh (or rather of war and 
confusion,) -will exei te themselves to 
hostile measures, or at least to 
unfriendly sentiments, if it is not, 
there is no forseeing all the conse-
quences which may follow, as it 
respects G.B •• 
It is not to be interred trom 
hence, that I am or shall be disposed 
to quit the ground I have taken, unless 
circumstances more imperious than have 
yet come to my knowledge should compel 
it; for there is but one straight course, 
and that is to seek truth and pursue it 
steadily. 
The form of the ratification requires 
more diplomatic experience and legal 
knowledge than I possess, or have the 
means of acquiring at this place, and 
therefore I shall say nothing about it. 18 
PROVISION ORDER 
While the friends of the treaty were trying to 
muster opinions favorable to it, Britain renewed or seemingly 
renewed her Order in Council of June a, 1793. This order 
authorized Britaints navy to seize ships carrying provisions 
to France. Because of this order Washington hesitated to give 
his final ratification to the treaty. He gave expression to 
these thoughts in a letter to Jay written August 31, 1795: 
18 ~., 85. 
It has not been the smallest ot these 
embarrassments, that the domineering 
spirit of Great Britain should revive 
again just at this crisis, and the 
outrageous and insu~ting conduct of 
some of her officers should combine 
therewith to play into the hands of 
the discontented and sour minds ot 
those, who are friends to peace, 
order, and friendship with all the 
world; but this by the by. 
The abject of this letter is to 
pray you to aid me with suan hints, 
relative to these points, which you 
conceive to be fit subjects tor the 
further friendly negotiations on the 
trade with Great Britain, agreeably 
to the recommendation of the Senate; 
and which appear to have been in 
contemplation by the concluding part 
of the treaty signed by yourself and 
Lord Grenville. 19· 
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This order was secret even as late as June 27, 1795, for it 
was not even known·in London. It was communicated to cruisers 
only, and was only known when captures brought it to light. 
Josiah Neucomb threw a new light on the order when he claimed 
that the order was not a renewal of the old one, but a secret 
instruction to British captains: 
19 Ibid., 99. 
'··· we, not judging it expedient to 
continue tor the present the purchase 
of the said cargoes ~eized corlij on 
behalf of our government are pleased 
to revoke the said article until our 
further order therein, and to declare 
that the same shall no longer remain 
in force; but we strictly enjoin the 
commanders of our ships of war and 
privateers to observe the remaining 
articles of the said instructions, 
and likewise all other instructions 
which we have issued and which still 
remain in force.' 20 
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By this edict the old order was partially abandoned. The new 
order was issued in 1795, and read as follows: 
••• and ordered that commanders of 
British ships of war {privateers 
were not included) detain all ships 
laden with corn or provisions bound 
for France or to ports occupied by 
French armies whenever the commanders 
had reason to believe that such ships 
were laden •on account of the said 
per•ons (exercising the powers of 
government in France) or of any of 
His Majestyts enemies.• 21 
The commanders were only to stop ships believed to be laden 
with provisions headed for France. How this was possible 
cannot be ascertained unless all ships were captured. Although 
the wording of the new order was different than the old order, 
in reality it was exactly similar, for American vessels, with 
provisions for France, were being captured as in 1793. 
1~. Neucomb further stated: 
Everything that was done refused to be 
done, everything that was said on our 
part involving the new instruction and 
what resulted from it, was based on the 
assumption, now known to be erroneous, 
20 Josiah Neucomb, "New Lights on Jay's Treaty", The American 
Journal of International Law, American Society of Inter-
national Law, Concord, New Hampshire, 1934, 28, 685. 
21 Ibid., 688. 
that the similarity referred to existed. 
The outward manifestations were the same. 
Provision vessels under our flag were 
being seized by British cruisers. 22 
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This had an indirect bearing on the treaty, for 
now it proved conclusively that Jay acquiesced in the principle 
that provisions were contraband: 
The worst of it was that the renewed 
depredations apparently confirmed the 
charge insisted upon by Madison and 
insistently denied by Hamilton, that 
Jay in the treaty had acquie$ced in 
the British policy of provision 
seizures, against which Jefferson had 
argued so soundly that the British 
Minister was unable to answer him; 
and which no American could be sustained 
in defending. Assuming, as everybody did, 
that the secret instruction was similar 
to the Order in Council of June 8, 1793, 
it followed either that the British 
were deliberately ignoring the treaty 
on the thin excuse that it had not yet 
been ratified; or that they de~ed Jay 
to have made the concession charged 
when he agreed to the ~anguage of 
Article 18 at the treaty. 25 
The importance of the woDding of this order was 
important in another way for its effect on the treaty. Mr. 
Neuoomb explained the significance of knowing the difference 
in the provision orders: 
••• you will observe that it was 
founded on indisputable information, 
22 Ibid., 587. 
23 Ibid., this was quoted from the British Record Office, 
FOreign Office, 5:9. 
of the accuracy of which the American 
Government especially can have no doubt, 
that cargoes of provisions had in a very 
great number of instances and to a very 
large extent been actually purchased by 
French agents in foreign countries, and 
shipped tor France under fictitious names. 
And as by the established Law of Nations 
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as expressly recognized by the American 
Government, its cargoes of this description 
would have been liable to seizure and 
confiscation if no such instruction had 
existed, the issuing of it cannot by any 
construction be said to afford any reasonable 
ground of complaint or even dissatisfaction. 
Much less when it is considered that all 
the vessels detained under this order have 
been dealt with according to the precise 
terms of the article contained in the 
late Treaty, by whieh it expressly pro-
vided th14t the oonduct of the two nations 
shall tor the present b! governed by 
the rules there laid down. 24 
This shift in the orders has escaped the notice 
of historians. There was no document to prove that the British 
borrowed from the instructions of .Tune, 1793. Pia.kering, the 
Secretary of state, was notified ot this shift by Phineas 
Bond. In my opinion 1~. Neucomb stressed this shift too muah, 
for the facts indicated that American ships were being seized 
under the same circumstances as the ships that were seized 
under the old order. 
Marshall pointed out how important Washington 
24 Ibid., 690, this was also quoted from the British Record 
O??Ice, Foreign Office, 5:9. 
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telt this order to be, for he hesitated in taking action for 
the final ratification of the treaty unt11 the order was 
~itted: 
Apprehending that this order might be 
construed as a practical construction 
of the article in the treaty whien 
seemed to favour the idea that pro-
visions, though not generally contraband, 
might occasionally become so, a con-
struction in whica he had determined 
not to acquiesce, the. president thought 
it wise to reconsider his decision of 
the result of this reconsideration, 
there is no conclusive testimony. 25 
CONCLUSION 
In a letter to Randolph, Washington presented his 
conclusions regarding the treaty: 
MOUNT VERNON, 22, Ju}.y, ~795. 
DEAR SIR, 
The first, that is, the condition~ ratifi-
cation (if the late order, which we have 
heard of,, respecting provision vessels, is 
not in operation,) may, on all fit occasions, 
be spoken of as my determination, unless fr~ 
from any thing you have heard or met with 
since I left you, it should be thought more 
advisable to communicate further with me on 
the subject. My opinion respecting the treaty 
is the same now that it was, namely, not 
favorable to it, but that it is 'better to 
ratify it in the manner the Senate have 
advised, and with the reservation already 
mentioned, than to suffer matters to remain 
as they are, unsettled. 25 
25 John Marshal~, The Life of George Washington, C.P. Wayne, 
Philadelphia, ~807, V, 519. 
26 Washington-Writings, 69. 
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The question respecting immediate ratification 
was brought before the cabinet on August 12, 1795. John 
Marshall's resume of th!s meeting will also serve as a con-
clusion for this chapter: 
The secretary of state maintained 
singly the opinion, that during the 
existence of the provisipn order, and 
during the war between Britain and 
France, this step ought not to be 
taken. This opinion did not· prevail. 
The resolution was adopted to ratify 
the treaty immediately, and to accompany 
the ratification with a strong memorial 
against the provision order, which should 
convey in explicit terms the sense of the 
Ameriean government on that subject. By 
this course, the views of the executive 
were happily accomplished. The order waa 
revoked, and the ratifications or the 
treaty were exchanged. 
The president was most probably 
determined to adopt this course by the 
extreme intemperance with which the 
treaty was opposed, and the rapid 
progress which the violence was 
apparently making. 27 
Washington felt that as undesirable as the treaty 
was, it was better than the prospects ot war. Professor Bemis 
very pointedll and humorously brought out Washington's disap-
proval: "We uan imagine that when Washington decided to accept 
the treaty, he kept it at arms length and with the other hand 
28 
closed his nostrils." The president signed the treaty on 
February 28, 1795 because there was no other course to follow. 
27 Marshall, 633. 
28 Smeriean Secretaries of State 
s. Beiils I. Krio i? New York 
Diplomacy, ed. by 
89. 
OH.APTER IX 
THE TREATY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES . 
He the president shall have power, by 
and with the advice and consent ot the 
senate, to make treaties, provided twa-
thirds ot the senators present concur. 1 
TREATY -MAiaNG POWER 
The above quotation placed in the hands ot the 
Executive and the senate, the authority to make treaties. It 
will be necessary to keep this quotation in mind in the dis-
cussion that is going to follow while the treaty was in the 
House. It was necessary tor the treaty to appear on the rostrum 
ot the House, since financial appropriations were necessary 
{tor the salary ot the various commissioners and for the fi-
nancing of the work or the commissions to settle the differ-
ences) in order to carry out the treaty. It was here that the 
real opposition to the document was met, for the House more 
accurately reflected the opinions of the people. Thus this 
chapter and the next will be representative of the people. 
Before discussing this aspect of the treaty, first 
of all a clear understanding of the treaty-making power must 
be given: 
1 F. Ogg and P. Ray, Introduction to American Government, 
D. Appleton co., New York, 1942, 991. 
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Under the artieles of confederation, 
Congress made treaties; and the framers 
of the constitution at first thought ot 
giving the power to the Senate. As, 
however, the coneept of the presidency 
grew in their minds, the opinion de-
veloped that it would be better to 
assign treaty-making along with the 
general management of the country's 
foreign relations, to the chief ex-
ecutive, assoeiating with him the 
Senate as an advising and restraining 
council. The House of Representatives 
was deliberately omitted from the plan 
in the interest of 'secrecy and despatch,' 
and the assent of two-thirds, rather than 
a simple majority, in the senate was pro-. 
vided tor in order to prevent treaties 
from being made too lightly, and also 
to give sectional interests like the 
New England :risheries added protection 
against being 'sold out.• 2 
This was a precise account of the treaty-making power. There 
was no mention made that the House was concerned in this 
aspect of foreign relations. The constitution ommitted to say 
anything about the conaurrenee or consent o:r the House in 
appropriations necessary to ea.rry a treaty into effect. If this 
particular phase of treaty-making had been specifically pro-
vided for in the constitution, many debates over the Jay Treaty 
would have been unnecessary. 
These debates were very lengthy, and cannot be 
presented in their entirety in this work. The most important 
2 Ibid., 644. 
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arguments presented on both sides will be given consideration. 
These opinions ~ould be viewed in the light ot what has been 
previously presented regarding the treaty-making powers. In 
these debates Madison, Giles, Baldwin and Livingston, opposea 
Smith, Harper, Sedgwick and Hillhouse, who presented the 
Federalist point of view. 
LIVINGSTON'S RESOLUTION 
When Washington committed the treaty to Congress 
on March 1, 1795, it seemed that "This was the signal in the 
House of Representatives to let loose the pent up wrath 
against this measure, whieh had only been restrained, until 
official notice of its ~atifioation should be received." 3 
reaolution: 
On March 2, Livingston proposed the following 
'That the President of the United Statea 
be requested to lay before this House a 
copy of the instructions to the Minister 
of the United States, who negotiated the 
Treaty with Great Britain, communicated 
by his Message of the 1st of March, 
together with the correspondence and 
other documents relative to the said 
Treaty.' 4. 
~~. Livingston averred that his purpose in asking for the 
papers was for the 2ake of information, but it was a question 
3 The Life and Corres..P.ondenae of Rufus King, ed. by Charles 
King, G.P. Putnam's sons, New York, 189~, II, 39. 
4 T.H. ~enton, Abridgment of Debates in Congress, John C. Revis, 
D. Appleton &. co., NewcYork, 1857, I, 640. Hereafter re-
ferred to as Abridg. of Debates. 
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as to what point this information was to apply. He affirmed 
that his object was n~ an impeachment of the president, 
unless when the papers were obtained they would make such a 
step advisable. The House resolved i tselt into a Committee of 
the Whole House to discuss the resolution. 
Mr. Murray said that he was against the resolutio 
for the following reasons: 
Mr. MURRAY said, that he was against 
the :resolution for two reasons. which 
then struck his mind forcibly. The first 
was the want. of a deola:ned object within 
the acknowledged cognizance of the House; 
the other was because he believed ~t was 
designed as the groundwork of a very 
dangerous doctrine, that the Houee had 
a right to adjudge, to adopt, or to 
rejeot Treaties generally, Had the 
gentleman stated the objeot tor which 
they called for the papers to be an 
impeachment, or an inquiry into fraud, 
as a oircumstanceattending the making 
of the Treaty, the subject would be 
presented under an aspect very different 
from that whieh it had assumed. He 
considered a Treaty, constitutionally 
~ade, to be the supreme law ot the 
land. The Treaty in view had been 
negotiated and ratified, he thought 
agreeably to the constitution. It has 
been issued, by the PRESIDENT'S procla-
mation, as an act obligatory upon the 
United States. If the House mean to go 
into the merits ot that instrument, and 
the information be called for with that 
view, he should teel himself bound by the 
constitution to give it every opposition. 5 
5 Annals of congress, Gales and Seaton, Washington, 1849, 429. 
Mr. Lyman was also opposed to the motion: 
If the resolution tended only to this 
object anxiety allayed, it was effecting 
a valuable purpose, but there was, he 
said, another consideration of vast im-
portance, which was, whether the Treaty 
had encroached upon the Legislative 
powers of the constitution. As to that 
point, he would not admit the papers 
could not be expected to give much light. 
But if the House chould conceive their 
constitutional powers extended to a 
consideration of the subject, undoubtedly 
they ought to be in possession of the 
papers in question, and all the information 
relative thereto. 6 
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Even Madison was no~ enthusiast of the motion 
as it was first proposed: "The resolution, in the form in which 
it was first presented, was liable to objec.ttion; the mover had 
removed the objection in great measure; by adding an exception 
7 
to the papers r~quested." 
On Maro~ 7 Madison moved to modify or amend the 
motion by adding: 'Except so muCh of the said papers as, in 
his judgment, it may not be consistent with the interest of. 
the United States, at this time to disclose.' 8 The amendment 
lost by a vote of 37 to 47. Madison realized that all the 
papers could not be had by the House because of the need tor 
secrecy in foreign affairs~ The other members of the House 
6 
.!.lli·, 428. 
7 . Ibid., 4.38. 
8 Ibid •• 
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felt differently, however. 
Mr. Smith presented another point of view re-
garding the papers pertaining to the treaty: 
It would b~ placing him[the Executiv~ 
in a·situation which it was to be hoped 
the Executive would not be placed in; 
for if he sent them it was explicitly 
saying, he had been negligent of his 
duty in not communicating them before; 
if he refused, it was setting up 
department against department, a 
situation of all others to be regretted. 9 
Mr. Gallatin took the opposing side by stating: 
••• - conceived that whether the House 
had a discretionary power with respect 
to treaties, or whether they were 
absolutely bound by those instruments, 
and were obliged to pass laws to carry 
them.fully into effect, still there waa 
no impropriety in calling for the papers. 10 
Mr. Lyman and r~. Holland expressed their views on 
this subject: 
9 
Mr. Lyman: 
Ibid., 457. 
He was against the resolution now 
on the table, as involving a doctrine, 
in his opinion, not only inconsistent 
with the principles of the constitution, 
but also inconsistent with the laws of 
nations •••• How far that House had a 
right to exercise their Legislative 
discretion and judgment relative to 
carrying the Treaty into effect. 11 
10 Benton, 645. 
11 ~., 658. 
Mr. Holland: 
The question is not whether the Treaty 
is a good or bad Treaty, but it is 
whether we have a right to exercise 
our judgments upon it. Then,,without 
any regard to the Treaty, we must be 
governed by the rational construction 
of the fundamental principles or 
government. 12 
some representatives viewed the resolution as a 
stepping stone to a violation of the rights of the other 
branches or the government. Others felt that the House was 
obliged to carry the treaty, constitutionally made, into efteo • 
several representatives introduced the theory that in Britain 
the king had to show all papers relative to a treaty, to the 
House of Commons before that body would pass the necessary 
legislation for carrying the treaty into etfeot. This was an 
absurd argument, for what Britain did in her parliamentary 
procedure did not have 'tO be followed by America. America's 
government was built upon a structure entirely different from 
that of England, thus the comparison was rutile. 
Mr. Williams stated that one of the reasons why 
the House was not vested with the authority to make treaties 
was for the purpose of secrecy, which was a necessity in 
12 Ibid., 661. 
foreign relations. Then, too, since the House was not con-
ferred with either the power to alter or amend the treaty, 
13 the papers were unnecessary. 
The discussion on the call for the papers led 
into a consideration of the question of, treaty-making. Here 
again many of the arguments were very tautalogical. A few o~ 
the more important ones will be presented here. 
I~. Gallatin presented one phase of the argument, 
while ~. Smith of South Carolina presented the Federalist 
view: 
1:v!r • Gallatin: 
The treaty-making power delegated to 
the Executive may be considered as 
clashing with that congressional 
authority to regulate trade. The 
question may arise whether a Treaty 
made by the PRESIDENT and Senate, 
containing regulations touching · 
objects delegated to Con~ess, can 
be considered binding, without 
congress passing laws to carry it 
into e:tt'ec.t. 14 
Mr. Smith: 
The PRESIDENT and senate have, by 
the constitution, the powers ot making 
Treaties:, and the House have no agency 
in them, excepting to make laws necessary 
to carry them into operation.) he considered 
13 Only the important arguments were presented, for they 
set forth the central points upon which all of the other 
one were based. 
14 Benton, MO. 
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the House as bound, in common with 
their fellow-citizens, to do every thing 
in their power to carry them into full 
execution. He recognized but one exception 
to this rule, and that was, when the 
instrument was clearly unconstitutional. 
In this case, he remarked, it had not 
been said that the Treaty was unconsti-
tutional. 
By adopting the treaty the Ex-
ecutive sanctioned the work of his 
agent. · 
Diplomatic transactions are in 
all countries of a secret nature; in 
the progress ot negotiation, many things 
are necessarily suggested, the publication 
of which may involve serious inconvenience 
and disadvantage to the parties negotiating. 
OUr constitution has, therefore, wt·sely 
assigned this duty to the Executive, the 
precedent attempted to be established is, 
then, a dangerous one; for it not only 
tends to alter the nature. ot the Govern-
ment, but to endanger the interests of 
the country. This is the first instance 
of the kind since the establishmBnt of 
the constitution the Executive has, 
indeed: of his own accord, communicated 
to us such papers relative to negotiations, 
as appeared to him proper to lay before 
us, and as might show the public he was 
pursuing the requisite steps for obtaining 
redress. But there is not one solitary 
instance on the .rournals, of a movement on 
our side to obtain such papers, where he 
has not deemed it proper on his part to 
transmit them. In this case, the PRESIDENT, -
has communicated the Treaty, without any 
papers accompanying it. This is an evidence 
of his sentiments. Had he thought it his 
duty to have communicated the instructions 
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and correspondence, he would unquestionably 
have done it. It has been said that he would 
refuse a compliance with sueh call, if he 
thought it improper; but this was no reason 
for making a wan~on call; ••• if, after this, 
they are requested, and he sends ':them., it 
will .be an avowal., on his part, that he 
committed an error in not sending them at 
first, or that they have been extorted from 
him. This call is then calculated to place 
him in a painful dil~; he must either 
resist the application ot this House, or 
surrender essential Executive rights. 
In the business of Treaties, the 
constitution has provided no other c~eck 
than the requisite concurrence of the 
Senate, and the right of impeachment by 
this House; unless, therefore, this call 
is predicted on an intention to impeach, 
and so stated and understood, it is an 
encroachment on the Executive, and will. 
be attended with serious consequences. 15 
Mr. Smith's argumen~ was better prepared than Mr. Gallatin's. 
He anal.yzed every point in a very logical manner, and used 
the constitution as his guide. He carefully pointed out the 
necessity of keeping the treaty-maki:r;J.g power in the senate 
and the E:xecuti ve. Since the papers were not being asked for 
with the intention of an impeachment, th~ were not necessary 
in order to carry the treaty into effect. The Senate had gi~en 
ratification to the document,. and the president intended to 
sign it, therefore, it was not up to the House to consider 
the treaty in any of its aspects. Mr. Smith's argument waa 
15 Ibid., 541. 
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presented in its entirety because of his excellent ideas 
about this aspect of government. 
As opposed to :Mr. Smith, Mr. Nicholas presented 
the following: 
This must be considered as a sufficient 
answer to the gentleman from south Carolina, 
when he said, that the PRESIDENT and Senate 
possessed the treaty-making power; for the,y 
possessed it with qualification, in matters 
of money; and unless the House chose to 
grant that money, it was so far no Treaty. 16 
Mr. Giles agreed with Mr. Nicholas with regard to treaties 
needing appropriations: 
The checks on the Trea ty-mald.ng power 
he considered as divisable into two 
classes; the first, consists in the 
necessary concurrence of the House to 
give efficacy to the Treaties; which 
concurrent power they derive trom the 
enumeration of the legislative powers 
of the House. Where the Treaty-making 
power is exercised, it must be under the 
reservation; that its provisions, so 
tar as they interfere with the specified 
powers delegated to Congress, must be 
so far submitted to the discretion of 
that department of Government. 
The other cheek over the Treaty-
making power, he noticed, was the power 
of making appropriations, the exercise 
of which is specifically invested in 
Congress •••• This is no doubt intended 
as a check in addition to those possessed 
by the House. It is meant to enable the 
House, without the concurrence of the 
16 Ibid., 642. 
other branches, to check, by refusing 
money, any misehiet in the operations 
carrying on in any department of the 
Government. 
If the PRESIDENT, said Mr. Giles, 
can, by the assistance of a foreign 
power, legislate against the rights 
of the House to legislate, and his 
proceedings are to be binding on the 
House, it necessarily destroys their 
right to the exercise of discretion. 17 
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Mr. Findlay also presented a very logical argument in the 
following: 
The Treaty-making power is not vested 
in Congress; the negotiating part of 
making Treaties is partly of an Ex-
exuctive nature, and can be most 
conveniently exercised by the department, 
and is, therefore, vested in the PRESIDENT 
and Senate. The PRESIDENT' shall have the 
power to make Treaties, two-thirds of the 
Senate agreeing therewith. 
[Regarding the argument that the president 
had no authority in negotiating a commercial 
treati\ The power of making Treaties is 
admittied to be so extensive as to emb~ace 
all subjects arising under the law of 
nations, for securing amity and friendship 
betwixt nations, and for the mutual pro-
tection of the citizens in their corre-
spondence with each other. Authority for 
this purpose is not vested in Congress 
among the enumerated powers, but expressly 
given to the PRESIDENT and Senate; therefore, 
Treaties to this extent, ratified under 
their authority, are the l~ws of the land 
according to the constitution. 
The powers specifically vested in 
Congress are so explicitly checked and 
guarded as to form an unequivocal limi-
tation to the Treaty-making power, when it 
17 Ibid., 655-656. 
extends to powers specifically vested 
in the Legislature, consisting of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, 
with the approbation of the PRESIDENT. 18 
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Mr. Hillhouse felt that the House should examine 
every treaty when asked to carry it into effect; on the other 
hand, he did not consider the House as having a constitutional 
right ~o interfere in making treaties, or that a treaty needed 
concurrence of the House to make it the law of the land. He 
was under the impression that treaties were exactly on the 
same tooting as laws in their operation on previous laws, that 
is, suspending and repealing such as were repugnan~. 19 
'I'he House voted on the Livingston Resolution on 
March 24.. The Resolution was passed in the committee of the 
Whole House by a vote of 61 to 38 - a majority ot 23. Then 
the House passed the resolution with a vote of 62 yeas to 37 
nays. 
WASHINGTON'S REPLY 
The Resolution was placed before the president, 
and after much deliberation {tor this would be establishing 
a new and somewhat dangerous precedent} Washington refused to 
send the papers. A part of his reply read: 
18 Ibid., 668. 
19 Ibid., 90. 
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To admit, then, a right in the House 
of Representatives to demand and to 
have, as a matter of course all the 
papers respecting a negotiation with 
a foreign power would be to establish 
a dangerous precedent. 
It does not occur that the inspection 
of the papers asked for can be relative to 
any purpose under the cognizance of the 
House of Representatives except an im-
peachment which the resolution has not 
expressed. 20 
The instructions were not sent to the House, and according to 
~~. Bowers, the president was wise in not sending them: 
Meanwhile, the papers should not be 
sent because the instructiams to Jay 
would 'do no credit to the Administration.' 
some would disappoint and inflame the 
people. 21 
The only instruction that would probably inflame the people 
would be the one concerning the opening of the West Indies te 
~erican trade. Washington established a precedent, in tha~, 
whenever the House asked for papers, the,y were to be furnished 
only at the discretion of the chief executive. 
BLOUNT'S RESOLUTION 
When the president refused to send the papers 
relative to the Treaty, Blount, in retaliation, proposed the 
following resolution: 
20 Ibid., 693. This entire letter is printed in Appendix II. 
~also the private letter to Hamilton explaining further 
Washington's reasons for refusing to send the papers 
(Appendix III). 
21 Bowers, 298. 
'Resolved, That it being declared by the 
second section of the second article of 
the constitution ••• , the House of Repre-
sentatives do not claim any agency, in 
making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty 
stipulates regulations on any of the 
subjects submitted by the constitution 
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to the powers of congress, it must depend, 
for its execution, as to such stipulations, 
on a law or laws to be passed by congress. 
And it is the constitutional right and duty 
of the House of Representatives, in all 
such cases, to deliberate on the expediency 
or inexpediency of carrying such a treaty 
into etteot, and to determine and act thereon, 
as, in their judgment, may be mc:st conducive 
to the public good. 
'Resolved. That it is not necessary to 
the propriety of any application from this 
House to the Executive, for information 
desired by them, and which may relate to 
any constitutional functions of the House, 
that the purpose for which such information 
may be applied; should be stated in the 
application. 22 
The executive would then know the reason for wanting such 
papers, and would probably be more amenable to sending them. 
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Vfhole House, 
and after a short debate, affirmed by a vote of 57 to 35, ~ 
right to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of 
carrying a treaty into effect, and to determine and act as in 
their judgment may be most conducive to the public good. 
The president and the House were now completely at issue. 
22 Benton, 696. 
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EXECUTION OF THE TREATY 
·Mr. Hillhouse submitted a resolution providing 
that the treaty be carried into effect: "Resol'Ved, That 1 t is 
expedient to pass the laws necessary to carry into effect the 
treaty lately concluded between the United states and the king 
of Great Britain." 23 Mr. Maclay of Pennsylvania submitted a 
resolution to the opposite effect. The question was to decide 
which one should be discussed first. Madison preferred the 
one suggested by Hillhouse, because the burden of the affirma-
tive would be placed on the adversary, and this was an ad-
vantage in a debate. Since Jay's Treaty was the first treaty 
to be made with a foreign nation under the new government, the 
treaty-making power was under scrutiny. 
The treaty was discussed in its many aspects. 
the arguments expounded were similar to the ones used by the 
various writers of the time. These objections have been.dis-
cussed, thus 1t will be unnecessary to repeat them now. The 
new arguments that were given, however, will be discussed, 
especially as they bring out the sectional interests. 
Mr. swanwick, being a merchant, explained in 
detail the reasons why the merqhants favored the treaty: 
23 Works of Fisher Ames, II, 37. 
But it is asked, it this Treaty be so 
Ull.favorable to commerce, why are the 
merchants so much in favor ot it. 
They explain the reason themselves. 
They are influenced by the present rather 
than future interests. Five million of 
spoliations they look to the Treaty to 
repay; their prop~rty afloat, they fear 
to be taken, and war they· dread; but ' 
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is there really weight in these arguments? 
I am ••• interested ••• in shipping, and 
have suf':tered the loss ot one of my cargoes 
at Bermuda, for which my undarwriters have 
made me only a partial allowance; but I 
neither dread any war on the part of 
England, situated as she now is, nor 
expect any payment of my loss from the 
Treaty •••• 
••• and the oomndssioners on 
spoliations are to act in London merely 
as arbitrators of the law at nations, on 
wh~ our claims of spoliations is at best 
but a very uncertain dependence. The 
merchants in sundry parts of the United 
states having thought it so, have claimed 
the interference of Congress in advancing 
them money, they rather doubted getting 
any where else. 
I judge it on its own merits, and 
these must lead me to vote for the propo-
sition to suspend appropriations, especially 
in a moment when our seamen continue to be 
impressed and our ships to be taken. 24 
Mr. Giles, in discussing articles six and ten, 
brought out some interesting points: 
••• this assumption of debt, without any 
obligation tor so doing, was extremely 
improper, particularly when it is recol-
lected that this article sweeps away all 
24 Benton, 710. 
acts of limitation, and relates to the 
whole extensive sense or business 
carried on in the United States from 
the extremes of New Hampshire to the 
extremes of Georgia, for an unlimited 
time before the Revolutions ••• but if 
he were to choose between indemnification 
to the American merchants for recent 
spoliations committed upon their commerce, 
or the payment of these debts, he should 
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not hesitate to prefer the first alternative; 
because to that there were known limits; 
to the other there was not, nor any date 
for calculation under the mode of adjustment 
prescribed by the Treaty. 25 
The tenth article: 
British subjects have great sums, both 
in public and private funds in the Uni~ed 
States. American citizens have little or 
no property in public or private funds 
in Great Britain. Hence the evident and 
substantial inequality of this reciprocal 
stipulation. On the other hand, Ameriaan 
citizens have a great share of property 
on the water, with very little naval 
protection, and of course subject to 
the naval superiority of Great Britain. 
It, therefore, Great Britain had 
stipulated, in case of war that in con-
sideration of a refusal on the part of 
the United States, to sequestrate proper-
ty of British subjects upon land, she 
would not molest the property of American 
citizens upon water. There would have been 
a substantial, instead of a nominal reci-
procity; as the article now stands there 
is an important right conceded, and no 
compensation obtained. 26 
25 Ibid., 716. 
26 Ibid., 717. 
-144-
This point was very well explained by ~~. Giles, and certainly 
the article would have been reciprocal if Britain would have 
promised to protect American property at sea, as America waa 
to protect British property on land. 
After much discussion "pro" and "con~, Mr. 
Griswold rose to a point of order so to speak, by saying: 
That in his opinion, the extensive 
view which the committee were taking 
of the merits of the Treaty with Great 
Britain was unwarranted by the Consti-
tution of the United States; that he 
did not believe any part of the ~reaty­
making power had been delegated to the 
House of Representatives; and that the 
committee might with as much propriety 
examine the merits of the constitution 
itself, for the purpose of deciding 
whether they would execute it or not, 
as to examine the Treaty in the manner 
which had been adopted in the committee. 27 
Mr. Gallatin expressed in a few words the hysteri 
in which the country was involved: 
He could not help considering the 
cry of war, the threats of a disso-
lution of Government, and the present 
alarm, as designed for the same purpose 
that of making an impression on the 
fears of being involved in a war, that 
the negotiation with Great Britain had 
originated; under the impression of 
fear, the Treaty had been negotiated and 
signed; a fear of the same danger, that 
of war had promoted the ratification; 
27 Ibid., 735. 
and now, every imaginary mischief 
which could alarm our fears, was 
conjured up, in order to deprive 
us of that discretion, which the 
House thought. they had a right to 
exercise, and in order to force 
us to carry the Treaty into effect. 28 
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Fisher Ames of Massachusetts made his famous 
speech in behalf of the treaty, even though he vehemently 
opposed it. By his oration he converted a number of his 
colleagues over to the pro-treaty group. His speech was very 
eloquent, for he appealeQ to the patriotiwa of his fellow 
representatives to pass the necessary legislation to earry 
through the treaty. Throughout the entire speech his patriotis 
rang through almost every word, tor he tried with all of the 
oratorical eloquence he had to get the others to join the 
"bandwagon". 6 ome e:xeerpt s will now be given: 
Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, 
and, when once roused, so difficult to 
pacify, that, if we could prove the 
alarm was groundless, the prejudice 
against the appropriations may remain 
on the mind, and it may even pass for 
an act of prudence and duty to negative 
a measure which was lately believed by 
ourselves, and may hereafter be miscon-
ceived by others to encroach upon the 
powers of the house. Prineiples that bear a 
remote affinity with usurpation on those 
powers will be rejected, not merely as errors, 
but as wrongs. Our sensibility will shrink 
28 ill!·, 740. 
from a post where it is possible it 
may be wounded, and be inflamed by 
the slightest suspicion of an assault. 
It will be impossible, on taking 
a fair review of the subject, to justify 
the passionate appeals that have been 
made to us to struggle for our liberties 
and rights, and the solemn exhortations 
to rej.ect the proposition, said to be 
concealed in that on your table to 
surrender them forever. In spite of this 
mock solemnity, I demand, if the house 
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will not concur in the measure to execute 
the treaty, what other course shall we take? 
How many ways of proceeding lie open before 
us? 
In the nature of things, there are 
but three: we are either to make the treaty, 
and to observe it, or break it. It would 
be absurd to say we will do neither. If I 
may repeat a phrase already so much abused, 
we are under coercion to do one of them; 
and we have no power, by the exercise of 
our discretion, to prevent the consequence 
of a choice. 
By refusing to act, we choose: the 
treaty will be broken and fall to the 
ground •••• In ease we reject the appropri-
ation, we do not secure any greater liberty 
of action, we gain no safer shelter than 
before from the consequences ar the de-
cision •••• It is neither just nor manly 
to complain that the treaty-making power 
has produced this coercion to act. It is 
not the art ot the despoti~ of that power, 
it is the nature of things, that compels. 29 
He was saying, in effect, that to pass the necessary legis-
lation was the best alternative. Nothing eould be gained by 
refusing, and much might be lost. He continued: 
29 Ames, 40-41. 
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On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. 
If I could find words for them, if my 
powers bore any proportion to my zeal, 
I would swell my voice to such a note 
or remonstrance, it should reach every 
log-house beyond the mountains. I would 
say to the inhabitants, wake from your 
false security; your cruel dangers, your 
more cruel apprehensions are soon to be 
renewed; the wounds, yet unhealed, are 
to be torn open again; in the daytime, 
your path through the woods will be 
ambushed; the darkness of midnight will 
glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. 
You are a father - the blood of your sons 
shall fall in your cornfield. You are a 
mother - the warwhoop shall wake the 
sleep of the cradle. 30 
Ames was certainly appealing to the patriotism of the repre-
sentatives when he painted such pictures or dark forebodings 
(as the last paragraph indicated). His examples were very 
abstract. 
eloquence: 
30 Ibid., 64. 
In conclusion he really burst forth with his 
Let us not hesitate, then, to agree 
to the appropriation to carry it into 
faithful, execution. Thus we shall save 
the faith of our nation, secure its 
peace, and diffuse the spirit of 
confidence and enterprise that will 
augment its pro~perity • 
••• Profit is every hour becoming 
capital. The vast crop of our neutrality 
is all see wheat, and is sown again to 
swell, almost beyond calculation, the 
future harvest of prosperity; and in 
this progress, what seems to be fiction, 
is found to fall short of experience. 31 
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Every representative was moved by this stirring speech at the 
time, but when the vote was taken this oratory was forgotten. 
this way: 
Professor Channing summed up Ames' speech in 
He declared that the opposition to the 
treaty was political, was not based upon 
the provisions of the instrument but was 
due to the desire to inflame the public 
passions against the government. The oppo-
sition was not to this treaty, but to 
any treaty with Great Britain. None should 
be made with a monarch or despot, there 
would be no naval security while these 
sea robbers domineer on the ocean. 32 
When the motion was voted upon in the Committee 
of the House, the vote was divided 49 to 49; it remained for 
the chairman, Mr. Muhlenburg to decide. He voted for the reso-
lution so that it could go to the House. In the House the 
vote stood; yeas 51, and nays 48. The necessary appropriations 
were passed on April 29, by a majority vote of three. It was 
an expensive victory for the Federalists because the majority 
of the country was on the other side. 
The House only had to appropriate a sum of 
90,000 dollars- thus it was not the money, but the principle 
behind the appropriations that was so important. 
31 Ibid., 70. 
32 Channing, 146. 
CHAPTER X 
THE TREATY AND THE PUBLIC 
Sel.dom has any measure of our 
Government awakened such con-
vulsions of popular feeling 
as did the Jay Treaty, which, 
surrendering our righteous and 
immediate demands, yet saved 
our future. 1 
HUMAN REASON 
Every author agreed that the major reason for 
opposing the treaty was the commercial clauses, and the 
failure to receive redress for American grievances. The op-
ponents asserted that the financial and commercial interests 
wanted to form profitable connections with England, and thus 
this would mean coming to terms with the Tories whom the 
farmers had fought in the Revolution. 'I'he sectional antagonisms 
between capitalism and agrariani~ were beginning to take deep 
root. 
Mr. Beard said: 
And as every one ~ows also, Jay 
succeeded in negotiating a trea~y 
which gained several concessions 
favorable to the mercantile interests 
of the North, though falling tar short 
1 A.J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, Houghton Mifflin 
Co., Boston, 1916, II, 117. 
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of their reasonable expectations, 
and at the same time afforded no 
consolation to the sout~ at all. 2 
The merchants and shippers were opposed to the 
treaty at first, but began to support the administration -
"When Hamilton thus made it clear that war not only meant a 
destruction ot eapitalistio enterprises and interests, but a 
possible social war which would make Shay's rebellion appear 
trivial in·comparison." 3 Then, too, this commercial class 
felt that the illegal seizures by England would continue it 
the treaty was not accepted, and there was a chance to receive 
compensation tor the losses already sustained on shipping. 
The insurance companies had stopped business because ot the 
seizures. The merchants had an opportunity to gain economically 
by the treaty, so they thought. What assurances they had that 
England would stop the seizure-s because Am.eriea ratified the 
treaty were negligible. 
The commotion began at Boston and 
seemed to rush through the union 
with a rapidity and violence which 
set human reason and common sense 
at defiance. The first effort was 
to deter the President from ratifying 
the instrument - the n~t to induce 
Congress to refuse the necessary 
appropriation. 4 
2 O.A. Bear4, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, 
Macmillan co., New York, 1915, 282. 
3 Ibid., 288. 
4 .An Autobiographical Sketch ot John Marshall, ed. by John s. 
Adams, University of Miehigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1937, 16. 
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An attempt will be made to show why the various 
sections of the country opposed the treaty. The most important 
reasons were that the treaty had a detrimental effect either 
economically or politically. 
NEW ENGLAND 
The New Englanders gradually decided to support 
the treaty for they definitely had something to gain by so 
doing. 
The Maritime New Englanders, who had 
begun by an unreflecting hatred ot 
the Treaty, soon came to see, its 
solid advantages tor them - a share 
in the Rritish East India trade, and 
indeed, the avoidance of war itself 
with Great Britain. 5 
The fear of war was an obsession with the people of New 
England, ·for the shipping interests had the most to lose, sine 
their cargoes would be seized without indemnification. 
All in New England, however, were not convinced 
of the advantages offered. The people of Boston held the first 
mass meeting in protestation of the treaty. They drew up a 
protest, whi~ was sent to the president, listing their reasons 
for opposition. These people were not only protesting against 
the treaty, but also against national men and measures. 
5 Mowat, 28. 
-152-
Aacording to Rufus King there would have been no meeting of 
the people if one,Jarvis ( a man writing under a pseudonym), 
had remained silent. The writers of the time felt that the 
town meeting in Boston was a manifestation of the common 
people. 
In a letter to Rufus King, Charles Gore stated: 
• • • so far as I aan"" lea:cn the temper 
of the country on the treaty, it is 
right; and so it certainly is in all 
our seaports, Boston excepted; where 
the mob, doubtless instigated by the 
same men, who occasioned the town 
meeting is continually attempting to 
burn the treaty, Mr. Jay's effigy, 
and to do other acts of violence. 6 
This point was further proved when a resolution 
of the Boston Chamber of Commerce was composed and sent to the 
president. In this, Boston approved the treaty, but this 
group was made up of influential and wealthy men, with the 
merchants in the majority: 
A motion was then made in the words 
following, viz. Resolved, as the 
opinion of the chamber, That the 
recommendation of the senate to 
the president of the United States, 
to ratify the treaty, as amended by 
than, was wide and prudent; because 
it settles 1n a fair and amicable 
manner points of difference between 
the two nations, which must otherwise 
6correspondence of Rufus King, II, 31. 
necessarily subject our country to· 
humiliating submission to British 
impositions and injuries, or induce 
a war. with all its horrors and 
distresses, to seek redress; and 
because, when considered collectively, 
the tendency of the treaty must be to 
promote and extend rather than to 
injure and restrain, our commerce. 7 
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In reply to this approbation, Washington showed 
his profound interest in the commercial classes by the follow-
ing letter: 
Sir, 
I have received your letter of the 
13th instant, covering a copy of the 
dissent, of a number of citizens of 
Boston, expressing their disapprobation 
ot the vote adopted at a late meeting 
in that town, relative to the treaty ••• 
and also a copy of the proceedings of 
the Boston chamber of commerce, on the 
same subject. 
While I regret the diversity of 
opinion which has been manifested on 
this occasion, it is a satisfaction to 
learn, that the commercial part of my 
fellow citizens, whose interests are 
thought to be most direct~y affected, 
so generally consider the treaty, as 
calculated, on the whol.e,. to procure 
important advantages to our country. 
This sentiment, I trust, will be ax-
tended in proportion, as the provisions 
of the treaty become well understood. 
With due respect, I am. Sir, 
Your obedient, 
Go. washington. 
·united States, 22~ August, 1'195. 8 
7 Am. Rem., I, 129. 
8 Ibid., II, 219. 
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What were the sentiments of the newspapers? As 
usual one of the Boston papers favored the treaty, while the 
other one disapproved or it. An example from each will be 
given. The Federalist was a writer who challenged each and 
every reason drawn up by the people of Boston against the 
treaty. He wrote tor the Boston Centinel as follows: 
The merchants of l.!assachusetts will 
consider, it they are willing to 
surrender all claim to their property 
captured by the British - to saddle 
themselves with an Indian war, at the 
annual expense of a million dollars, 
in a vain attempt, to gain, by force, 
indemnity for a few slaves, once the 
property ot their southern brethren. 9 
This writer's contempt for the South can be plainly discerned, 
and his picture seemed to be a little exaggerated. 
From the Boston Chronicle - a Republican wrote 
an open letter to the president, the grammatical construction 
of which could stand improvement: 
But, strange to say, your ambassador 
has destroyed the very ground upon 
which your neutrality proclamation 
was founded, and has made a treaty 
in direct violation of it. You mentioned 
the modern law, and on the contrary 
he has expressly declared the reverse. 
You ·was fyler~ so particular on this 
point, as to italiaise the term 
'modern'; but ~n opposition to this 
9 Ibid., II, 247. 
declaration, he has consented to the 
ancient law or-nations, which is, no 
more, no less than the particular law 
ot Britain. · 
You was [ilerEil either mistaken in 
your proclamation, or 1~. Jay must be 
guilty ot acting contrary to his in-
structions. 
We request of you then, sir, 
to let us know the reasons, why you 
cannot. vindicate your \rHilary conduct, 
before we are obliged o accede to the 
propriety or Mr. Jay's nefociation. 
If you was [wer~ preoipi ta e in your 
proclamation of guaranteeing to the 
United States, their neutrality, on 
the 'modern law of nations' - if 
you was (wereJequally nasty in declaring 
that Mr. Jay was sent to vindicate, 
with firmness, the rights of the 
United States - if these things were 
done without mature deliberation, and 
you are now obliged to retreat, 'we 
the people,' as friends to ytu' and to 
themselves, would-thank you o let them 
kriow the reasons, why you have altered 
your sentiments. 10 
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· George Cabot, in writing to Ru:t"us King, gave an 
inkling as to how the treaty was being received in other parts 
of Massachusetts. Here Cabot probably did not take in a genera 
overall view of the people, for he limited it to what he 
termed the respectable part of the community: 
With a view to ascertain the state 
of public opinion & to contribute 
my mite towards forming it rightly 
in other parts of the state, I attended 
10 Ibid.t II, 142. 
the commencement at Cambridge & was 
gratified to perceive that sensible 
and virtuous men from other quarters 
resented the proceedings ot Boston, so 
that, it I were to judge from the 
evidence of that day, I shou'd pronounce 
that the sober sense of Massachusetts 
approves the treaty. 
OUr mercantile men have learnt 
something more of our rights and the 
rights ot the other nations than they 
knew formerly, but they have yet t.o 
learn that the commerce of the u.s. 
is not such as wou'd enable us to 
dictate the terms on whiah an inter-
course is to be held with the nati~s 
of Europe. 11 
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In Lexington, Massachusetts the people held a 
town meeting on August 13, 1795, and atter reviewing the 
treaty could find no civil or commercial privileges; on the 
contrary, it deprived them of benefits as citizens of the 
United states. 
Now in viewing the repercussions in other parts 
of New England, the various opinions can be shown: 
Still another blow fell to the 
Federalists when senator John 
Langdon of New H~pshire, who 
had supported Hamilton's financial 
policies deserted on the treaty. 
The merchants of Portsmouth -
a sacred cla.ss with the Hamiltonians -
shared in the general protest. 12 
11 King, 18. This letter was written from Brookline, Massa-
chusetts, July 25, 1795. 
12 Bowers, 282. 
In vermont, where the treaty was the 
sole topic of the conversation, there 
were no public meetings. 13 
In Connecticut, where the preachers, 
Professors, politicians had the people 
cowed, there was scarcely a whimper. 14 
-157-
At Newport~ Rhode Island, on August 19, the 
treaty was denounaed in a report to the people by a committee 
(chosen by the people}: 
Your committee would further observe, 
that the treaty contains many sentences 
ot doubtful construction; that it is 
deficient of the reciprocity, which 
ought to be the basis of all contracts; 
that it is an infraction of the :friendship 
and gratitude whioh·the republic of France 
may justly .claim from the United States, 
and that it may be ruinous to the agriculture, 
manutactures, and commerce ot the United 
States. 15 
MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES 
The treaty met with full opposition in the Middle 
Atlantic states. In Philadelphia a group ot ships-carpenters 
burned Jay in effigy. He was also portrayed as holding a 
balance in one hand, and on the light end was written "Liberty 
and Independenaeof America"; on the heavier end was "British 
Gold"; in the other hand Jay held the treaty, and from his 
mouth came the words "Pay me what I demand, and I will sell 
16 you my country." 
13 Ibid., 
14 Ibid., 283. 
15 
16 Latane and Wainhouse, 93. 
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After the president signed the treaty, Madison 
said that the merchants in Philadelphia bowed to the consti-
tutional authority and devotion to the president. He explained 
this sudden about face in a letter to Monroe: 
There is good reason to believe that 
many subscriptions were obtd by the 
Banks, whose directors solicited them 
and bt the influence or Br calitalists. 
In Ba timore Charleston, & ot er com-
mercial towns, except Philada, New York, 
and boston, no similar proceeding has 
been attainable. Acquiesenoe has been 
inculcated with the more success by 
exagserated pictures of the public 
?rosperitz, an appeal to the popular 
eeiiag for the President, and :the bugbear 
ot war;sti11, however, there is little 
doubt that the real sentiment of the 
mass of the community is hostile to the 
treaty. 17 
Whether this was true or not could not be ascertained by the 
author. It was difficult to understand why the merchants 
. 
sudden~y favored the document. 
Washington, writing to one James Ross, in August, 
1795, criticized the people of the seaport towns in this way: 
PHILADELPHIA, 22 August, 1795. 
DEAR SIR, 
The seaport towns, or rather parts of 
them, are involved, and are endeavoring as 
much as in them lies to involve the communi-
ty at large, in a violent opposition to the 
17 The Writings of .Tames Madison, ed. by Gaillard Hunt, 
G.P. Pub&Dl!s sons, New York, 1.906, VI, 259-2.60. This 
letter was copied exactly as was printed in this work. 
treaty with Great Britain, which is 
ratified as far as the measure depends 
upon me. The general opinion, however, 
as far as I am .able to come at it is, 
that the current is turning. 
If one could belie~e that the 
meetings, which have taken place, 
spoke the general sense of the people 
on the m~asure they condemned, it might 
with truth be pronounced, that, it is 
difficult to bear prosperity as adversity, 
and that no stipulation or condition in 
lite can make them happy. 18 
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Handbills were issued in New York denouncing the 
treaty, and asking the nitizens to attend a meeting at the 
Federal Hall to consider it. Hamilton attended with Rufus 
King, intending to defend the treaty, but when he attempted 
to make a speeah he was greeted with hisses and was stoned 
from the platform.. 
The cry "Damn J"ohn Jay, damn everyone who won't 
damn J"ohn J"ay. Damn everyone who won't sit up all night with 
a candle in their window damning John J"ay", became a very 
popular utteranae. There were many other anti-treaty toasts 
at dinners, one of which went as tallows: 
1. Clip't wings, lame legs, the pip and 
an empty crop to all Jays. 
2. May this cage made for the American 
eagle prove a trap for the King birds 
and J"ays. 
5. Mr. J"ay and his treaty 'be forever 
politically damned.' 
4. May John J"ay enjoy all the pleasures ot 
purgatory. 19 
18 Washington- Writin5s, 94. 
19 R. lfeEl:roy, The Pathway to Peace, Ivlacmillan Co., New York, 1927 . 90 
-150-
The New York Chamber of Commerce voted its ap-
proval of the document, but as in Boston, it was a vote of the 
merchants. While all or this opposition to Jay and his treaty 
was taking place in New York, Jay was elected governor of that 
state two days before hia arrival in America. 
In New Jersey a mass meeting was held at Trenton 
in the State House on Augu.st 20, l?95, and the treaty was de-
nounced in this manner: 
'••• degrading to the national honor-
dangerous to the public interest - and 
destructive of the agricultural and 
commercial view of the United states. 
Further resolved That the citizens 
of Trenton and its vicinity ••• do, upon 
the most cool and dispassionate consideration, 
disapprove of the aaid treaty, and hope, 
by this public expression of their sentiments, 
to prevent, as far as possible, its ratifi-
cation by our supr~e Executive.' 20 
Other township meetings in New Jersey vehemently 
presented denunciations of the treaty - important ones being 
from Bordenton, Blackb.orse, and Reckless: 
lst. Resolved, That the very preamble 
of the treaty ftlls us with mortifi-
cation and astonishment, in as much 
as it abandoned the high claims, the 
positive losses, and that honorable 
reparations demanded throughout the 
union, and so explicitly declared by 
our chief magistrates, as necessary to 
be insisted upon, and which were held 
20 Am. Rem., II, 209. 
up to the people as justly to be 
expected, on his appointment of 
an envoy extraordinary, to Great 
Britain for that purpose, only. 
3d. R~solved, That we do not 
comprehend the policy whi~h leads 
us, from the love and protection 
of a sincere, powerfUl, and friendly 
nation:France, into the arms of an 
old, inveterate, unalterable foe; 
tram wham we have received nothing 
but injury, duplicity, and insult. 21 
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Delaware was not excepted in its opposition to 
the document. The people drew up a Memorial to George W~shing 
ton, asking him not to ratify it, and thereby promote the 
happiness ot his constituents. The reasons given in this 
Memorial were similar to the ones presented by the other peopl • 
Kentueky also joined in the cry of opposition. 
Since Kentucky was an inland state, she was dependent upon 
the Mississippi for navigation and commerce, thus her reasons 
for opposition centered against the use of the Mississippi 
by the ~ritish: "··· because it has let the subjects or this 
hostile and treacherous government into a participation of 
our right to navigate the Mississippi, and has thereby dis-
pelled every hope of obtaining an amicable adjustment of our 
differences with Spain on that subject. " 22 Their objections 
were centered around states' rights and a dislike for Britain. 
21 Ibid., I, 140. 
22 Ibid., II, 259. 
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SOUTHERN STATES 
The SoQth joined the other two sections or the 
country in opposing the work of Jay. Since the south repre-
sented the agricultural interests of the country, she had 
nothing to fain from the treaty. If article twelve were 
adapted, her shi~ents of cotton would be curtailed, just 
when cotton was coming into its own. Then, too, she was to 
receive no compensation ~or the slaves, which she considered 
a part of her property. The North, however, would eventually 
receive compensation for the seizure of the ships by Britain 
(if the commissioners decided in favor or Amerioa, that is). 
Apparently and from all indieations in the provisions of the 
treaty, the administration was taking care of the northern 
interests at the sake of the south, or so it seemed to the 
southerners. 
The citizens of Baltimore composed the ~Baltimore 
Addresstt to the president and thus voiced their protests: 
we, the undersigned citizens or 
the United States, inhabitants of 
Baltimore town, beg leave respectfully 
to represent, that the treaty lately 
negociated with Great Brit~in ••• had 
excited in our minds the most serious 
apprehension and alarm for the interest 
and safety of our canmerce, the 
rights of our fellow citizens, 
and the dignity of our government. 
Our territory and frontier 
posts ••• are to be surrendered at 
an unneeessarily distant period -
a remote hope of recovery, after 
much expense and perplexity in the 
usual mode of 1 egal proceedings and 
much injury from the depreciation 
of their e.api tals is the only compen-
sation proeured for our suffering 
merchants, who have been unjustly 
deprived of their property in the 
prosecution of a fair trade; nor 
has any effectual provision been 
made to remedy the evil or prevent 
fUture spoliations of our commerce, 
under like frivolous pretexts. No 
restitution whatever is made ••• for 
a large amount of property, carried 
off from the southern states, contrary 
to the late treaty of peace. 23 
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No mention was made of the debts due to British citizens, 
however. 
Charles Pinckney made his famous speech in St. 
Michael's Church, Charleston, on .ruly 22, 1795. He condemned 
the president for commencing the negotiations without previ-
ously submitting his intentions to the Senate • .ray was the 
most improper man to undertake such a mission (which in the 
opinion of Pinckney was dishonorable and treacherous). He 
attacked the treaty with regard to commerce and neutrality. 
23 Ibid., I, 200-201. According to one writer in the Am. Rem., 
~following cities were opposed to the treaty because of 
their prejudice against England: Norf&lk and Portsmouth 
because these cities were burned by the Brtttsh; Baltimore 
because it was an asylum for the French; Philadelphia be-
cause the citizens were the sworn foes of royalty. 
From the general content of the speech, one can tell the lack 
of thought and logic that it contained. His arguments were 
deficient in emphasis, and were distorted by his severe preju-
dice of the administration and its personnel. Whether he could 
have negotiated a better treaty was open to question. He, un-
doubtedly should have shown more tact in presenting his argu-
ments, for then they would have carried more weight. 
Charleston was the center of opposition in the 
South. The fact that the French were deeply imbedded there 
account~d in some way for the forcible resistance to the treaty 
The treaty was offensive to France, and since she could do 
nothing tangible to combat i t.s being adopted, her only weapon 
was to arouse public opinion against it in the hopes of 
staving off ratification. That France was working hard to 
prevent the ratification came to the fore in the following 
resolution ·or Williamsburg, south carolina: 
Resolved, That we consider this treaty 
as militating against the principles 
of our constitution, as subjecting the 
commerce of this country to Britain -
as a surrender of the power of congress 
to form commercial regulations; and in 
particular as hostile to the people of 
France, with whom we ought to be on the 
terms of friendship, if we were under 
no obligation of gratitude, and if we 
had not been bound by a former treaty 
with that nation.H 24 
24 Ibid., II, 272. (This was composed on August 5, 1795.) 
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Camden Town, south Carolina did not spare any 
adjectives in condemning the treaty. This resolution also 
showed· .. a friendship for France: 
Resolved unanimously, That the 
aforesaid treaty strikes us, in 
every point of light, withastonish-
ment and indignation. It appears to 
us mean, slavish, and obscure, nowise 
equally binding; but conferring all 
advantages on the one side, and imposing 
all restraints on the other; degrading 
to the dignity of an independent republic, 
and insulting to the honor and spirit of 
a brave people •••• 
Resolved unanimously, That the 
treaty appears to us, in every shape, 
calculated to dissolve those bonds of 
affection and interest, which ought to 
connect us, in a friendship inviolate, 
with the people of France, a great and 
regenerated people •••• 25 
The Southerners also opposed the British right to 
search American vessels, but this was due to two reasons: 
first of all the south always sought the protection of indi-
vidual rights, and secondly because American ships were 
carrying provisions to France. 
When savannah criticized the treaty it was because 
the United States received no political or commercial benefit 
from it. In Georgia there were no legal impediments to the 
recovery of debts, yet if the treaty went into effect, the 
25 Ibid., 55. (This was written on dUly 25, 1795.) 
Georgians would be taxed to pay off the British. 
It is entirely silent on that im-
portant subject, the restoration of 
negroes and other property carried 
from this continent by the British 
troops, in direct violation of the 
treaty of 1783, to the disappointment, 
and, in many instances, ruin of the 
unfortunate citizens of the United 
States, who have suffered the un-
warrantable measure; whereas the 
British government and courts of law, 
where attempts have been made to 
recover by that means, have repeatedly 
held out assuranc.es of compensation. 
Even this paltry privilege{Irade 
in the West Indie€)is rendered of very 
small use to Amerlaan merchants by 
their being positively restricted from 
exporting the produce of the West Indies 
to any part of the world in their own 
vessels; and, in exahange for this 
pretended advantage, the treaty has 
relinquished the right of exporting 
cotton, the growth of our own soil, 
and one of the most important staples 
of the southern states, in American 
vessels to foreisn ports. 26 
-166-
Richmond County, Virginia maintained the same 
argument regarding article twelve: 
So that the other part of the same 
article which prohibits the expor-
tation of cotton from the United 
states, is not included in the-
exception of the Senate. 
This is particularly injurious 
to this state; for the cultivation 
of cotton has become, within these 
26 Ibid.t I, 136-137. 
few years one of the greatest con-
veniences to the citizens; and the 
improvements .in machinery are ex-
tending its cultivation •••• A prohi-
bition to export it would, therefore 
be sensibly felt; and may have a 
direct tendency to disaffect the 
-16?-
minds of the people to the seneral movement. 
But it is said, that it may be ex-
ported in British bottoms. Admit this and 
the injury is increased by the addition 
of insult. To be restrained from exporting 
the produce of our own fields, in our own 
vessels, is to sct~mit, not to treat. 27 
Georgia strongly opposed almost every provision 
of the treaty, but senator Gunn's vote for ratification 
caused all the more bitterness in the people: 
In Georgia the popular sense 
had been betrayed by the ratifi-
eation vote of Senator Gunn, the 
bitterness was sizzling. 28 
It had been said that the demonstration in the 
state of Virginia was the worst ot all, but on the contrary, 
two counties in Virginia sent their resolutions approving the 
treat.y to the president. In Richmond, however, the people were 
united in their opposition: 
Resolve~ unanimously, That, considering 
the treaty now offered by Great Britain 
to America to be 
Insulting to the dignity, 
Injurious to the intereat, 
2?Ibid., II, August and September, 1?95, 48. 
2B:sowera, 283. 
Dangerous to the security, and 
Repugnant to the constitution, 
of the Unlted States: 
We, the citizens of Richmond, hold it, 
therefore, not only unbecoming fresnen 
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to be silent, but that under the strong 
impressions, which mature reflection has 
rivetted on our minds, we should deem it 
criminal, in the highest degree, not to 
give our entire and pointed disapprobation 
of the instrument. 29 
The influence of the French was evident in the 
resolution of Amelia,County, Virginia: 
These articles{!eventh and otherrif 
we consider as most shameful and 
pernicious, inasmuch as they appear 
calculated to depress the agricultural 
and commercial interest of those states, 
and at the same time operate most cruelly 
against that gallant people, who so 
generously and effectually afforded 
us their powerful support, when the 
armies and fleets of Ureat Britain had 
a near prospect of completing our 
subjugation. 
6th, Because, The whole: treaty, in 
all its aspects, appears to be entirely 
calculated for the aggrandizement of 
Great Britain, and the extension of her 
commerce; to the destruction of American 
prosperity, and, eventually her independence, 
and to the abolition of that connection 
with France. 30 
This was Washington's home state, how did he feel 
about these many resolutions which affect him? In a letter to 
Henry Knox, he stated: 
29 . Am. Rem., I, July 29, 1795, 133. 
30 Ibid., II, 45. 
MY DEAR SIR, 
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MOUNT VERNON, 20 Sept~ber, 1795. 
The t~per of the people of this State, 
particularly the southern part of it, and of 
South Carolina and Georgia, as tar as it is 
discoverable from the several meetings and 
resolutions, which have been published, is 
adverse to the treaty with Great Britain; and 
yet I doubt much whether the great body of 
yeomanry have formed any opinion on the subject, 
and whether, it their sense could be fairly 
taken under a plain and simple statement of 
facta, nine tenths of them woUld not advocate 
the measure. But with such abominable misrepre-
sentations as appear in most of the proceedings, 
it is not to be wondered at, that uninformed 
minds should be affrighted at the dreadful 
consequences that are predicted, and which 
they are taught to expect from the ratification 
of su~ a diabolical instrument, as the treaty 
is dwnominated. From North Carolina we hear 
little concerning it, and from Kentucky . 
nothing. 31 
From this letter it could be said that washington did not 
rely too much upon the various and sundry resolutions that 
were forthcoming from the south. He felt that the treaty was 
being misrepresented, and if the people would do any thinking 
they would slowly begin to favor the instrument. 
Westmoreland and Frederic counties of Virginia 
approved the document. From all of the information that was 
accessible to the author, these two counties in this state 
were the only two ,in the South to approve. This was noteworthy 
31 washington-Writings, 106. The italics are the author•s. 
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because Virginia seemed to be violently opposed to all 
parts of the treaty. By approving, however, Virginia had more 
to gain regarding the debts due to Britain. Americans from 
other states would be taXed to pay otf the debts, the majority 
of which were contracted by Virginians. 
Frederic County: 
1st. Resolved, That the conduct of 
the president of the United States, 
in ratifying, agreeably to the advice 
of 2-3 of the Senate of the United 
states, the treaty of amity, commerce, 
and navigation, between the United States 
of America and Great~Britain, negooiated 
by John Jay, esq. is entitled to, and 
meets with, the entire approbation of 
this meeting. 32 
Westmoreland County: 
Resolved, That in the late negociation 
with Great Britain, its primary objective, 
the preservation of peace, has been 
completely effected, which, of itself, 
is all-important, and that very considerable 
additional good has also been acquited 
by the surrender of the western posts, 
which leads to the termination of Indian 
warfare, and compensation for the spoli-
ations on our commerce. 
Resolved, therefore, That we feel 
ourselves perfectly satisfied with the 
government of the United States in this 
transaction •••• 33 
G2 Am. Rem., III, December 1, 1795, 144. 
33 ~·, September 29, 1795, 312. 
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CONCLUSION 
What conclusions can be drawn ~rom this infor-
mation about the reception of the treaty? A writer, under 
the pseudonym - A Mentor - for the Lancaster Journez, wrote 
the following critical evaluation of the varied sentiments. 
(It was colored to a marked degree.} 
In Boston, not more than thirty-two 
of the actual merchants were supposed 
to appear in support of it. 
In Philadelphia, and where the 
mania aeaned to have the most effect, 
and where the influence of bank directors, 
stock jobbers, &e. had its tull weight, 
410 are said to have signed the address 
in favor of it. - But are these all 
merchants? No! Among than are shbpkeepers, 
booksellers, brokers, gentlemen &c. - an 
intermixed phalanx. 
so far the mercantile interest, 
which the president has vouehsafed to 
say, is 'directly affected.' Of those 
whose interests could not be 'affected,' 
as they were not merchants, the number 
is few indeed. - A meeting near Trenton, 
and one in the populous borough of York, 
were among the principal; and I think I 
may venture to assert, that not more than 
400 of this class of partizans have 
collected in the whole. 
Thus we may form some idea of the 
respectable ~nd formidable support the 
treaty has received - 1000 merchants, 
stock jobbers, bank-directors, and a few 
influenced artizans, &c •• 
Now let us search for something like 
a contra or supra credit, to over balance 
this tremendous[being raotious]debit. 
In Charleston, Philadelphia, New York, 
Boston, and Portmaouth, where the 
meeting against the treaty were nearly 
unanimous in their voice, at least 
25,000 citizens are supposed to have 
attended - add to this, the numerous 
meetings throughout the union •••• 
Out of at least 40,000 independent 
citizens of the. United States, who 
preserve the spirit and dignity or 
exercising their rights on this interesting 
occasion, cannot a sufficiency of respecta-
bility be procured, to outweigh that of 
100 flatterers of administration: 34 
Marshall drew these conclusions: 
The treaty, therefore, when exposed 
to the public view, found one party 
prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, 
but the other, not ready in its defence. 
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To the passions, the prejudices, and the 
feelings of the nation, an appeal might 
confidently be made by those whose only 
object was its condemnation; but reflection, 
information, and consequently time, were 
required by men whose first impressions 
were not in its favour, but who were 
indisposed to yield absolutely to those 
impressions. 
Many intelligent men, therefore, 
stood aloof,.while the most intemperate 
assumed, as usual, the name of the people; 
pronounced a definitive and unqualified 
condemnation of every article in the 
treaty; and with the utmost confidence 
assigned reasons for their opinions, 
which in many instances, had only an 
imaginary existence; and in some,were 
obviously founded on the strong prejudices 
which were entertained with respect to 
foreign powers. 35 
34 Ibid., II, 201-202. 
35 John Marshall, The Life of George Washin~ton, 624-526. 
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The opposition, although seemingly unified, was 
sectional. Naturally the people who had least to gain opposed 
it the most. From all indications it was favorable to the 
economic interests of the North, while it neglected the inter-
ests of the south, The North, however, looked askance on the 
supposed advantages that it obtained. 
Mr. Bowers presented a very good summary of the 
people's reaction to the treaty: 
These marching mobs, mass meetings, 
resolutions and petitions, and banning 
effigies give no conception of the 
popular fBrment. Never had the people 
been more agitated or outraged. Whenever 
two men met whether bankers or bakers, 
the treaty was the topic of their talk. 
In taverns, where travelers were pro-
miscuously packed like sardines in a 
box, the quarreling made night hideous 
and sleep impossible. 
The farmers were against the treaty, 
the lawyers for it, and they debated 
with passion, with more heat than 
light •••• soon the anti-treaty press 
was publishing statistics on public 
sentiment. The mass meetings against 
and the selec.t gatherings of the 
merchants. Fifteen thousand people 
had met and denounced the treaty, and 
seven hundred had approved it, according 
to the Independent Chron±ele. 35 
36 Bowers, 28'1. 
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CONCLUSION 
Neutrality, as a new principle of international 
law in 1793, served as the basis for America's future foreig~ 
policy. American history was changed because of this doctrine. 
It was not necessary at the time, as America had no resources 
with whiah to engage in warfare. If America had felt that she 
was boliged to enter hostilities as France's ally, her positio 
in the world in 1815 (end of the war) would have been very 
dubious,to say the least, for she would have been on the losin 
side. England certainly would have taken advantage of her 
superior position. 
In the proclamation washington had no·, intention 
'of aiding Britain by the position that America took. He hoped 
to be on friendly terms with both'oontestants, but not with 
the intentions that permeated the minds of some Americans. 
They hoped to gain economically from America's position. 
Washington's aims were centered about diplomacy and government. 
The very fact that America remained neutral, and 
took the first steps towards conciliation with Britain, after 
the harmful Orders in council, showed America's purposes and 
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willingness to conciliate matters. washington knew that the 
country was not prepared for war, and his clear, steady 
thinking led him to this pacific settlement with Britain. 
Although this conciliation (Jay's Treaty) only postponed the 
war until 1812. The reason being that the issues of the War 
of 1812 were not provided for in the Jay Treaty, impreasment 
of seamen, etc •• 
Professor Moore presented a fine conclusion of 
America's position in 1793, by quoting William Hall: 
'The policy of the United States in 
1793,' says the late W.E. Hall, one 
of the ~ost eminent of English publicists, 
'constitutes an epoch in the development 
of the usages of neutrality. There can 
be no doubt that it was intended to give 
effect to the obligations then incumbent 
on neutrals. But it represented by far 
the most advanced existing opinions as 
to what those obligations were; and in 
some points it even went further than 
authoritative custom has up to the present 
day advanced. In the main, however, it is 
identical with the standard of conduct 
which is now adopted by the comrnunity 
of nations.' 1 
JAY'S TREATY 
Jay has been both praised and condemned for his 
work. It was not the purpose of this work to praise or condemn, 
but to present as thorough an analysis as was possible of all 
aspec~s of the treaty. 
Jay was a well qualified diplomat, in that, he 
1 J. Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy, Harper & 
Brothers, New York, 1918, 47. 
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knew the constitution and its limitations, and he could apply 
this knowledge to advantage in negotiating a treaty. This 
knowledge was not sufficient for a diplomat, however, for he 
must have skill, and a. sense of mediation, and ttgood common 
s~nsen. From the outcome of the treaty, it would se~ that 
Jay inclined too muCh towards this sense of mediation. He was 
not schooled in the proficiency of diplomacy. England was very 
fortunate in having Lord Grenville aa a negotiator, since he 
was a good diplomat. The fact that he represented a great 
power was an advantage in wringing concessions from Jay. 
The envoy certainly worked under many handicaps, 
for he had nothing with which to threaten Great Britain. 
He represented a new government, whose sea power was nil when 
compared to the naval strength of the •Mistress of the seas•. 
He could not abandon the negotiations and precipitate a war 
that would have ruined America financially and commercially, 
to say nothing of the tremendous loss of lives. 
His one trump card, so to speak, was snatched 
away by an indiscretion of his colleague, Hamilton. England, 
in the beginning, :teared that the United States woald join 
the armed neutrality, which was being formed by sweden and 
Denmark, against England. In Jay's instructions he was given 
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permission to find the ministers of these two countries, and 
discuss the possibility of America's membership in the said 
neutrality. England was more inclined to conciliation when 
she was under this fear. Jay could have used this to America's 
advantage. 
Hamilton wrote to Hammond, who in turn passed the 
information on to Grenville, that the United States had no 
intention of joining the neutrality. Hamilton was given no 
authority to make such a state111ent. He knew Hammond would rela 
the news to Grenville. Naturally when Grenville learned this, 
he stiffened his apposition. Jay lost his best opportunity 
through no fault of his own. Professor Bemis believed that the 
instrument should have been called "Hamilton's Treaty", sinc6 
Jay acted under Hamilton's "suggestions•, thus any blame for 
the shortcomings at the treaty should be shouldered by Hamilton 
3ay did not gain any personal advance tor under-
taking the task, in tact he had to take much criticism and 
abuse. The people who cri tieized the most, probably would have. 
been a failure at such a task thsnselves. Besides his se~ing 
unpopularity, he was elected governor ot New York. He was 
courageous enough to carry out this mission for his government 
with little thought for himself personally. 
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Although J"ay should not have abandoned the inter-
ests of his country so readily, he dUlhis best under the 
trying circumstances. He even admitted that it was "dry busi-
ness". 
Mr. Mona~an stated: 
Jay had obtained the minimum of demands 
establish&Q by the Federalist leaders; 
evacuation of the posts, compensation 
for spoliations, and the maintenance 
ot existing commercial relations. 
Beyond these he secured but little of 
substantial value and accepted minor 
stipulations that were unnecessarily 
humiliating. He attempted to write 
into the treaty more liberal definitions 
ot neutral rights and the more advonced 
principles of maritime law, but he 
realized that it was hopeless to expect 
England to surrender th.e principles upon 
which much of her naval streng'Ul was 
based unless she was forced to do so by 
armed intervention. Jay admitted realistically 
in sending the treaty home 'that Britain, 
at this period, and invol.ved in war should. 
not admit principles, which would impeach 
the propriety of her conduct in seizing 
provisions bound to France and enemy's 
property in neutral ships, does not appear 
to me extraordinary. The artieles as they-
now stand secure compensation for seizures, 
and leave us at liberty to decide whether 
they were made in such cases as to be 
warranted by the existing law ot nations.' 
Compensation to Americans tor British 
spoliations amount.e~ to more than ten 
million dollars. 2 
2 F. Monaghan, John J"ay, Bobbs-Merril.l co., Indianapolis, 1955, 
381. 
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America made this treaty with Britain at the wrong time with 
respect to neutral rights, for Britain would not recognize 
any neutral rights that would work to the advantage of France. 
Later on when she did not have to protect herself she might 
have been more amenable. 
The treaty introduced two principles into American 
diplomacy: the peacefUl arbitration of disputes, and the mutu-
al extradition of persons. For these along day should receive 
commendation. Arbitration of disputes has saved many delicate 
situations in American history since that time. 
If the treaty was viewed from the immediate inter-
ests at that time, it was easy to understand why it was con-
demned by the House of Representatives and the people. The 
condemnation was inevitable. The people were not ready to 
form an alliance with their old enemy, England. They were 
more inclined toward France because of the aid that country 
gave in the Revolutionary War. Also the fact that some parts 
of the treaty contravened the previous treaty with France 
made it all the more objectionable. The people also felt that 
it was unfavorable to their sectional interests. The commercial 
class received all of the so-called benefits. If the treaty 
can be viewed with the idea that it was an inspiration for the 
growth of international consciousness, it was a light to the 
world. 
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APPENDIX - II 
GRENVILLE'S PROPOSALS 
1. A line due west from Lake Superior 
to Red Lake River, then down this 
river to the Mississippi. 'Jlhis line 
was impossible, as the line with the 
question mark indicates. 
2. A line due north from the confluence 
of the Mississippi and the st. Croix 
to the waterway between the· Lake-of-
the-Woods to Lake superior. This 
again was impossible. 
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APPENDIX - III 
WASHINGTON'S ANSWER TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
REQ.UESTING THE PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE TREATY 
Gentlemen ot the House ot Representatives: 
With the utmost attention I have considered your 
resolution of the 24th instant, requesting me to lay before 
your House a copy of the instructions to the Mlnister of the 
United states, who negotiated the Treaty with the king of 
Great Britain, together with the correspondence and other 
documents r,elative to that Treaty, excepting such of the said 
papers as any existing negotiations ,ay render improper to be 
disclosed. 
In deliberating upon·this subject, ~t was im-
possible for me to lose sight or the principle which some have 
avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to 
tha consequences which must flow from the admission of that 
principle. 
I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indi-
cated a disposition to withhold any information whien the 
constitution has enjoined upon the President, as a duty, to 
give, or which could be required of him by ~ither House of 
Congress as a right; and, with truth, I affirm, that it has 
been as it will continue to be, while I have the honor to 
preside in the Government, my constant endeavor to harmonise 
with the other branehes thereof, so far as the trust delegated 
to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the 
obligation it imposes, to 'preserve, protect, and defend the 
constitution,' will permit. 
The nature of foreign negotiations requires 
caution; and then success mus often depend on secrecy; and 
even, when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all 
the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have 
been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; 
for this might have a pernicious influence on future negoti-
ations; or produce immediate ~naonveniences, perhaps danger 
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and mischief, in relation to other Powers the necessity of 
such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for resting 
the power of making Treaties in the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate; the principle on which the body 
was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, 
then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand, and 
to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a 
negotiation with a foreign Power, would be to establish a 
dangerous precedent. 
It does not occur that the inspection of papers 
asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance 
of the House of Representatives, except that of an impeachment; 
which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have 
no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of 
my station will permit, or the public good shall require; to 
be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the 
negotiation with Great Britain were· laid before the Senate, 
when the Treaty itself was communicated for their consideration 
and advice. 
Having been a member of the General Convention, ••• 
I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject, and 
from the first establishment of the Government to this moment, 
my conduct has exemplified that opinion, that the power of 
making Treaties is exclusively vested in the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided 2-3 
of the Senators present concur; and that every Treaty so made, 
and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land. 
As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my under-
standing, that the assent of the House of Representatives is 
not necessary to the validi t.y of a Treaty; as the Treaty 
with Great Britain exhibits in itself all the objects requiring 
Legislative provision. And these papers called for can throw 
no light; and it is essentiql to the due administration of the 
Government, that the boundaries fixed by the constitution 
between the different departments should be preserved - a just 
regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under 
all the circumstances of this ease, forbid a compliance with 
your request. 
G. Washington 
United States, March 30, 1796. 
This was taken from T. Benton's Abridgment of the Debates of 
Congress, 693. 
APPENDIX - IV 
PRIVATE LETTER FROM WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON 
REGARDING THE REQ.UE3T FOR THE PAPERS 
FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
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PHILADELPHIA, 31 March, 1796. 
MY DEAR SIR, 
From the first moment, and from the fullest 
conviction in my own mind, I had resolved to resist the 
principle , whiah was evidently intended to be established 
by the call of the Ho. of Representatives; and only de-
liberated on the in which this could be done with the 
least bad consequences. 
To effeot this, three modes presen~e4 themselves 
to me. lst, a denial of the Papers in toto, assigning 
concise but cogent reasons for that denial; 2d, to grant 
them in whole; or, 3d, in part; aeoompani ed with a pointed 
protest against the right of the House to controul 
treaties, or to aall for Papers without specifying their 
object, and against the compliance being drawn into prece-
dent. 
I had as little hesitation in deciding, that the 
first was the most tenable ground; but, from the peculiar 
circumstano.es of this case, 1~ merited consideration, 
if the principle could be saved, whether f~cility in the 
provisions might not result from a compliance. An attentiv 
examination, however, of the Papers and the subject, 
soon convinced me that to furnish all the Papers would 
be highly improper, and that a partril delivery of them 
would leave the door open for as much calumny as the 
entire refusal -perhaps more so - as it might, and I 
have no doubt would be said, that all such as were 
essential to the purposes of the House were withheld. 
This is quoted from Washington- Writings, 181. 
APPENDIX- V 
ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
OF 'rHE TREATY AB PRESENTED BY 
(1} 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6} 
{1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
EDMUND RANDOLPH 
Advantages: 
Old bickerings were settled; 
except for impresament. 
Indian wars were at an end; 
they were started by Britain 
New opportunities were presented 
for extending trade. 
Ports were surrendered by 
the British. 
Captures of American vessels 
were to be compensated (later 
on by decision of a committee). 
Britain was interested in securing 
to the United States the use of 
the Mississippi River. 
Disadvantages: 
Loss of negroes and compensation 
for them. 
Assumption o~ debts due to 
British creditors. 
Lands may be taken from the 
United States by the indulgence 
of the British settlers. 
Situation of provisions being 
listed as contraband. 
-186-
Doubtful Advantages: 
(1) East India trade. 
(2) European trade not too 
doubtful, but or peculiar 
advantage. 
Recommended Ratification: 
{l) Non-interruption of commerce. 
{2) cannot be thrown into foreign 
politics by the outrages or 
another. 
{3) Some prospect of extending 
.Am.eri can commerce with the 
Briti~ dominions. 
(4) Cannot be on ill terms with 
France or Britain. 
Dissuades Rejection: 
(l) Latitude of authority with 
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which Jay was vested, and his not 
having exceeded it. 
(2) 
(3) 
{4) 
(5) 
{6) 
Little expectation of obtaining 
a much better treaty. 
Possibility or convulsions with 
France, and re-inspiring Great 
Britain's former arrogance. 
Impression which a refusal to. 
ratify would make on the public 
national character - not all 
the advantages were on one side. 
Postpon~ent or the surrender 
of the posts. 
Exposure of 20 senators to 
assault. It was a victory of 
the minority in the Senate. 
This was given by"Edmund Randolph on the British Treaty, 
1795", The American Historical Review, Macmillan Co., 
New York, 1907, XII, October 1906 to July 1907. 
APPENDIX - VI 
EVALUATION OF THE TREATY ACCORDING TO 
A. J. DALLAS 
.. 188-
1. Origin and Progress of the Negotiation. 
2. Nothing was settled by the Treaty. 
5. Treaty contained a colorable but no real 
reciprocity. 
4. The treaty was an instrument of party. 
5. Treaty violated the general principles of 
neutrality and was in collision with possible 
previous arrangements whieh subsisted between 
America and France. 
a. Britain gained time and an opportunity 
to turn the war in her favor. 
b. Britain gained supplies ror her 
West ·India colonies during the war. 
c. Britain gained the advantage over 
France by prohibiting the exportatimn 
of sugar, thus Frenoh colonies would 
remain without supplies. 
d. Another gain of Britain's was that 
her vessels, to any extent of tonnage, 
could carry on the West India trade 
and supply domestic and European 
engagements. 
e. They could use American ports for 
asylum. 
6. The Treaty was calculated to injure the united 
states in the friendship and favor of other 
foreign nations. 
7. The Treaty is impolitic and pernicious in 
respect to domestic interests and the happiness 
of the United States. 
a. The British Treaty and the Constitution of the 
United states were at war with ~ch other. 
This was taken from A.J. Dallas, "Features of Mr. Jay's 
Treaty", Life and Writinfs of Alexander J. Dallas, 
ed. by George Mifflin Da las, J".B. Lippincott & Co., 
Philadelphia, 1871. 
APPENDIX - VII 
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C01WARISON OF THE ACTUAL STATE AND THE 
STATE ACCORDING TO THE TREATY 
BY A. J. DALLAS 
Actual state - American ships of any size could 
go to the West Indies. 
By Treaty - American ships o:r seventy tons 
burden were permitted. 
Actual state - Load molasses to any port in 
the world. 
By Treaty - Prohibited the shipping of 
molasses to any port. 
Actual state - Regulate commerce to encourage 
one nation and discourage another. 
By Treaty - Abandoned this right, for there 
was to be no duty on British goods. 
Actual state - Freedom of navigation to the 
British dominion in East India. 
By Treaty - America was admitted to the East 
India dominion, but was prohibited 
from carrying on the coasting trade. 
Actual state - Provisions were not contraband. 
By Treaty - Provisions were deemed contraband 
of war. 
Actual State - Free ships-free goods. 
By Treaty - America waived this claim and 
accepted the old principle, 
enemy ships-enemy goods. 
Actual State - American ports were opened to 
prizes made on Rri tain by France. 
By Treaty - American ports were only open to 
Britain and shut to the prizes taken 
from Britain and Spain. 
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Actual state - America eould freely enter British 
ports in the West Indies and Europe. 
By Treaty - American vessels were allowed only 
to the ports that were unrestricted 
by Britain. 
This also was taken from A.J. Dallas "Features of 
Mr. Jay's Treaty"~ 
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Albert B. Hart, Manua1 of American History, Diplomacf 
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Very excellent for a bibliography, and in 
preparation for lectures. 
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of American History, Ginn and co., Boston, 1896. 
Bibliographical gu.ide arranged according to 
topics in American History. 
Samuel Bemis and Grace Gordon, Gu.ide to the Dip1omatic 
History of the United States 1775-1921, United states 
Government Printing Offiee, washington, 1935 •. 
Annotated bibliography classified chrono-
logically according to topics. 
SOURCE MATERIAL 
Diary of John ~uincy Adamsy 1794-1~5, ed. by Allan Nevin , 
Longmans Green & Co., New ork, 1928, 1-17. 
Little factual material on neutrality or the 
:Jay Treaty, but is good for Adams' opinion 
of :Jay's work in London. 
Very good·source material especially con-
cerning neutrality and the :Jay Treaty -
although most of the letters in this volume 
have been reproduced in the writings of 
the important men of the period. It is 
good to compare the reproductions with 
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the originals for the purpose of authenticity. 
Documents Accompan{ing A Message o~ the President of 
th£ United States o Congress of the Fifth of December, 
1793, Relative to Great Britain, Printed by order ot 
the House of Representatives, February 10, 1806, A.G. 
Way, Washington, 1806. 
Contains the letters that transpired between 
Jefferson and Pinekney over the British Orders 
in Council. Presents many new provisions of 
the orders not found in other works. Also 
valuable because it presents Jefferson's · 
viewpoints on the orders through his letters. 
Observations on Certain Documents, Duane's Printed 
Collection, Philadelphia, 1814. 
Valuable for defining neutral rights, and is 
written by T. Schlegel. Also contains Hamilton's 
o~servations, but not too valuable for topics 
that were under consideration. 
Documentarz source Book of American History, ed. by 
William MacDonald, Third Edition, Macmillan co., New York 
1926' 243-257. 
Presented the text of the proclamation 
of neutrality, and the provisions of 
the Jay Treaty. There was no discussion 
of them, but an excellent list of references 
was given. 
Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy, ed. by 
Freeman snow, Boston Book co., Boston, 1894, 68-73. 
Th.is also was a presentation of the articles 
of the Jay Treaty. All of these references 
were used in order to obtain an accurate 
account of the treaty. 
Treaties Made between Great Britain and the United 
States from the Year 1783 to 1914, Parker & Bliss, 
Tray, 1915, 7-24. 
The treaties presented here were supposed 
to be transcribed from the officia~ documents. 
It was useful for the comparison and authen-
ticity of other works. 
Jonathan E~iot, The American Diplomatic Code, Embracin~ 
a Collection of Treaties and convention.a between the 
United States and Foreign Powers 1778 to 1834, Jonathan 
Eliot Jr., Washington, 1834, 242-268. 
All treaties were listed chronologically 
according to the country with whom they 
were made. It was also a concise diplomatic 
guide. 
Carl R. Fish and Victor Alberg, Foundations of American 
Neutralitb, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 
1922, 1-o • 
The authors presented source materia~ 
concerned with neutrality. American 
neutrality with France was discussed 
very thoroughly. It also contained the 
correspondence between Jefferson and 
Washington. 
This book was important for the Pacificus 
letters regarding neutrality. It was a 
defense of the document as would be expected. 
Hamilton defended the right of the executive 
to issue the document, and condemned the 
French people for executing their king. 
He disavowed any duty that the United States 
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would have to France. It was very pro-English. 
Number four of the letters dealt in vague 
generalities, and seemed very incidental to 
the other letters. Throughout the letters 
the author stressed the powers of the ex-
ecutive, while he toned down the powers of 
the legislature. This would indicate to a 
small degree the monarchial tendencies of 
Hamilton. 
Alexander Hamilton, A Defence of the Treaty of Amitl, 
Commerce, and Navigation, entered into between the 
United States of America and Great Britain as it appearea 
in the papers under the Sl~ature of Camillus, Franols 
Childs & Co., New York, 17 • 
Only the first twenty-five of the thirty-
eight letters appear in this work. The others 
were written at a later d~te. The book was 
written in the old English, thus it was very 
difficult to read. Since it was the original, 
it was valuable for comparing reprints .to 
ascertain authenticity. 
The Works of Alexander Hamiltonj Comprising his Corre-
fiondenoe and his Political and Official Writinss 
elusive of the Federalist, ed. by John Hamilton, 
Charles S. Francis & Co., New York, 1851, VII, 175-528. 
This work contained the entire collection 
of the Camillus letters. Hamilton wrote a 
defense of the treaty, in concert with 
Rufus King and John Jay. Numbers 23-30 
were written by Rufus King excepting the 
part in the brackets, which was Hamilton's 
work. These letters were authentic because 
they were compared with the original inthe 
work listed above, and they compared exactly. 
Hamilton was supposedly appealing to 
the common people, but he did a very poor job of it. In many instances he wrote in 
abstractions. The style of writing, however, 
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was the very best. His ideas and language 
would not appeal to the common people, however. 
It seamed as though it were written by an 
Englishman, for he defended England on every 
ground, while he condemned the United states. 
He relied on the principles of international 
law, but the laws quoted were seemingly laws 
of expediency - or the ones that further 
proved his point~ These essays were considered 
the greatest of Hamilton's controversial 
essays. 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. by WQrthington 
Ford, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1899, VI and VII. 
Jefferson's viewpoint regarding the Jay Treaty 
and neutrality were the parts or this work 
that were consulted. Jefferson was critical 
of neutrality and the treaty. This was very 
·evident in his writings. His condemnation 
of the treaty was very general. 
The Complete Jefferson, ed. by Saul Padover, Duell, 
Sloan & Pearce Inc., New York, 1943. 
This was a one volume Jefferson library, for 
the author has brought together the major 
writings of Jefferson. The only writings 
that were omitted were his letters. It was 
arranged according to the subject matter. 
It could be read for pleasure or consulted 
for reference. It dealt mostly with French 
affairs regarding neutrality. There was a 
discrepancy in the spelling of the word 
"negotiation". 
The American Remembrancer: or an Impartial Collection 
of Essays, Resolves, Spee()hes, Relative or having 
Affinity to the Treatt with Great Britain, Printed by 
Henry Tuckness for Ma hew Carey, Philadelphia, November, 
1795, I - II - III. 
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This was a presentationof all essays both 
pro and con regarding the treaty. The author 
pledged himself to observe the strictest 
impartiality in collecting these essays. 
He presented the various memorials and 
memorandums which the people composed 
throughout the country. The essays of the 
many writers were also presented in their 
entirety. This work was invaluable, especially 
for the chapter pertaining to the treaty and 
the public. This was an excellent work. 
Correspondence and Publie Papers of dOhn Jay, 1794-
1826, ed. by Henry Johnston, G.P. Putnam's sons-;---
~York, 1893, IV, 1-233. 
Mr. Johnston edited the oorrespo~dence 
between Jay and the home office during 
the negotiations. Jay's instructions were 
reprinted. There was no correspondence 
included regarding the armed neutrality, 
whether this omission was intentional or 
not could not be determined by this author. 
William Jay, The Life of John Jay, J.J. Harper, New York, 
1833, I - II, 271-384. 
Since this biography was written by Jay's 
son, he naturally was inclined to write 
favorably about his father. It was not 
written from the viewpoint of a state~ 
but from a man. He defended everything 
that Jay did. Jay's correspondence was 
also included. 
Thomas Benton, Abridgment of the Debates of Confress, 
from 1784 to 1856, from Gales and seaton's Anna s of 
Congress; from their Register of Debates , and from 
the Official Reported Debates, by Johri c. Rivis, 
D. Appleton Co., New York, 1857, I, 639-754. 
This book was an abridgment of the im-
portant debates in Congress. It was 
copied directly from the Annals, and 
when compared for authenticity, it was 
copied verbatim. It was valuable in 
obtaining the most important debates 
regarding the treaty. The selections 
were pertinent to the treaty. Gave a 
very accurate picture of the treaty as 
it was .discussed in the House. 
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The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United 
States; Wlth an .Appendlxt contain1ng ImJ>ortan't state 
Papers and Public Documents, and all. the Laws o:r a 
Public Nature; with a Copious Index, Fourth Congress, 
First Session, Com~romising the Period from December 7, 
l795 to dune 1, 17_6, Inclusive, Gales and seaton, 
Washington, l849, 426-783, 969-1264. 
This was a very authentic study and presentation 
of all of the debates in Congress. It was very 
comprehensive, especially of the Jay Treaty. 
The authors presented all the information that 
was attainable in the House, and it was very 
accurate. This was the best source of information 
on the treaty as it was discussed in the House. 
The material given was sufficient, for it was 
an unbiased work, therefore, the reader was able 
to draw many logical conclusions. It was 
merely a presentation of material, for no 
viewpoints of the authDrs' were given. 
dournal of the Executive Proceedings of the senate of 
the United states of Ameriea; from the Commencement 
of the First, to the Termination of the Nineteenth 
Congress, l789-l805 1 printed by Duff Green, Washington, 
l828, I, 176-192. 
This journal was similar to the Annals, for 
it presented the discussion (as much as was 
attainable1 of the senate on the treaty. Since 
the Annals contained the same information, it 
was easy to compare the two for verification. 
-199-
~hey were exactly similar. The debates that 
took place were not published, because of the 
secret resolution that was imposed on the 
Senate. The various resolutions that were 
proposed were presented in their chronological 
sequence. Even from this scant bit of material 
it was possible to gain a thorough knowledge 
of this aspect of the treaty. 
The Writings of Geor~e Washington, ed. by Worthington 
C. Ford, G.P. Putnam s Sons, New York, 1889-1893, XII -
XIII, 1794-1798, 1-222. 
As the title indicated this was a compilation 
of the letters of Washi~gton to various people. 
It was especially useful in obtaining the 
president's views on the treaty. His various 
decisions about the document were based upon his 
own opinions of it. It was especially good for 
his reasons for denying the papers to the House. 
His private letters would clearly show his 
sentiments, and since they were not intended 
for publication, were very enlightening. 
The Writings of George Washington; being his Correspondenc~ 
Addresses, Messages, and o_!her Papers, offJ.cJ.al and 
private with a Life of the Author, ed. by Jared Sparks, 
American stationers co., Boston, 1837, XII. 
This work was exactly similar to that of 
Professor Ford, thus it again was useful 
in making a comparison between the two 
for authenticity. 
John Marshall, The Life of George washington, Commander 
in Chief of the American Forces, and First President of 
the United States,_c.P. Wayne, Philadelphia, 180'7, v .. 
Although this was a good account of 
Washington's life, it was not too detailed 
an account of the president's viewpoints. 
Regarding the treaty, Marshall presented his 
own views. He quoted from Washington's letters 
without using the source of his material. 
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'l1he Writings of James Iv!adison, Comprising his Public 
Papers and his Private Correspondence~ including Letters 
and Documents, now for the first time pri~ted, ed. by 
Gaillard Hunt, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1905, VI, 
1790-1802, 230-296. 
All of Madison's letters were critical of 
the treaty. In a few letters Madison's 
Ehglish could definitely be questioned. 
In the one quoted in this work, the 
spelling and punctuation were copied 
exactly as they were printed in this 
work. His arguments were well presented 
and show much study. It was valuable 
for the reaction of the public. Madison must 
have obtained some information showing 
that the merchants of Philadelphia were 
bribed to sanction the treaty. He did not 
state where he received this, but from 
his letters it seemed to be true. 
The Writings of James Monroe, Including a Collection of 
his Public and Private Pa~ers and Correspondence now tor 
the first time printed, e • by stanislaus M. Hamilton, 
G.P. Putnam's sons, New York, 1899, II, 1794-1796. 
Monroe dealt more with Franee with regard 
to this treaty. Since he was the American 
Minister to France at the time the treaty 
was consummated, his reaction to it would 
be influenced by his connection with that 
country. 
The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King~ Comprising 
his Letters, Private and Official, his FU:Iic Doeumenta 
and. his S;peeahes, ed. by Charles R. King, G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, New York, 1894, I, 501-576, II, 1-67. 
Volume I was not too valuable. Volume II was 
important for a dissuasion of the treaty in 
the senate and the House. Since King was an 
important senator, he gave some idea of what 
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went on within the closed chamber. Too 
much material was not published. The book 
contained correspondence from others to 
King, and from King to others. His views 
were very rarely given, so these works 
were not too valuable from that standpoint. 
The correspondence was not arranged in 
chronological or topical sequence, and this 
limited the value of the work. 
Works of Fi$her Ames with a Selection !rom his Speeches 
and Correslondence, ed. by seth Ames, William Gowans, 
New York, 869, I - II. 
Volume I contained the correspondence of 
Ames, and was not too valuable tor the 
work under consideration. Volume II contained 
his important speech regarding the treaty in 
the House in April of 1795. From this speech 
Mr. Ames presented his arguments for passing 
the neces•ary appropriations for carrying the 
treaty into effect. His arguments were 
tautological, in that, they were exactly 
the same though disguised by other details. 
He briefly discussed the provisions of the 
treaty - all details were omitted. In many 
instances he spoke in generalities, and his 
appeal to patriotism was very clear throughout 
the entire speech. The language and choice 
of words were very fine. He sounded, however, 
like a typical politician in action. He also 
indulged in a good deal of self pity. 
James Callender, Annual Re~ister or Historical M~oirs 
of the United States for t e ;ear 1796, Brown and Mador, 
Philadelphia, January i9, 179 , 255-287. 
This was the register of the events of 
each year. The author was opposed to the 
president and the treaty. He was especially 
critical of Washington, and in criticizing 
the president, the author showed his anti-
federal sentiments. 
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Alexander J. Dallas, "Features of' Mr. Jay's Treaty", 
Life and Writings of Alexander J. -Dallas, ed. by 
George Mifflin Dallas, J.B. Lippincott&. Co., Phila-
delphia, 1871, 160-210. 
The author was much opposed to the treaty, 
and presented a critical evaluation of' the 
document. His organization of his criticism 
was very well carried out, and showed much 
thought. A part of the author's work was 
given in the Appendix of this work (see 
Appendix VI and VII). 
Noah Webster or Curtius, "Vindication of the Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, with Great Britain", 
A Collection of Papers on Political, Literary± and Moral 
Subjects, Webster and Clark, New York, 1843, 79-224. 
These essays, vindicating the treaty, were 
written for the New York Minerva in 1795. 
The author, writing under the pen name "Curtius", 
criticized the arguments presented by "Decius". Mr. Webster•s arguments were very weak, and no 
authentic proofsfor his statements were given. 
His arguments were the least convincing of all 
the men who wrote pro and con on this subject. 
It seemed that he did not do too mueh research 
before writing. 
"Edmund Randolph on the British Treaty, 1795", The 
American Historical Review, Macmillan co., New York, 
1907, XII, October l906 to July 1907, 587-599. 
This work contained letters and messages 
of Edmund Randolph regarding the treaty. 
He presented a very thorough review of 
his views. The letters were sent to the 
Review by Mr. Ford. The first three letters 
were and still are in the Library of Congress. 
It was valuable for a review of the treaty, 
and as it affected the constitutionality of 
the additional article that the senate composed. 
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Oliver Wolcott, British Influence on t.he Atf'airs of' the 
United States Proved and Explained, Young and Minis, 
Boston, 1804, l-23. 
This book was signed "Marcustt, who was in 
reality Oliver Wolcott. Wolcott succeeded 
Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury. 
Although it was supposed to be a study of 
the after effects of Jay's Treaty, it really 
was a condemnation of the state of Virginia, 
for her action regarding the question of the 
British debts. The author was very critical 
of Jefferson, but this can be understood, 
in that, the author was a follower of Hamilton. 
Col. Timothy Pickering, Letters Addressed to the People 
of the United states of' America on the Conduct of the 
Past and Presen~ Administrations of the American Govern-
ment, towards Great Britain and France, Longman, Hurst, 
Reea, Orme & Brown, London, l8ll, 1-168. 
For the most part this book dealt with 
a later period, but was of some value 
in this study. The author was critical 
of Jefferson and France. 
Henry c. Lodge, War Addresses; 1915-1917, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., Boston, 1917, 11 -136. 
This was a publication of a series 
of lectures given by the author. He 
discussed neutrality, but seemed very 
idealistic about Washington. He did not 
present any new ideas or views. 
Macall Medford, Oil without Vinegar, and Di__gnit~ without 
Pride; or Britis~ Amerlcan and West-Ind1a In~erests 
Considered, W.J. & J. Richardson, London, 1807, 1-87. 
The author dealt with the e:conomic aspects of 
the West Indian trade. It was not biased, and 
was written a little after the period of the 
Jay Treaty, thus it was a contemporary point 
of view. He forecasted war, and its effects on 
Britain and America. 
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